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This thesis examines, comparatively, patterns of welfare provisions in 
the East Asian NICs (newly industrialising countries) and the OECD 
(the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) 
countries. It is based on the analysis of secondary data. The concept of 
'the welfare state' is historically and culturally specific. It has been used 
for a half century, but such usage is inconsistent. Most analytical 
approaches to the development of 'the welfare state' do not capture the 
dynamics of the relationship between the state and civil society because 
the concept of 'the welfare state' is used in a static manner. If we wish 
to understand the development of welfare in the East Asian NICs a 
better analytic concept is that of 'welfare configuration'. It covers both 
the services provided by the state, and by various sectors of civil 
society. The study compares welfare configurations in the East Asian 
NICs and selected OECD countries with specific reference to education 
and child care provisions. Particular attention, is paid to historical 
developments and changing social, economic and cultural forces. Four 
models of welfare configurations are suggested, taking into 
consideration: (a) type of welfare (education, child care etc.); (b) changes 
in welfare provision over time; and (c) government policy. It is argued 
that different welfare configurations are a result of different 
relationships between the state and civil society. The low involvement 
of the state in welfare in the East Asian NICs in comparison with the 
OECD countries is a function of a weaker civil society and stronger 
state power in those countries. This differential strength of civil society 
is related to the historical development of these nations and their 
geopolitical location. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis investigates the question of why the development of 
welfare is different in the East Asian newly industrialising countries 
(NICs) I when compared to the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries The welfare 
'configurations' of the East Asian NICs and the OECD countries are 
analysed over the past two decades. It is argued that different welfare 
configurations are a result of different relationships between the state 
and civil society in different countries. In particular the low 
involvement of the state in welfare in the East Asian NICs in 
comparison with the OECD countries is a function of a weaker civil 
society and stronger state power in those countries. This differential 
strength of civil society is related to the historical development of 
these nations and their geopolitical location. 
Research Problem 
'The Welfare State' arose in a rather ad hoc fashion to deal with the 
advanced western countries' social problems. The expansion of 'the 
welfare state', however, was increasingly challenged after the mid-
1970s, after which an anti-welfare state upsurge appeared in the 1980s. 
The crisis in 'the welfare state' not only caused many countries to 
adopt some defensive or reconstructive steps, but also paved the way 
for discourses that attempted to find a way out for 'the welfare state' 
(Alber 1988b; Culpitt 1992; Gordon and Katznelson 1988; Johnson 1987, 
1989, 1990a, 1990b; Kamerman and Kahn 1989; Mishra 1984; OECD 1981; 
Offe 1984; Rosanvallon 1988b; Sachs 1982; Shiratori 1986). 
In recent years, at least a dozen concepts have been constructed 
and discussed as possible substitutes for the traditional concept of 'the 
welfare state' (Abrahamson 1991; Berger 1990; Gilbert and Gilbert 1989; 
Glazer 1984; Gronbjerg 1982; Halsey 1981; Heclo 1981; Himmelstrand et. 
al 1981; Jones 1985a, 1985b; Johnson 1987, 1989, 1990a, 1990b; Kamerman 
1983; Kamerman and Kahn 1989; Kramer 1985; Le Grand and Estrin 
1 South Korea will become a member of the OECD in 1996. Singapore has just been 
reclassified by the OECD as a 'developed' country. See OECD 1994a: 9, and The 
Economist, January 13th 1996: 27. 
1989; Le Grand and Robinson 1984; Mishra 1984, 1990; Papadakis and 
Taylor-Gooby 1987; Pinker 1992; Poole 1985; Quadagno 1984; Robson 
1976; Taylor-Gooby 1986). A common feature in all these discussions is 
that the role of government in welfare provision could be 
supplemented, or even replaced, by non-government agencies. 
The concept of 'the welfare state' has been used for a half century, 
but usage is inconsistent (Alber 1988a: 451; Alber, Esping-Andersen and 
Rainwater 1987: 461; Graycar and Jamrozik 1993: 1-9). This 
inconsistency is caused by the inadequate consideration of the 
relationship between the state and civil society. There are two 
prominent limitations of the models/typologies of welfare state 
regimes so far provided. One is that they stress state welfare; the other 
is that they focus on advanced capitalist societies, especially on OECD 
countries. This also leads to what Jones (1993: 214) has called 'very 
much a Western welfare capitalist typology'. 
Further, current theories of welfare development have been 
formulated by Western scholars to account for the expansion of 'the 
welfare state'. Such theories are almost exclusively based on the 
experiences of developed Western countries and on state welfare 
provision (eg. Collier and Messick 1975; Korpi 1978, 1983; Gough 1979; 
Mishra 1981; O'Connor 1973; Offe 1984; Skocpol 1985a, 1988, 1992, 1993; 
Wilensky 1975). They ignore the experiences of the developing 
countries. 
The origins of the East Asian NICs social welfare institutions are 
similar to those of developing countries. While some differences 
between the East Asian NICs exist, the similarities in welfare 
development in these countries outweigh the differences. They share 
the same level of development, they entered the rank of NICs in the 
1970s, and they posses a strong state and weak civil society. These social 
forces together have shaped the development of welfare in the East 
Asian NICs since the post war era. In these societies the family or 
kinship system plays a larger or more important role in welfare 
provision, albeit it is more difficult to measure. This role is likely to 
continue, perhaps with state supplementation. 
Both the state and civil society in the East Asian NICs have been 
undergoing dramatic political, economic, and social changes in the past 
40 years. Recently, the changing relationship between the state and 
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civil society has become increasingly apparent. Since the 1980s, with 
the development of civil society and democratisation the state cannot 
but introduce more welfare measures to maintain its political 
legitimacy and economic growth. In this sense, the different 
experiences of welfare development in the East Asian NICs challenge 
not only current theories of welfare development but also the 
models/typologies of 'the welfare state'. 
In economic terms the development of the East Asian NICs has 
been described as a 'miracle'. Economic policies in these four NICs 
have been widely discussed, but their social welfare policies have been 
given little attention during this process. The development 
experienced by these countries cannot be understood without 
considering social welfare. The analysis of the East Asian NICs' welfare 
development, undertaken in this thesis, will fill this research gap. 
The thesis argues that the concept of 'the welfare state' is 
historically and culturally specific. Different welfare development in 
different countries is best understood by examining the relationship 
between the state and civil society in relation to welfare provision. 
Neglecting the welfare provisions of various sectors of civil society 
creates an exaggerated picture of the divergence between countries in 
the extent of their welfare provision. If we wish to understand the 
development of welfare in the East Asian NICs, the concept of 'the 
welfare state' is not relevant and not useful. A more useful analytic 
concept is that of 'welfare configuration'. That is a description of the 
differing involvement of the state and various sectors of civil society 
in welfare provision. If we talk, from the welfare provision 
perspective, about different 'types' of societies, then we will find 
different models of welfare configurations existing in different 
societies. 
Plan of the Thesis 
This thesis illustrates the centrality of an understanding of the 
relationship between the state and civil society for the welfare 
configurations that emerge in both the East Asian NICs and OECD 
countries. A welfare configuration is the outcome of interaction 
between the state and civil society in welfare provision. Particular 
attention is paid to changing social, economic and cultural forces in 
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different historical contexts. Taking state welfare intervention, type of 
welfare, and changes in welfare provision over the last two decades 
into account, four models of welfare configurations are suggested. 
By reviewing recent literature on existing typologies of welfare 
state regimes, it is argued in Chapter One that focusing on the OECD 
countries and emphasising the welfare provision of the state sector, 
rather than of various sectors of civil society, produces limited 
typologies of 'the welfare state'. A more comprehensive perspective is 
needed if we are to compare welfare provision in different countries, 
and the concept of welfare configuration is introduced and defined to 
analyse welfare provision in the East Asian NICs and OECD countries. 
The relationship between the state and civil society is important 
to understanding welfare development in different countries. Chapter 
Two focuses on the roles of the state and civil society and their 
relationship by exploring classical and contemporary debates on the 
state and civil society. 
Chapter Three elucidates and presents an analytical framework of 
the relationship between the state and civil society in welfare 
provision. By drawing attention to the welfare state-society relation, 
this chapter develops and uses the notion of 'welfare configuration'. 
This notion provides a better approach for understanding different 
welfare developments in different countries. 
Chapter Four describes state development and the place of 
welfare in the East Asian NICs, and compares welfare expenditures 
and structure in the East Asian NICs and OECD countries. It shows that 
in any cross-national comparison it is impossible to neglect the 
historical processes of interplay between the state and civil society. 
Analyses of state welfare (public expenditures) alone tend to produce a 
distorted picture of policy outcomes. A fuller understanding can only 
be provided by examining the welfare configurations produced by the 
interaction of the state and various sectors of civil society. 
Chapters Five and Six demonstrate that in the East Asian NICs 
and OECD countries there are different welfare configurations, using as 
examples the provision of education and child care. Chapter Five 
explores welfare configurations by examining education in Australia, 
Sweden, the USA, Singapore and Taiwan. Chapter Six examines and 
explains welfare configurations of child care provision in the East 
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Asian NICs (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) and the 
five OECD countries (Australia, Japan, Sweden, the UK and the USA). 
In both Chapter Five and Chapter Six the countries used in the 
comparisons are from the OECD countries and the East Asian NICs. 
However some different countries are used in each chapters. The 
decision on which countries to compare was made on the basis of an 
assessment of both the availability and reliability of the data sources. 
The family as a provider of child care in the East Asian countries is 
stronger than in the Western OECD counterparts. A comparison of 
welfare configurations of education and child care provision in these 
countries shows that the state and various sectors of civil society share 
the responsibility of welfare to varying degrees. 
Chapter Seven focuses on the differences demonstrated in 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 by analysing the history of welfare development in 
these countries in order to explain why welfare development is 
different in the East Asian NICs compared to the OECD countries. The 
different articulation between the state and civil society among these 
countries is, to an important extent, a key to account for these 
differences. More specifically, the East Asian NICs and the OECD 
countries exhibit their differences along five dimensions. They include 
the construction of civil society, the role of trade unions, the extent of 
the development of social citizenship, the direction of development 
strategy and the influence of the external environment. 
In the concluding chapter, the thesis returns to the key question 
of why welfare development is different in the East Asian NICs 
compared to the OECD countries, and addresses changes and 




'THE WELFARE STATE' 
There have recently been several works which seek to classify welfare 
states into different types. These models and typologies are mostly 
generated from 'ideal-type' classifications derived from empirical 
cross-national or comparative studies on advanced welfare states (eg. 
Flora 1986; Esping-Andersen 1990; Mishra 1990; Pfaller et al. 1991; 
Ginsburg 1992). They are based on the historical outcomes of the 
developmental experiences of advanced welfare state regimes, OECD 
countries in particular. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to review this recent 
literature on the typologies of welfare state regimes and point to a new 
typology. First, Bismarck and Beveridge's two models of the welfare 
state before 1945 are described. Second, the typologies of welfare state 
regimes from the early post-war era to the mid-1970s (the welfare state 
in crisis) are explored. Third, I discuss the typologies of the 'post-crisis' 
welfare state, particularly after the 1980s. Finally, a more 
comprehensive perspective for comparing welfare provision in 
different countries is presented. 
Models of the Welfare State Before 1945: 
From Bismarck to Beveridge 
Bismarck: The Original Model of the Welfare State 
Widely seen as the starting-point of the welfare state is the German 
social insurance arrangement developed at the end of the 19th century. 
In 1881, the German Emperor proclaimed that he wanted to create 
something valuable for the workers but also their masters. His strategy 
was to maintain social order by granting social insurance against the 
risks of occupational injury, invalidity and illness and old age. His 
Chancellor, Pince Otto von Bismarck, implemented these policies 
(Olsson et al. 1993: 17). 
Essentially, this model was based on the nation-building ideals of 
the Second Reich, in which social insurance was used to strengthen the 
then independent states into a single administration, boost its 
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international industrial and military status, and dissolve the threat to 
the regime from industrial workers. The Bismarckian social insurance 
schemes were highly political, a typical feature of them being their 
selectivity or corporatism, with the aim of covering industrial workers 
as a social category with a common interest. Therefore, it is difficult to 
say that the Bismarckian social insurance schemes regarded industrial 
workers as a collective, and sought to bring employees and employers 
together with the state as a third partner. Rather, 'the proposal,... grew 
out of practical experience of voluntary, and to some extent, company 
sponsored insurance schemes, supplemented with analytical work by, 
in particular, German state theorists' (Olsson et al. 1993: 17). 
Beveridge: The Paradigm Model of the Welfare State 
The 'Beveridge Report', Social Insurance and Allied Services, was 
published in Britain in 1942 and became the paradigm model for the 
post-war welfare state. However, as a system of truly national 
insurance which provided a safety-net for all, it was only one step 
towards the alleviation of poverty and other social ills (Riley 1992: 197). 
As its author claimed: 
Social insurance fully developed may provide income security: it 
is an attack upon Want. But Want is one only of five giants on 
the road of reconstruction and in some ways the easiest to attack. 
The others are Disease, Ignorance, Squalor, and Idleness. ... The 
State should offer security for service and contribution. The State 
in organising security should not stifle incentive, opportunity, 
responsibility: in establishing a national minimum, it should 
leave room and encouragement for voluntary action by each 
individual to provide more than that minimum for himself and 
his family. (Beveridge 1942: 6) 
Beveridge's claim to be regarded as one of the founding fathers of the 
British welfare state rests on much more than his Report of 1942 (Lynes 
1984: 90). In Full Employment in a Free Society, which constructed the 
second part of his national plan for citizenship and outlined a detailed 
illustration of the policies needed to prevent unemployment in 
postwar Britain, Beveridge (1944: 36) was so convinced of the necessity 
of government action that he asserted, 'Full employment cannot be 
won and held without a great extension of the responsibilities and 
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powers of the State exercised through organs of the central 
Government. Basically, the responsibilities of the state were vast and 
the notion of the welfare state was that of a social service, ensured via 
insurance (Riley 1992: 197). More importantly, the state was regarded as 
existing for all the citizens, as he alleged, 'acceptance by the state of 
responsibility for full employment is the final necessary demonstration 
that the state exists for the citizens— for all its citizens— and not for 
itself or for a privileged class' (Beveridge 1944: 252). 
Broadly, the Beveridge plan has four main features: (1) universal 
participation, (2) flat-rate benefits, (3) benefits financed from 
contributions, and (4) a national minimum. That is, it turned its 
attention from selectivity to universality whereby the individual 
members of the community as a whole should be covered by social 
insurance or security; benefits should be supplied at a flat rate; 
contributions should be flat rate; and in the form of a national 
minimum. This idea was regarded as a key step away from the 
previous system of limited public assistance (Olsson et al. 1993: 20-21). 
Beveridge's idea of universality in social security was linked to a 
subsistence level of provision. The national minimum was regarded as 
a safety net that would stimulate citizens to pursue the virtues of 
thriftl. Briefly, his goal was 'a national minimum— a minimum 
income for subsistence; a minimum of provision for children; a 
minimum of health, of housing, of education.' As Beveridge (1943: 
143, quoted in Pinker 1992: 275) argued, 'Being a minimum only it 
leaves room and incentive to individuals to add to it themselves 
according to their personal capacities and desires.' 
In his view, state intervention and self-help were not 
incompatible; rather they were complementary welfare principles. 
Beveridge contemplated and supported the future growth of 
occupational and private pension schemes. Beveridge was convinced 
of the moral and practical value of the voluntary sector, and he 
suggested that statutory assurances of subsistence would foster not only 
self-help in the private sphere, but also altruism in the voluntary 
sector. 
According to Pinker (1992: 275), 'Beveridge's insurance principle 
expressed par excellence the values of welfare pluralism insofar as it 
lie. Beveridge was obviously opposed to the idea of welfare as charity. 
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combined statutory intervention with direct personal responsibility.' 
As far as all the other vital service sectors were concerned, Beveridge 
left broad room for the development of the private and voluntary 
sectors. Pinker (1992: 276) further argues, 'Beveridge should be 
remembered as a welfare pluralist who put forward a model of service 
provision that was neither institutional nor residual. The model 
outlined in his Report is best described as a horizontally layered, mixed 
economy of welfare, in which the state guarantees a basic level of 
provision.' 
Recently, with the critique of the welfare state by the New Right, it 
is clear that 'the optimistic assumptions which underpinned the 
Beveridge Report have been under siege' (Riley 1992: 197). In fact, 
Beveridge's hopes had already tripped with the publication of the 1953 
edition of his Report. As Riley (1992: 199) comments: 'National 
Insurance benefits had already become rather inadequate, and 
increasingly they were being means-tested, rather than being given as 
of right. Within a very few years of the generally warm reception of the 
Beveridge Report, it was widely observed that the welfare state had 
huge shortcomings.' Generally speaking, many criticisms were aimed 
at Beveridge's proposals in the post-war period, since his plan did not 
recognise or provide for the needs of women, of one-parent families, 
nor for the costs of disablement. Yet, 'he deserves [credit] for 
transforming the rickety structure of prewar social security into a 
building whose foundations have proved remarkably solid' (Lynes 
1984: 97). 
Typologies of the Welfare State: 
From the Post-war to the Mid-1970s 
T. H. Marshall: The Idea of Social Citizenship 
Marshall's analysis of citizenship mainly focused on the inner logic of 
the growth of citizenship and its implications for social inequality, 
social justice and economic dynamism. For him, social citizenship 
constitutes the main idea of the welfare state. In his book Citizenship 
and Social Class, written just after the Second World War, Marshall's 
main idea was that modern universal citizenship is incompatible with 
the principle of social class, albeit that some citizen rights weaken class 
hierarchies more than others (Pixley 1992: 218). 
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Using British experience, Marshall marks the process of 
modernisation over the last three centuries as one of the general 
expansion of citizenship and identifies three kinds of rights— civil, 
political and social. He suggested that in the medieval period all rights 
depended on a person's status in the local community. As 
differentiation causes these local communities to decline, each right 
becomes governed by specialised national institutions such as the royal 
law courts (civil rights), parliament (political rights) and the poor law 
(social rights). The law, parliament and the welfare state become the 
three vital institutions in his tripartite analysis of citizenship. 
However, different rights developed in different ways and at different 
speeds. The first to emerge was civil rights, which become the basis for 
collective bargaining in the eighteenth century and in turn made 
possible the evolution of political rights, which upheld public opinion 
and national consciousness in the nineteenth century. Ultimately, 
increasing pressure to win civil and political rights made it possible for 
most people to get social rights in the twentieth century. (Marshall 
1950; Pierson 1991: 22-24; Smith 1991: 29-30) 
From historical analyses, Marshall argued that the growth of 
citizenship should give rise to a more comprehensive equality, but the 
continuities of social class would also sustain systematic inequalities. 
In the words of Marshall (1950: 31), 'it is true that class still functions. 
Social inequality is regarded as necessary and purposeful'. So, before 
the end of the nineteenth century, the growth of citizenship had little 
direct effect on social equality: 
Civil rights gave legal powers whose use was drastically curtailed 
by class prejudice and lack of economic opportunity. Political 
rights gave potential power whose exercise demanded experience, 
organisation, and a change of ideas as to the proper functions of 
government. All these took time to develop. Social rights were at 
a minimum and were not woven into the fabric of citizenship. 
(Marshall 1950: 46) 
Then, with the advance of citizenship, social rights made absolute 
class-abatement possible: 
Class-abatement is still the aim of social rights, but it has acquired 
a new meaning. It is no longer merely an attempt to abate the 
obvious nuisance of destitution in the lowest ranks of society. It 
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has assumed the guise of action modifying the whole pattern of 
social inequality. It is no longer content to raise the floor-level in 
the basement of the social edifice, leaving the superstructure as it 
was. It has begun to remodel the whole building, and it might 
even end by converting a sky-scraper into a bungalow. (Marshall 
1950: 47) 
Social rights are about the quality of life and contain education, health 
and welfare services so as to offer what Marshall (1963: 74) describes as 
'the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare 
and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to 
live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in 
the society.' In Marshall's view, the emergence of the welfare state is 
not only an historical process, but is also part of a broader progressive 
history of expanding citizenship (Pierson 1991: 23). In this account, 
civil, political and social rights build the base for full membership in 
the community or the social solidarity of modern societies (Olsson et 
al. 1993: 22). 
As individuals vary in their dominating resources, Marshall was 
aware of the pressures between the legal equality of citizenship and the 
real inequalities of the capitalist market. For him, a mixed economy 
was still the best guarantor of a welfare system which would aid 
citizenship rights. Yet he seriously queried whether citizenship rights 
within the welfare state would foster social equality. He was not overly 
concerned that the state power involved in securing social rights 
would lead to the instability of the socio-economic system. Marshall 
was thus in favour of state welfare and overlooked the role of non-
statutory benefits. 
What a welfare state could reach in terms of meeting human 
needs, for Marshall, was still a vital issue. By the end of his career, 
Marshall was giving his attention to the endless tensions between 
human needs and the dictates of a market economy (Marshall 1981; 
Riley 1992: 204). Turner argues that (1993: viii) although 'Marshall's 
research provided at best a description of the historical development of 
citizenship rights without explaining their growth', his work not only 
'provided a definition of the three dimensions of citizenship', but also 
'was influential and stimulated a significant growth of empirical 
research and conceptual elaboration.' 
Richard Titmuss: Social Division of Welfare 
Richard Titmuss was another key post-war welfare theorist whose 
ideas have had an important influence in Britain as well as in 
Scandinavia. Unlike Marshall, who believed that the expansion of 
citizenship is made possible by the achievement of social rights 
enshrined in the welfare state, Titmuss embraced increasing 
collectivism as a necessary and desirable means of reinforcing social 
integration. 
In 1958 Titmuss agreed to the phrase 'Welfare State showing up 
in his book title after considerable persuasion from his publisher, but 
he required the quotation marks to reveal that this was not his own 
description of Britain's social services. He objected to the phrase for 
three reasons — because it implied state patronage, the ultimate in 
welfare had truly been realised, and state social services were only one 
source of welfare provision to meet social needs. Titmuss (1968: 124) 
later put it, 'I did not choose this title. It was chosen for me. ... I am no 
more enamoured today of the indefinable abstraction 'The Welfare 
State' than I was some twenty years ago when ... the term acquired an 
international as well as a national popularity.' 
In an essay from his book on The Social Division of Welfare 
(1958), Titmuss argued that social welfare is not the only form of 
institutionalised commitment to human well-being. With regard to 
state welfare or statutory social provisions, there are at least three 
forms of welfare: 
First, fiscal welfare; fiscal policies through tax credits or tax 
deduction as an alternative to cash benefits; 
Second, occupational welfare; occupational benefits, from fringe 
benefits at business level to provisions via national contracts made 
through bargaining by the organisations of employees and employers; 
Third, social services, such as different kinds of voluntary 
assistance, charitable and mutual aid (Olsson et al. 1993: 23). 
Titmuss classified organised welfare into four forms: social, fiscal, 
occupational and private. For him, social welfare refers to state welfare 
or statutory services, and it has certainly been the central platform of 
the modern welfare system. This does not mean that the significance of 
occupational and private welfare should be underrated, however. In 
other words, non-statutory forms of social service serve ends 
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corresponding to those of the statutory services, but there is still a 
normative distinction between them. Indeed, we can find these four 
forms of welfare, in diverse forms and to a greater or lesser extent, in 
different welfare states, though the welfare mix differs. 
In Titmuss's view (1958: 52), the different welfare sectors bring 
about different political and moral outcomes though they may meet 
similar needs. While statutory welfare encourages unity and social 
cohesion, the whole tendency of occupational welfare is 'to divide 
loyalties, to nourish privilege and to narrow the social conscience.' As 
for the question of equity raised by occupational and fiscal welfare, 
Titmuss asks 'whether and to what extent social service dependency 
benefits should be proportionately related to occupational and income 
achievement' (1958: 52-3). 
Titmuss indicted occupational welfare, root and branch, but did 
not discuss the voluntary sector in either The Social Division of 
Welfare or The Irresponsible Society. Unconditional altruism is 
presented in the discussion of the voluntary sector and can be found in 
The Gift Relationship. Commenting on this account, Pinker (1992: 276) 
points out that 
Titmuss ... was not a welfare pluralist, and his hostility to the 
mixed economy of welfare was uncompromising. He thought that 
any significant expansion in the role of the private and voluntary 
sectors would undermine the principle of equity, increase 
inequalities and weaken social solidarity. The tenacity with which 
the principle of a unitary and institutionally dominant statutory 
welfare system has been defended within the discipline of social 
administration in Britain owes much to the influence of Titmuss. 
Indeed the issues that he raised are still relevant to the current 
debate about welfare pluralism. 
It is worth noting that Titmuss' three models of social policy come 
from a series of lectures published posthumously in 1974. He described 
the three models as: residual, industrial achievement-performance and 
institutional (1974: 30-32). All three models embrace 'consideration of 
the work ethic and the institution of the family in modern society'; but 
they also 'represent different criteria for making choices' 2 (1974: 32). 
2 These three models can be indirectly attributed to both Bismarck and Beveridge, as 
well as American experience in this field of social action (Olsson et al. 1993: 24). The 
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The industrial achievement-performance model means that 
social welfare institutions are adjuncts of the economy, and 'social 
needs should be met on the basis of merit, work performance and 
productivity' (1974: 31). This model is closest to a modern version of 
the Bismarckian model and is also the cornerstone of the persistent 
development of social security on the European content. Yet if 
compared to the institutional welfare model, it is still a 'segmented' or 
'fragmented' welfare system (Olsson et al. 1993: 25). As a classification, 
Titmuss's three models of social policy are useful, but as a typology for 
describing the welfare state it has been criticised for two basic reasons: 
first, 'most actual welfare states embrace elements of all three models', 
and secondly, 'in practice it has been used to underpin evolutionary 
accounts of the development of the welfare state from a residual 
through an industrial achievement-performance towards an 
institutional basis' (Pierson 1991: 185). 
Wilensky and Lebeaux: Residual vs Institutional Welfare 
According to Wilensky and Lebeaux (1965: 138), the residual and the 
institutional are two dominant conceptions of social welfare in 
America. The residual (or marginal) view of the role of welfare deems 
that state provisions 'should come into play only when the normal 
structures of supply, the family and the market, break down'. This 
formulation is based on the premise that an individual's needs can 
properly be met via two 'natural' (or in Titmuss' words, 'socially 
given') channels: the family and the market economy (Wilenskey and 
Lebeaux 1965: 139; Titmuss 1974: 30). 
Wilensky and Lebeaux argued that while the residual concept has 
changed since the Great Depression of 1929, it may still, and often does, 
mean a minimalist and only formalised residualist view of welfare 
(Bryson 1992: 56). As Wilensky and Lebeaux (1965: 139) argue, 'it does 
not reflect the radical social changes accompanying advanced 
industrialisation, or fully account for various aspects of contemporary 
social welfare activity.' 
An institutional view considers welfare provisions as 'normal, 
"first line" functions of modern industrial society and 'implies no 
trichotomy derived from a dichotomy: residual vs. institutional welfare, developed by 
Wilensky and Lebeaux (1965). 
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stigma, no emergency, no "abnormalcy" (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 
138-40). According to Titmuss (1974: 31), this model sees social welfare 
as a major integrated institution in society, providing universalist 
services outside the market on the principle of need'. In Wilensky and 
Lebeaux's words (1965: 140), social welfare was 'a proper, legitimate 
function of modern industrial society in helping individuals achieve 
self-fulfillment.' In this sense, Sweden is a perfect example of this 
model in the world (Mishra 1981; Johnson 1987). 
Typologies of the 'Post-crisis' Welfare State 
Esping-Andersen: The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism 
The welfare state has been approached both narrowly and broadly. 
According to Esping-Andersen (1990: 1-2), those following the 'narrow' 
approach sees it as 'the traditional terrain of social amelioration: 
income transfers and social services, with perhaps some token 
mention of the housing question.' Those who take a broader view see 
it in terms of political economy, and in their view 'issues of 
employment, wages, and overall macro-economic steering are 
considered integral components in the welfare-state complex.' In his 
book, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Esping-Andersen 
(1990) follows the broad approach, since his aim is to grasp the 'big 
picture' rather than dwell on the detailed characteristics of varied 
social programs. 
Esping-Andersen views the welfare state as a major institution in 
the construction of different models of post-war capitalism. As he puts 
it, 'to study the welfare state is... a means to understand a novel 
phenomenon in the history of capitalist societies' (Esping-Andersen, 
1990: 1) and 'to talk of "a regime" is to denote the fact that in the 
relation between state and economy a complex of legal and 
organizational features are systematically interwoven' (Esping-
Andersen, 1990: 2). This is also why he prefers to use terms such as 
'welfare capitalism' and 'welfare-state regimes'. 
According to Esping-Adersen, first, 'existing theoretical models of 
the welfare state are deficient', and second, 'only comparative 
empirical research will adequately disclose the fundamental properties 
that unite or divide modern welfare states' (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 2- 
3). He attempts to reveal how varied policy instruments lead to the 
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shaping of different welfare state regimes. The regimes which cluster 
around three ideal regime types are identified as liberal, conservative 
(or corporatist) and social democratic. In terms of their main 
characteristics and expressed according to Titmuss' typology of welfare 
models, one can summarise these three regime types from typical 
exemplars as follows (see Table 1.1). 
Table 1.1 Esping-Andersen's Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism 

















1. Assistance is 





2. Entitlement rules 
are strict, benefits are 
modest, recipients are 




3. Social reform has 
been bound by 
traditional, liberal 
work-ethic norms; 
4. The state encourages 
the market via 






1. The state fully 
ready to replace the 
market as a provider 




2. The state plays a 
key role not only in 
admitting the 
legitimacy of social 
rights but also in 
keeping class and 
status differences, so 
its redistributive 
effect is minor; 
3. In many case the 
corporatist regimes 
are shaped by the 
Church; 
4. Greatly stresses the 
role of family support. 
The state should 
support and deliver 
only when the 
family's capacity is 
unable to provide. 
Scandinavian 
countries like Norway 
& Sweden 
1. Main aim is to 
promote equality of 
the highest standards 




2. Benefits are 
graduated according to 
earnings but all strata 
are unified in a 
universal insurance 
system; 
3. The state is seen as 
the chief means of 
realising the social 
rights of all its 
citizens; 
4. The fusion of 
welfare and work 
means it is committed 
to the principle of full 
employment, and fully 
relying on its 
attainment. 
Source: Esping-Andersen 1990: 26-29. 
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Esping-Andersen (1990: 28) also recognises that 'there is no single 
pure case' in any of the three welfare state regimes. Yet, throughout the 
book, his main endeavours are focused on describing the regime types. 
It is worth noting that Esping-Andersen adds two new dimensions, de-
commodification and stratification, to the debate about welfare models 
or policy regimes. By 'de-commodification' he means the degree to 
which 'citizens can freely, and without potential loss of job, income, or 
general welfare, opt out of work when they themselves consider it 
necessary' (Esping-Andersen 1990: 23). In brief, it 'refers to the degree to 
which individuals, families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard 
of living independently of market participation' (Esping-Andersen, 
1990: 37). Stratification has a more sociological usage, but it is also 
important when considering how the welfare state impacts on the 
distribution of life-chances. In Esping-Andersen's words (1990: 58), 
'welfare states may be equally large or comprehensive, but with 
entirely different effects on social structure. One may cultivate 
hierarchy and status, another dualism, and a third universalism. Each 
case will produce its own unique fabric of social solidarity.' 
Esping-Andersen not only makes an effort to construct a typology 
of three regimes of welfare capitalism, but also tries to create three 
further measures of stratification. On the basis of the index of de-
commodification and measures of stratification, which are seen as 
being mutually upholding, he divides 18 nations into three clusters 
which correspond closely to the groups of stratification. These 
classifications are shown in Table 1.2. 
Esping-Andersen's comparative study of welfare capitalism drew 
both praise and criticism. The advantages are: 
1 He has made an important contribution to understanding the 
structure and the development of the welfare state and of its 
influence on social and political life (Papadakis 1991: 98). 
2 His study has status as a milestone that all future research on the 
welfare state will have to take as a point of reference (Huber 1992: 
555). 
3 There are many useful insights into the mechanisms peculiar to each 
country that have led to particular outcomes (Papadakis 1991: 98). 
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4 His model is the most successful attempt thus far to develop a 
quantitative approach to a class analysis of comparative social policy. 
(Ginsburg 1992: 23) 
5 His classifications provide a more interesting and differentiated 
picture of welfare provision than any relying on aggregate 
expenditure alone (Castles and Mitchell 1992: 9). 
Table 1.2 Esping-Andersen's Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism in 
Terms of De-commodification and Stratification 
De-commodification 
Low 	 Medium 	 High  
Australia Italy Austria 
United States 	 Japan 	 Belgium 
New Zealand France Netherlands 
Canada 	 Germany 	 Denmark 
Ireland Finland Norway 
United Kingdom 	Switzerland 	 Sweden 
Stratification 
Liberal 	Conservative 	Socialist 
Australia Austria Denmark 
Canada 	 Belgium 	 Finland 
Japan France Netherlands 
Switzerland 	 Germany 	 Norway 
United States Italy Sweden 
United Kingdom* 	Ireland* 	New Zealand* 
Source: Esping-Andersen 1990: Tables 2.2 and 3.3 
Note: All nations scored 'strong on their own stratification label, 
while nations marked by '*' scored 'medium'. 
The disadvantages are as follows: 
1 The interpretation and the indices used to measure the regime types 
are open to dispute (Papadakis 1991: 97). 
2 His quantitative analysis of welfare states make less of issues such as 
race and gender (Ginsburg 1992: 23). 
3 His quantitative analysis which still relies on linear models and 
cross-sectional data provides an inadequate basis for understanding 
the phenomenon of conjunctural causation and the possibility of 
multiple paths to the same outcome (Huber 1992: 555). 
4 His model has not been applied to the policy areas of health care, 
family benefits and services, education and housing. It also cannot 
account for fiscal welfare (Ginsburg 1992: 23). 
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Castles and Mitchell: Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism or Four? 
Researchers in this field, frequently motivated by the positioning of 
their country in the 'wrong' box, have expanded this approach. It is 
worth noting that, among others, Castles and Mitchell (1992) take 
Esping-Andersen's study as a starting point and question his 
conclusions. Using their empirical analysis of the linkages between 
politics (welfare effort), instruments and outcomes, Castles and 
Mitchell (1992: 2) suggest that there is 'a fourth "radical" world' to 
which several nations belong (see Tables 1.3 and 1.4). 
Table 1.3 Welfare Expenditure, Benefit Equality and Taxes 
Household Transfers 
as a Percentage of GDP 
Low 	 High 











Ireland 	 Norway 
New Zealand 	Sweden 
United Kingdom 
Income & Profit Taxes 
as a Percentage of GDP 
Low 
High 
Ireland 	 Austria 
Japan France 
Switzerland 	Germany 





New Zealand 	Sweden 
United Kingdom 
Source: Castles & Mitchell 1992, Table 2 and 3 
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Table 1.4 Political Configurations and Worlds of Welfare 
Non-Right Incumbency  
Low 	 High 
Low Canada (Rad) Germany 
France (Con) 	 Italy 
Ireland 	LIBERAL Netherlands CONSERVATIVE 
Switzerland 
USA 
Trade Union Density 
High Australia 	 Austria (Con) 
New Zealand RADICAL Belgium 




Source: Castles & Mitchell 1992: Table 4. 
Note: N-RH refers to non-right hegemony. 
They believe that 'the four worlds model is a better predictor of 
redistributive outcomes than either a conventional welfare effort 
"leaders and laggards" model or Esping-Andersen's typology based on 
social policy instruments' (Castles and Mitchell 1992: 24). Nonetheless 
there are a variety of problems. The model has to await the expansion 
of the Luxembourg Income Study Project (US) dataset to test the degree 
of fit of both models against complete data from all 18 OECD countries 
included in the typologies of Esping-Andersen, and Castles and 
Mitchell. Like Esping-Andersen, state welfare remains the focus of 
Castles and Mitchell's typology, and the non-statutory welfare sector 
seems to be neglected in their study. More importantly, their study of 
18 OECD countries is restricted to Western advanced countries alone 
and little attention is paid to the East Asian NICs. It would be useful to 
incorporate countries beyond OECD into their typology of welfare state 
regimes; this would also be conducive to testing its validity. 
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Johnson: Welfare Pluralism and the Mixed Economy of Welfare 
According to Pinker (1992: 283), 'the nature of the British social services 
since the Second World War has been predominantly pluralist rather 
than institutional or residual', yet the welfare mix established in the 
post-war period has been under threat since the mid-1970s. In recent 
years, with a response to the alleged crisis of the welfare state, concepts 
of 'welfare pluralism' and 'the mixed economy of welfare' have been 
much discussed in the social policy or social welfare field. As Johnson 
(1987: 54) has stated: 
In most ... welfare states... policies of retrenchment have been 
introduced, and although the rhetoric of retrenchment has 
exceeded its practical application, a change of emphasis has 
undoubtedly occurred. This change in emphasis finds its 
expression in welfare pluralism: a reduction or reversal of the 
state's dominance in welfare provision and an increase in the 
role of the informal, voluntary and commercial sectors. 
Gould (1993: 7) insists that these moves towards welfare pluralism in 
the West 'were a response to a logic of events which in an important 
way was linked with the success and structure of the Japanese 
economy.' Morris and his colleagues (Morris 1988: 6) also have 
described how during the 1980s, there were a series of fundamental 
changes: 
(1) The rate of increase in public expenditure was curtailed. 
(2) Costs for public services were consistently increased. 
(3) Entitlement or eligibility for some benefits was tightened 
minimally. 
(4) Privatisation of welfare occurred in many public services. 
(5) The state shifted from welfare provider to welfare producer in the 
movement to a mixed welfare economy. 
(6) There was an increase in means testing. 
(7) Social programs were increasingly evaluated in terms of their 
impact on economic development. 
Why has 'welfare pluralism' or the 'mixed economy of welfare' 
become a widely popular concept, open to many different 
interpretations? According to Pinker (1992: 282), there are two reasons: 
'first, as a concept it provides more accurate descriptions of the British 
welfare state, past and present, than do the concepts of "institutional" 
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and "residual" welfare; secondly, the differences in our interpretation 
of it relate to inferences about future intentions as to present realities.' 
What then is 'welfare pluralism'? Welfare pluralists Hatch and 
Mocroft (1983: 2) have described it as follows: 
In one sense welfare pluralism can be used to convey the fact that 
social and health care may be obtained from four different 
sectors— the statutory, the voluntary, the commercial and the 
informal. More prescriptively, welfare pluralism implies a less 
dominant role for the state, seeing it as not the only possible 
instrument for the collective provision of welfare services. 
Under welfare pluralism, there are two major themes: decentralisation 
and participation. The former refers to 'a movement of power from 
central government to local authorities and from local authorities to 
the neighbourhood or "patch": The latter means that 'welfare 
pluralists favour citizen, consumer and employee participation not 
simply in service provision, but also in decision-making' (Johnson 
1989: 21). 
What is 'the mixed economy of welfare'? In Johnson's words 
(1990b: 145), it refers to 'the provision of health and welfare services by 
a variety of suppliers. Four sectors are usually identified as being 
concerned with welfare: the state sector, the commercial sector, the 
voluntary sector and the informal sector of families, friends and 
neighbours.' 
Clearly, the two terms decentralisation and participation are used 
to depict a reduced role for state intervention in welfare and a 
correspondingly increased role for the other three non-statutory 
sectors; the state's role has been a central issue in the debate. Yet Le 
Grand and Robinson (1984) show that the state does not have only one 
role in welfare. There are three broad areas of state intervention: 
provision, finance and regulation. The New Right would wish to see a 
reduction of the state's role in all three areas. Welfare pluralists Hadley 
and Hatch (1981), who may be taken as leading proponents of welfare 
pluralism, argue for the retention of the state's role in finance and 
regulation, along with a diminution of its role in direct welfare 
provision. 
Johnson insists (1989: 17), however, that 'some doubt is cast on 
the capacity and the desirability of the informal and voluntary sectors 
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substituting for the state in social service provision, as the number of 
dependants is rising and the family is undergoing social changes 
(declining family size, the increasing participation of women in the 
labour market and rising divorce rates) these may reduce the state's 
capacity to provide care. The voluntary sector bothers about problems 
of uneven and incomplete coverage, equity, fragmentation and 
accountability. As for the commercial sector, there are also serious 
difficulties in securing effective control and regulation. Particularly 
when a large proportion of private concerns are subsidised from public 
funds. 
Johnson thus doubts whether the informal, voluntary and 
commercial sectors are able to substitute effectively for the state 
without adverse consequences for welfare provision. Johnson (1990b: 
161) warns that if they 'cannot respond in the ways and to the extent 
expected of them, then any reduction of statutory activity will merely 
serve to legitimate cuts in public expenditure and the development of 
market provision. 'Welfare pluralism is as much the outcome of a 
failure of political nerve as that of a resurgence of ideological 
confidence', Pinker (1992: 282) suggests two factors causing this: 'a loss 
of public confidence in both major political parties and the 
deteriorating state of the British economy.' Johnson thus argues that 
the debate about the welfare mix should pay attention to the main task 
of reforming state service rather than the transfer of welfare 
responsibilities from the state to the non-statutory sector. In Johnson's 
words (1990b: 162), 'a debate about how to achieve greater 
decentralization and participation is likely to prove more fruitful than 
debates about how to change the welfare mix.' 
Johnson concludes that there appears to be very little possibility of 
the state's major role in welfare provision being successfully 
transferred to the informal and voluntary sectors, but this should not 
be used an excuse for maintaining the status quo. New ways of 
organising, providing and financing welfare must be sought in order to 
keep the statutory services much more responsive to social needs. 
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Rose: The Welfare Mix 
The term 'welfare mix' was first coined by Richard Rose (1985a) and 
comes from the reflection that ordinary people meet their needs of 
everyday life in three different social institutions: the household, the 
market and the state. For him, 'the welfare state is a familiar phrase, 
but it is also misleading.' (Rose 1989: 130) Though important, the 
state's role in producing welfare is not a monopoly. Consequently, 
comparing societies merely regarding the state's provision of welfare 
can be misleading, and 'a crisis of the welfare state is not a crisis of 
welfare in society.' (Rose 1986: 36) Welfare is the conjoint product of 
the whole of society, which is produced by what Rose calls the welfare 
mix. Such a mix has five crucial features: 
(1) It amounts to total welfare in society (TWS), which can be set out by 
a simple formula: TWS = I-I + M+ S, in which H equals the 
household production of welfare, M equals welfare bought and sold 
in the market, and S equals welfare produced by the state. 
(2) The mix is logically independent of total welfare in society and can 
take many different forms, ranging from monopoly provision to 
the provision by each source of one-third of a given welfare service. 
(3) Substitution and growth in welfare has the potential to alter the 
mix totally; the growth of total welfare in society reflects a net 
increase, yet if one sector expands by substituting for another, then it 
does not necessarily produce a net increase. 
(4) It stresses interdependences between the three sources, which are 
imperfect providers of welfare, but the strengths of each sector often 
compensate for the limitations of the others. 
(5) In mixed societies, families have many ways to sustain their welfare 
by changing the mix of resources. 
Following the five welfare products identified as central by Wilensky 
(1975: 1), Rose adds two items to construct his seven major welfare 
concerns: income, food, housing, personal social services, education, 
health, and transportation. Depending upon whether or not the 
service is monetised at the point of production or at the point of 
consumption, Rose (1986: 17) identifies four different ways of 
providing a given welfare service: 
(1) The market: production and consumption of services monetised, 
eg. private education. 
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(2) The state: production monetised, but consumption on a non-
market condition, eg. public education. 
(3) The household: neither production nor consumption monetised, 
eg. a father teaching his son how to use a saw. 
(4) Barter: a market exchange without money, eg. a teacher giving 
tuition to a plumber's child in return for household repairs. 
Unlike welfare pluralists, Rose neglects the voluntary sector in his 
analysis of the welfare mix. In his view (1989: 134), American non-
profit institutions are only a derived form of market provision: 'since 
profit is a small portion of the total cost of producing a service, the cost 
per beneficiary is virtually the same in these organisations as 
elsewhere.' 
The state's provision of welfare has crowded out neither the 
market nor the household. Rose (1989: 135) argues that to understand 
welfare in society, one must understand what the state does and does 
not contribute to the welfare mix. Monetisation, industrialisation and 
economic growth have caused an expansion in total welfare in society. 
In order to understand changes in total welfare one must thus 
understand 'the decline of the traditional role of the household; the 
monetisation of welfare production by the Industrial Revolution; and 
the fiscalization of welfare production by the state.' 
Historically, the family system has been the most fundamental 
unit of support. Until recent times it was not only the key source of 
social support for individuals, but also the crucial method of 
distributing essential goods and services for everyday life. With 
industrialisation, urbanisation modernisation and most importantly 
the development of capitalism, the role of the market gradually 
extended. Obviously, market mechanisms do not ensure an adequate 
income for everyone. Only government can meet the non-labour 
market income maintenance needs in industrial societies (Graycar and 
Jamrozik 1993: 2). State intervention thus was not only seen as an 
inevitable means to supplement the family's role of social support 
where the market falls short of provision, but also regarded as 'an 
outcome of this contradiction between the survival needs of workers 
and their household and family members, and the drive for 
profitability inherent in the structure of capitalism' (Bryson 1992: 71). 
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Prior to 1945 the provision of welfare by the state was frequently 
of less importance in ordinary people's lives than the role of the 
market and household systems. Yet, social policy in the post-war era 
tended to be made either without much reference to the non-statutory 
sectors, or around unfounded, ideological images of them. In recent 
years, this has changed. Governments are cautiously looking for a 
more explicit welfare mix to integrate and balance the sectors, and 
particularly, to reduce the state's role in both the funding and the 
production of welfare services (Baldock 1993: 29). 
In comparisons of welfare states, the United States was always 
regarded as 'reluctant' or 'laggard' (Wilensky 1965: xii; Bryson 1992: 99). 
Yet, Rose insists, such an analysis ignores the conjoint importance of 
the welfare mix. Insofar as state and market are added together, then 
the United States spends a higher proportion of the national product 
on health than many European countries. This is most evident in 
international comparisons, particularly in comparison of First and 
Third World societies, 'for a characteristic of the Third World is that 
most production and consumption is not monetized; the household is 
of primary importance' (Rose 1986: 15). In East Asia, for example, the 
primary responsibilities for welfare will not be carried out without 
family (Rose 1985b). Rose's simple model of the welfare mix provides a 
new comparative base of social welfare configurations in different 
societies, particularly in comparisons of the East Asian NICs and the 
OECD countries. 
Abrahamson: The Welfare Triangle 
Similarly, Abrahamson (1991: 238) has represented the welfare mix in 
Europe as the 'welfare triangle'— market, state, and community. It is 
worth noting that community not only replaces household in Rose's 
welfare mix model, but is also often equal to civil society in his context 
(see Figure 1.1). Abrahamson shows that the three areas of the 'welfare 
triangle' have their corresponding media: money, power and 
solidarity. In the market arena, the accessibility of welfare is by means 
of buying goods and services. In the state arena, distribution is the 
product of political power. In the civil society arena, allocation is an 
expression of formation of solidarity, and the family, among others, is 
the most important. 
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Using the welfare triangle to describe European countries in the 
post-war period, Abrahamson (1991: 239) argues that: 
Traditionally, Western Europe has emphasized market solutions, 
while Eastern Europe has favored state solutions. In both the East 
and the West, the Southern countries— the Mediterranean 
region— have emphasized family, household, and community 
assistance over both market and state programs, while such 
community forces have diminished in the North. 
Figure 1.1 The 'Welfare Triangle' in Post-World War II Europe 
Source: Abrahamson 1991, Figure 2. 
Since the mid-1980s, the triangle seems to be altering rapidly. The 
East is expanding the role of the market (Westernised). The West is 
moving towards a larger role for civil society solutions (modernised 
'Southern' forms). The South is modernising arid initiating both state 
and market forms of welfare provision. 
Regarding the organisation of social policy in a future Europe, 
Abrahamson identifies the three tendencies: 'privatization means 
commodification, decentralization means "communization" and 
debureaucratization means deprofessionalizaticm' (Abrahamson 1991: 
239). Yet by examining welfare state types within clusters of countries, 
that is, by combining Leibfried's typology and Bislev and Hansen's four 
'idea-types' of European social policy (see Tables 1.5 and 1.6), 
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Abrahamson concludes that there will be three distinct political 
approaches to welfare provision by the year 2000. These three scenarios 
are: the dual welfare society, the corporate welfare state and 
community welfare or welfare socialism. He suggests that 'the first two 
scenarios: the dual society, or the "two-third" society, could well be the 
reality in 1990s Europe.' (Abrahamson 1991: 261) In other words, the 
overall development of European welfare systems in the 1990s will 
likely move towards 'Americanization', with a move away from the 
modern or Scandinavian model to a corporatist model for welfare 
policy. 
Table 1.5 Leibfried's Four Types of European Welfare States 
Scandinavian 	Bismarck 	Anglo-Saxon 	Latin Rim  
Type of 	Modem 	Institutional 	Residual 	Rudimentary 
welfare 
regime 
Characteristic Full employment 	Full growth 	Full growth 	— 
Welfare 	Employer of first Compensator of Compensator 	A half- 
state as 	resort 	first resort 	of last resort institutionalized 
promise 
Right to 	Work; backed up Social security; 	Benefits; no 	Work and 
by an 	backed up by an such back up 	welfare 
institutionalized institutionalized 	 proclaimed; only 
concept of social concept of social implemented 
citizenship 	citizenship 	 partially 
Basic income 	Marginal, but 	May radicalize May support 	May support 
debate 	may improve 	somewhat the development development of 
income packaging 	decoupling of 	of "normal" "normal" welfare 
work and income 	welfare 	system 
system 
Source: Leibfried 1990, quoted in Abrahamson 1991: Table 9. 
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Table 1.6 Bislev and Hansen's Four 'Ideal-Types' 
of European Social Policy 
Catholic 	Corporatist 	Liberalist 	Social democratic 
Countries 	Latin Rim 
Main 	Residuality; 





































are superior to 
transfers 
Source: Bislev & Hansen 1989, adapted from Abrahamson 1991: 257. 
As a model of welfare change, the welfare triangle is likely to 
underscore demographic, economic and social factors rather than the 
political factors shared by many European countries. Though the 
comparative effect of these pressures differs from country to country, 
the direction of welfare change is the same everywhere, as 
governments are obliged to balance the responsibility between state, 
market and household. In fact, the welfare triangle is an imperfect 
model, for welfare systems everywhere seem to be altering into the 
left-hand half of the triangle. The evidence also reveals western 
countries are more and more stressing market mechanisms. 
Yet we must recognise that reality does not often follow the ideal-
type of a simple model. By and large, the welfare triangle still provides 
'a useful summary of the potential variety of welfare mix 
arrangements and a framework for describing and explaining the 
direction of change' (Baldock 1993: 30-31). However, the validity, of the 
model of welfare triangle needs to be further examined. Apart from 
European countries, insofar as other societies are incorporated as 
comparative cases such as America, Australia and the East Asian 
countries, including Japan and NICs, then the model of welfare 
triangle might be well examined. 
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Summary 
Drawing on the work of Rose, who develops the concept of the 
'welfare mix', and Abrahamson who develops the concept of the 
'welfare triangle I propose to use the concept of a welfare 
configuration. 
A welfare configuration is the empirical outcome of the 
relationship between the state and various sectors of civil society with 
respect to particular fields of welfare. A particular welfare 
configuration will therefore describe (a) the differential impact of the 
state and various sectors of civil society on welfare provision and, 
importantly, will do so in respect to (b) a particular welfare area e.g. 
education, health and child care. 
However; before examining specific welfare configurations it is 
necessary to first examine sociological writings on the state and civil 
society to clarify the concepts (the purpose of the next chapter, Chapter 
Two), second, to explore the welfare state-society relation (Chapter 
Three), and finally, to examine in general terms the differential impact 
of the state in welfare provision in OECD countries and the East Asian 
NICs (Chapter Four). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
The state and civil society constitute separate and distinct institutional 
spheres constituted through different but interrelated processes. The 
state is deeply involved in the institutions and processes of civil 
society through its powers to make law as well as its various policies. 
Civil society also influences the structure and process of state apparatus 
via its social and economic resources. Civil society is analytically 
separate from the state but empirically the relationship is dynamic and 
symbiotic. It is argued that a fuller understanding of the relationship 
between the state and civil society should include the family in civil 
society. 
The objective of this chapter is to explore how classical and 
contemporary social scientists, in particular sociologists, have 
understood the relationship between the state and civil society. Three 
questions are central: What is the state? What is civil society? What is 
the relationship between the state and civil society? 
Classical Debates 
The State/Society Dichotomy 
Although there is some theoretical dispute about the relationship 
between the state and society, we can divide diverse viewpoints into 
two main schools: 'society over state' and 'state over society'. There are 
two representatives on the perspective of state vs. society: Locke held 
that civil society was prior to and outside of the state; Hegel argued that 
the state was superior to civil society. The former regarded society as a 
reality prior to the state, which for him was a political organisation set 
up by people to defend their interests and provide for their security. In 
other words, the state can and should be seen as an 'instrument' for its 
citizens to defend their 'life, liberty and estate' (Held 1989: 19). Upon 
this account, the state is a 'necessary evil' and nothing more than an 
apparatus of real social welfare for its citizens. In contrast, Hegel 
highlighted the role of state in dominating and shaping society, and 
3 1 
considered society as inferior to the state in respect of their 
interrelations (Pelczynski 1984: 2; Riley 1992: 184). 
In the eighteenth century, 'civil society' was regarded as a state of 
civility and as the product of civilisation. In the nineteenth century the 
concept of civil society was closely examined by Hegel in his 
Philosophy of Right (Pelczynski 1984: 1). It is likely that Hegel was the 
first to organically elaborate the distinction between 'civil society' and 
the 'state'. In the long run, the term appeared in sociology through the 
analyses of Hegel and of Marx (Abercrombie et al. 1994: 56). 
In Hegel's view, the state is positive. The state is not only the 
creation of humanity but also the expression of its collective will on 
the basis of rational decisions. So it is possible as a means of realising 
the common good and fulfilling individual self-expression (Waters 
and Crook 1993: 216). Civil society, Hegel argued, was an intermediate 
institution between the state and the family. In his schema the state 
was the final stage in the development of a series of 'ethical 
communities' in the rise of social evolution, but it alone had the 
ability for the type of 'universality' required to constitute citizenship 
(Riley 1992: 184). For Hegel, 'civil society cannot exist without the state, 
and in virtue of its nature cannot achieve "universal freedom". The 
modern state embodies reason, not by absorbing civil society but by 
guarding certain of the universal qualities upon which it is predicated' 
(Giddens 1985: 20-21). 
Sociologists and anthropologists usually see the state as a way of 
organising society. Marx, Durkheim and Weber viewed the state as one 
form in which humans have organised their social existence (Vincent 
1992: 46-47). Though these founding fathers of sociology often used the 
broader study of society to account for the state, there exist some 
divergences between them on state and society and/or civil society. 
Here, I will explore how they have understood the relationship 
between state and society and/or civil society. 
Marx on 'state' and 'society' 
For Marx, the state is an instrument for the restriction and alienation 
of human nature rather than a means for individual self-expression. 
So unlike Hegel, who viewed the state as a representation of the 
collective will, Marx saw the state as a creation of the ruling class and 
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an instrument of class domination. He suggested the state fosters and 
supports the interests of the bourgeoisie. 
Following Hegel's usage of 'btirgerliche Gesellschaft', the term as 
used by Marx referred not merely to a part of society but to all of 
society. It is evident for Marx that civil society is equal to bourgeois 
capitalist society. However, this vision obviously emphasised the 
economic aspect of civil society. Thus the division of labour, exchange, 
private ownership of the modes of production and the society divided 
into the property-owners and propertyless were 'the heart of the civil 
society' anticipated by Marx. For him, the relationships of production, 
and the division of society into the propertied classes and propertyless 
classes were the clarifying traits of civil society (Shils 1991: 6). 
Durkheim on 'state' and 'society' 
In The Division of Labour in Society (1984), Durkheim viewed society 
as an interdependent social whole which was a moral reality 
embodying what he called 'social facts'. Such facts had a reality above 
and beyond the individuals who formed a society. Most of Durkheim's 
work was committed to the study of social order. He argued that social 
order arose out of moral relationships since individuals needed a 
consensus which limited their behaviours in accordance with the 
benefits of a social whole. 
The shift from 'mechanical solidarity' to 'organic solidarity' is 
not only related to an increasing division of labour but also to the rise 
of modern society. More importantly, the division of labour is seen as 
a process of moral change, that is, change in the nature of the 
consensus maintaining the social order. Yet unlike Marx who saw the 
problems of the modern world as inherent in society and argued for 
social revolution, Durkheim's argument was that 'social disorders 
were not a necessary part of the modern world and could be reduced by 
social reforms' (Ritzer 1983: 14). 
Modern society is characterised by the weakness of collective 
consciousness and the decline of morality. Accordingly, Durkheim 
insisted on a key role for consensus and implied the importance of 
function and interdependence (Forder et al. 1984: 112). It is important 
for modern society to strengthen the state, the family and education as 
this will provide the engine to drive moral commitment. Moreover, 
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the growth of community-oriented feelings and solidarities could rely 
on the development of occupational corporations (Waters and Crook 
1993: 534). 
Unlike Weber, Durkheim argued that a 'political society can be 
detected in the degree of complexity in social organisation. He 
contended that the state refers to an administrative staff or officialdom 
which is formally assigned to the functions of government; a political 
society does not inevitably dominate a state (Giddens 1986b: 2). In The 
Division of Labour, Durkheim claimed that the state did not exist until 
the rise of an organic solidary society. The increasing division of labour 
articulates with larger individual freedom, however, the power of the 
state also extends in order to realise and foster individual rights. 
According to Giddens (1986b: 28), 'Durkheim nowhere undertook 
to show what determines the degree to which the State is able to 
"separate itself" from society', but regarding the state-society relation, 
Durkheim emphasised that 'every form of State, weak or strong, is 
rooted in civil society, and nourished from it.' To a large extent, this 
typically sociological perspective implies that the state within society is 
based on civil society, and analytically it is separate from civil society. 
Weber on 'state' and 'society' 
Weber was more of a conservative than Marx on the issue of the role 
of the state. Ritzer (1983: 22) argues that 'while he was a severe critic of 
many aspects of modern capitalist society, and came to many of the 
same critical conclusions as did Marx, he was not one to propose 
radical solutions to problems'. So unlike many Marxists and socialists, 
Weber disagreed with radical reforms, for they would bring more 
harm than good. In his view, the notion that state institutions in 
modern society should be 'smashed' in a revolutionary process of 
radical change was 'at best a foolhardy view' (Held 1989: 39). 
According to Weber, a modern state is a compulsory political 
association which has power and a legitimate use for that power. 
Thereby Weber presented a definition of the state: 'a state is a human 
community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate 
use of physical force within a given territory' (Gerth and Mills 1948: 
78). In this sense he obviously associated the concept of the state with 
the notion of legitimacy. Like Marshall's analysis of citizenship and 
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social class, Weber's discussion of state legitimacy is also an 
investigation of 'state mediation' which is 'the state's involvement in 
the relations between groups and classes in society' (Barbalet 1986: 13). 
For Weber, the legitimacy of a social order or system of domination is 
verified by social actors within society. 
In modern society, he contended, when economic life becomes 
more differentiated and complex, both private and public 
administration become more and more bureaucratized. Although his 
analysis of the trends in bureaucratization contributes to an 
understanding of the state, Weber's view also has some limitations. 
For instance, his argument that the expansion of bureaucracy gives rise 
to an enlarged view of the power of political elites causes him to 
ignore the fact that the subordinate social actors may enhance their 
power and thus affect state structures (Barbalet 1986: 17; Held 1989: 43). 
Contemporary Debates 
The State 
The state in contemporary society has a significant effect on ordinary 
people's everyday life. The activities of the state permeate almost every 
single aspect of everyday life such that 'few of us may claim that our 
lives are entirely "untouched" by the state' (McGrew 1992: 66). The 
state formed in history as the formal or legal apparatus or instrument 
for maintaining social order and resolving social conflict within and 
between societies. The modern state as the primary institution of 
public power is responsible for social 'stability and control as well as 
the mobilization, integration, and distribution of social and economic 
resources' (Braungart and Braungart 1990: iv). 
Mann asserts the historically unique feature of the advanced 
capitalist state, in particular its prevalent influence within modern 
society. He claims that: 
The state can assess and tax our income and wealth at source, 
without our consent or that of our neighbours or kin (which 
states before about 1850 were never able to do); it stores and can 
recall immediately a massive amount of information about all of 
us; it can enforce its will within the day almost anywhere in its 
domains: its influence on the overall economy is enormous; it 
even directly provides the subsistence of most of us (in state 
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employment, in pensions, in family allowances, etc.). The state 
penetrates everyday life more than did any historical state. Its 
infrastructural power has increased enormously_ (Mann 1988: 6) 
The expanding role of the state in social life is one of the most 
important changes to occur over the past century. As Giddens (1986a: 
45) argues one evident characteristic of Western societies over the past 
hundred years is the increasing intrusion of the state into economic 
life, as well as into other spheres of social activity: 
States have ... attempted more and more to 'intervene in 
economic activity by seeking to influence the supply of and 
demand for goods, engaging in economic planning, prices and 
incomes policies, and so on. But the state also intrudes into a 
variety of other aspects of social life; participating in the 
foundation and organisation of prisons, asylums, hospitals, and 
in the provision of that array of services included under the 
general rubric of "welfare'. (Giddens 1986a: 71) 
Clearly, what is distinctive about the modern state is the depth and 
scope of its intervention. It is difficult to understand the nature of 
modern societies without understanding the modern state. In many 
ways Isltates are central to our understanding of what a society is' 
(Mann 1988: 30). 
Yet it is also startling that the increase of state intervention in 
advanced industrialised societies has been accompanied until recently 
by a curious neglect on the part of social scientists of the role of the 
state and its relationship to groups and individuals' (Ham and Hill 
1993: 22). According to Giddens (1986a: 71-72), this neglect is caused by 
two factors: first, it arose as a result of a distorted division of labour in 
the social sciences; second, the sociological roots of this neglect 
emanate from nineteenth-century classical economic theory in which 
the state is assigned a minimal role. 
Historically, the objective of sociology was the study of 'society', 
more specifically, it refers to 'what nineteenth-century thinkers used to 
call "civil society": the economy, family, and other institutions outside 
the state' (Giddens 1986a: 72). The discussion of the state became the 
specific area of the discipline of 'political science' or 'politics'. 
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While 'the state is undeniably a messy concept', it can be defined 
in terms of what it looks, or what it does (Mann 1988: 4). What, then, is 
the state? Ham and Hill (1993: 23) suggest that: 
The state can be defined both in terms of the institutions which 
make it up and the functions these institutions perform. State 
institutions comprise legislative bodies, including parliamentary 
assemblies and subordinate law-making institutions; executive 
bodies, including governmental bureaux and departments of 
state; and judicial bodies— principally courts of law— with 
responsibility for enforcing and, through their decisions, 
developing the law. 
Mann (1988: 4) proposes a neo-Weberian definition of the state as: 
1 A differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying 
2 centrality in the sense that political relations radiate outwards 
from a centre to cover 
3 a territorially demarcated area, over which it exercises 
4 a monopoly of authoritative binding rule-making, backed up by 
a monopoly of the means of physical violence. 
Mann's definition of the state gives emphasis to three key points. First, 
it stresses that the notion of government refers to the whole political 
apparatus of rule within society, but that the notion of the state 
encompasses much more than the notion of government. Second, the 
state defines the sphere of supreme authority within society. 
Essentially, the state as the sphere of public power is to be differentiated 
from the agencies or institutions (such as the police, courts etc.) within 
society. Third, and more importantly, the state is the primary law-
making body within a given society. The state thus can formulate, 
implement and adjudicate the laws and legal framework which 
exercise control over civil society (McGrew 1992: 68-69). In this sense, 
the state has influence on, or even some control over, institutions 
which might be seen as elements of civil society. 
Traditional sociologists always paid attention to the effects of state 
activities, rather than the nature of the state itself. Recently, there has 
been much sociological writing about 'bringing the state back in'; 
'state-centred' theory, 'theories of the state and' theories of the welfare 
state' (eg. Amsden 1985; Ashford 1991, 1993; Baren and Parikh 1991; 
Bendix et al. 1990; Blau 1989; Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1985; 
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Jessop 1990; Quadagno 1984, 1987; Skocpol 1985a, 1985b, 1987, 1988, 1992, 
1993; Skocpol and Amenta 1985, 1986; Weir et al. 1988). 
The traditions of state theory pay attention to different facets of 
state-society relations and defend rather contradictory positions. But 
the different state theories contribute to an understanding of how the 
state operates in contemporary society. The concept of the state is 
drawn from philosophical and political theory. Although the state and 
society (or the public and private) dichotomy is commonly understood, 
'state theories often rely on a much less clear distinction between the 
state and civil society' (Davis et al. 1988: 16). 
The society-centred approach has been dominant in social science 
until recently, but it is surely an inadequate tool with which to 
investigate social change in the East Asian NICs (Skocpol 1985). 
Neither the pluralist theory of politics nor the elitist theory of social 
change is able to identify the most important mechanism of social 
change. Likewise, Marxist theory is more or less limited by its view of 
the state as a tool of class domination or as a reflection of class relations 
embedded in the mode of production. Clearly, only employing internal 
social dynamics to explain social changes in any given society is an 
inadequate method. 
The current popularity of the state-centred approach has led to its 
adoption as a perspective for analysing East Asian economic 
development (eg. Amsden 1989; Deyo 1987; Haggard 1990; Wade 1990). 
Yet, the limits of the state-centred approach lie in its neglect of the fact 
that the state is rooted in society and obtains its principal features from 
society. In order to stress the key role of the state in economic and 
social development and correct the limitations of the former society-
centred approach, the state-centred approach is inclined to overstress 
the state as an autonomous actor at the expense of social forces. 
Both state autonomy and state strength are outcomes of the 
changing state-society relation, and even a weak society has it own 
ways of affecting the state structure. To keep control over the ordinary 
people and their actions the state has to constantly struggle with social 
classes and civil society groups; its control may also change critically 
from one issue to another and from one sector to another. 
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Civil Society 
There are some writers in contemporary social science who insist that 
civil society does not exist as a reality discrete from the state and the 
market. Anthony Giddens, for example, stresses the extensive 
administrative reach of the modern state apparatus and resists the use 
of the notion of civil society. He argues that: 
... with the formation of the modern state, 'civil society' is no 
longer that which co-existed with previous state forms. In class-
divided societies there are large spheres of society which retain 
their independent character in spite of the rise of the state 
apparatus. ... With the rise of the modern state, and its 
culmination in the nation-state, 'civil society' in this sense 
simply disappears. What is 'outside' the scope of the 
administrative reach of the state apparatus cannot be understood 
as institutions which remain unabsorbed by the state. (Giddens 
1985: 21-22) 
Despite Giddens' assertions the notion of civil society has remained a 
general analytical tool in social science in recent years (eg. Arato and 
Cohen 1988; Bell 1989; Bryant 1993; Cohen and Arato 1992; Devine 
1991; Gold 1991a; He 1993, 1995; Hsiao 1990; Jacob 1991; Keane 1988a, 
1988b; Kumar 1993, 1994; Roniger 1994; Rosenblum 1994; Schmidt 1995; 
Shils 1991; Shotter 1989; Tamas 1994; Taylor 1990; Tester 1992; Turner 
1990). 
In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989), 
Habermas has interlaced the notion of civil society with his earlier idea 
of public sphere. The discourse of individuals, either by themselves or 
in groups and organisations, takes place in the public sphere. In this 
sense, these individuals not only form public opinion but also are able 
to exert pressure on the political system without being fixedly part of it. 
In civil society, 'new social movements', which are unforced 
associations and movements and outside the range of the state, bring 
new problems and perspectives to political attention (Olsson et al. 1993: 
29). 
According to Abercrombie et al. (1994: 55), 'in the social sciences, 
there is no consensus as to the theoretical and empirical separation of 
political, economic and social relations.' The changing meaning of the 
concept of 'civil society' reveals shifting theoretical attitudes regarding 
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the relationship between economy, society and state. The term 'civil 
society refers to different things for different people, and often 
declines into a muddled political slogan. It is used in a range of ways 
for different purposes, functioning as a pragmatic concept (White 1994: 
376-377). What, then, is civil society? Taylor (1990: 120-121) 
distinguishes three senses of civil society that can be identified from 
within the European political tradition: 
1 In a minimal sense, civil society exists where there are free 
associations, not under the tutelage of state power. 
2 In a stronger sense, civil society exists only where society as a 
whole can structure itself and coordinate its actions through 
associations free of state tutelage. 
3 As an alternative or supplement to the second sense, we can 
speak of civil society wherever the ensemble of associations can 
significantly determine or inflect the course of state policy. 
Turner (1990, 1994) argues that the concept of civil society is not only 
fundamental to the definition of political life in European societies, 
but it is also a point of contrast between the West and the East. He thus 
defines civil society as: 
[A] prolific network of institutions— church, family, club, guild, 
association and community— [which] lies between the state and 
the individual, and which simultaneously connects the 
individual to authority and protects the individual from total 
political control (Turner, 1994: 23). 
In the most abstract sense, Keane (1988a: 14) defines civil society as : 
[A]n aggregate of institutions whose members are engaged 
primarily in a complex of non-state activities— economic and 
cultural production, household life and voluntary associations—
and who in this way preserve and transform their identity by 
exercising all sorts of pressures or controls upon state institutions. 
Held (1989) sees civil society as a segment of society. As he puts it: 
Civil society connotes those areas of social life— the domestic 
world, the economic sphere, cultural activities and political 
interaction— which are organised by private or voluntary 
arrangements between individuals and groups outside the direct 
control of the state. (Held 1989: 6) 
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In contrast, Shils' idea of civil society is more complex than Held's. 
According to Shils (1991: 4), civil society consists of three main 
components. First, it is a part of society containing a complex of 
autonomous institutions (i.e. economic, religious, intellectual and 
political). Second, it is a network of relationships between the state and 
a part of society, and is a set of institutions which not only keep 
efficient ties between the state and civil society but also preserve their 
division. Third, it is 'a widespread pattern of refined or civil manners'. 
However, Shils (1991: 4) also recognises that 'the first has been 
called civil society; sometimes the entire inclusive society which has 
those specific properties is called civil society'. He argues that civil 
society has a life of its own, which is markedly different from the state, 
and which 'is largely in autonomy from it. Civil society lies beyond the 
boundaries of the family and the clan and beyond the locality; it lies 
short of the state' (Shils 1991: 3). 
In the same vein Diamond (1994: 6) argues that civil society is not 
synonymous with 'society' or with everything that is not the state or 
the formal political system. In terms of what civil society is and is not 
he defines civil society as: 
[T]he realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-
generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, 
and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules. It is distinct from 
"society" in general in that it involves citizens acting collectively 
in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, and ideas, 
exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on 
the state, and hold state officials accountable. Civil society is an 
intermediary entity, standing between the private sphere and the 
state. Thus it excludes individual and family life, inward-looking 
group activity (e.g., for recreation, entertainment, or spirituality), 
the profit-making enterprise of individual business firms, and 
political efforts to take control of the state. (Diamond 1994: 5) 
The debate on whether the family is included in civil society remains 
an open question. While Shils' and Diamond's definitions of civil 
society exclude the family, some scholars argue for including the 
family in civil society (eg. Abercrombie et. al 1994; Held 1989; Keane 
1988a; Taylor 1990; Turner 1994; White 1994). For example, White 
(1994: 377) argues that civil society is often used loosely to mean an 
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intermediate sphere of social organisation or association between the 
basic units of society and the state. Such a conventional usage usually 
excludes firms and families, and he suggests that 'economic 
institutions, as key matrices of social organization, should also be 
included within the definition' (White 1994: 389). 
Although they do not use the term 'civil society', the family is 
seen by Berger and Neuhaus (1977: 2-3) to be one of four 'mediating 
structures' I. Nisbet (1982: 111) views history partly as a war between 
the state and the family, each of which struggles for the individual's 
loyalties. The state, in seeking to be proactive, may formulate social 
policy which directly or indirectly affects the private interests of 
individuals and their families (Hill and Lian 1995: 142). The state now 
provides most of the services formerly provided within families. The 
diminishing role of the family is the most significant long-term social 
changes that produce more dependence on 'the welfare state' (Jones 
1990: 77). 
The family in most developing countries, in particular the East 
Asian NICs, plays a crucial role in welfare provision. If the family is 
excluded in the conceptualisation of civil society, welfare development 
in these societies can be hardly understood. A notion of civil society 
which includes the family is important for understanding the 
character of developing countries and better captures the different 
welfare configurations in different countries. It also gives us a fuller 
picture of the social forces which influence welfare development in 
these countries. 
Conclusion 
The thesis uses a notion of civil society which includes the family, 
because the family as a provider of welfare is directly relevant to the 
central enquiry of this thesis. Civil society is analytically separate from 
the state, but empirically both the state and civil society are tied 
together 'by the constitution and by traditions which stress the 
obligations of each to the other as well as their rights vis-a-vis each 
other' (Shils 1991: 4). 
I Neighbourhood, church and voluntary association are the other three elements 
included in the 'mediating structure'. 
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'Society against the state' is a neoconservative slogan, and it is 
based on a model in which civil society is equated with the market or 
bourgeois society. However, from a welfare provision perspective, the 
market is not the only source of welfare. The family, voluntary sector 
and church are also part of civil society and can be seen as key 
components of welfare provision. Examining the relationship between 
the state and various sectors of civil society in welfare provision will 
explicate the role of the collectivity and provide an analytical 
framework to understand the place of welfare in the state-society 




THE WELFARE STATE-SOCIETY RELATION 
The concept of 'the welfare state' is used in a static manner and it is 
not relevant and not useful to understand the development of welfare 
in the East Asian NICs. A better concept is that of 'welfare 
configuration'. That is a description of the differential involvement of 
the state and various sectors of civil society in welfare provision. By 
drawing attention to the relationship between the state and civil 
society in welfare provision, the concept of welfare configuration 
provides a better approach for understanding different welfare 
developments in different countries. 
Different welfare developments in different countries can be 
explored through examining state-society relations as different state-
society relations lead to different welfare configurations. Two issues 
will be discussed in this chapter: making sense of the role of the 
collectivity and the relationship between the state and civil society in 
welfare provision. 
Making Sense of the Role of the Collectivity 
State welfare, is a narrow view of welfare provision which excludes 
the non-statutory sectors (Gould 1993: 3). According to Pierson (1991: 7), 
at its simplest, state welfare refers to 'state-provided forms of welfare' 
or 'social welfare provision through the agency of the state'. The use of 
the word 'state' implies an acknowledgment of the active role played 
by the state in the social sphere. 
Historically, the state apparatus, offering a wide range of public 
services such as health, education, housing, income support and 
pensions, has come under the title of 'the welfare state'. Yet, the 
welfare that we know today goes beyond the scope of services the state 
provides. Because state welfare is set alongside the non-statutory 
sectors of market, family and voluntary welfare, as a source of different 
welfare provisions, these various sectors should not be neglected. 
In fact, welfare provision involves not only the decisions of the 
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sectors as well. Pierson (1991: 7) stresses that 'the ways in which welfare 
is delivered outside of the state or the formal economy, through the 
church, through voluntary organisations and, above all, through the 
family, is just as important.' 
During the 1980s the 'welfare mix' or the 'mixed economy of 
welfare' emerged and became a paradigm of welfare provision. That is, 
there is an increasing trend to privitisation. To some extent, this 
paradigm stresses that welfare deriving from both the state and non-
state sources is a response to 'the welfare state in crisis' and attempts to 
make sense of the role of the collectivity (Baldock 1994; Bryson 1992; 
Gilbert and Gilbert 1989; Johnson 1987, 1989; Rose 1986, 1989; Yeatman 
1990). 
Alber (1988a: 467) argues that the increasing financial capacity of 
private households is one reason for 'the acceptance of the austerity 
policy of western governments in recent years. However, private 
means are sufficient only to supplement public provisions, not to 
substitute for them.' Tilton (1986: 34) also suggests that the aim of 'the 
welfare state' 'is not to abolish markets, but to make them function 
efficiently and in a more equitable social setting.' It is the interaction 
between markets and non-markets and the division of responsibility 
between them for the delivery of welfare provisions that form a 
welfare configuration in modern society. As shown in Figure 3.1, this 
is an arrangement within the area of collective action for social 
welfare. 
Figure 3.1 Sources of Welfare Provision 
Note: Govt.= Government 
Vol.= Voluntary Sector 
Co-op.= Co-operative 
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In their book To Empower People (1977: 2), Berger and Neuhaus 
develop the concept of 'mediating structures which refers to 'those 
institutions standing between the individual in his private life and the 
large institutions of public life.' They argue that mediating structures 
play a key role in transmitting meaning, value and identity from the 
private to public. Yet in the modern period governments have in effect 
eroded these mediating structures. The family, for example, has been 
stripped in key areas, religion has been marginalised, and voluntary 
social service has been undermined by the development of state 
welfare and professional power. Accordingly, Berger and Neuhaus 
suggest that minimally 'public policy should cease and desist from 
damaging mediating structures' (1977: 6), and this means allowing 
people to do things for themselves wherever possible (Saunders 1993: 
79). 
The renewal of a reconstituted civil society is seen as one of the 
initiatives to reduce the excessive powers of the interventionist state. 
John Keane, a leading proponent of this argument during the 1980s, 
claims that the reasons for the shrinking popularity of the Keynesian 
welfare state, or what he calls 'state-administered socialism', lies in the 
failure to perceive 'the desirable form and limits of state action in 
relation to civil society' (Keane 1988a: 3). 
The state intervenes and even replaces the self-activity of its 
citizens because the model of state-administered socialism believes 
that 'state power could become the caretaker and moderniser of social 
existence' (Keane 1988a: 4). As long as 'the welfare state' has an ability 
to 'deliver the goods', this mix of citizen passivity and state 
interference could be acceptable. Thus the practical impact of 'the 
welfare state' on its citizens is 'to encourage the passive consumption 
of state provision and seriously to undermine citizens' confidence in 
their ability to direct their own lives. The passivity of the policytakers 
was assumed to be a necessary condition of the achievement of 
socialism by gradually extending networks of administrative state 
power into civil society' (Keane 1988a: 4). Under this circumstance, 'the 
actual experience of many citizens in daily contact with welfare state 
institutions ... [is] that socialism means bureaucracy, surveillance, red 
tape and state control' (Keane 1988a: 4). 
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In Keane's view, these questions about democracy and socialism 
can be posed fruitfully only by rethinking the relationship between the 
state and civil society. In other words, this relationship between the 
state and civil society must be rethought in a way that affirms the 
necessity and desirability of drawing stricter limits upon the scope of 
state action, while expanding the sphere of autonomous social life' 
(Keane 1988a: 3). To achieve the traditional socialist aspirations for 
liberty and equality, the only proper form is via a redefinition of the 
relationship between the state and a reconstituted civil society. Yet it is 
impossible to achieve the task of reform without substantial changes to 
'actually-existing civil societies'. Thus reform is only possible by 
returning many welfare functions once performed by the state to the 
competence of individual and social actors in civil society (Keane 
1988a, 1988b). 
In the same vein, Rosanvallon (1988a: 213) contends that the 
Keynesian welfare state is not only too centralised, bureaucratized and 
impersonal, but also 'bursting at the seams'. Accordingly, it is 
appropriate to introduce the notion of 'civil society' to overcome the 
conventional dichotomy between state and market. It is necessary 'to 
bring into being a civil society of greater density and to develop its 
scope for exchange and mutual support, instead of "externalising" 
these needs and abandoning their satisfaction to the twin poles of 
market or state' (Rosanvallon 1988a: 204). 'The post-crisis welfare state' 
can achieve its goals of social welfare via three aspects: (1) reducing the 
requirement for state intervention, (2) reinstating mutual support as a 
function of society, and (3) creating greater visibility for the social 
(Rosanvallon 1988a: 202). 
From an institutional perspective, Gilbert, Specht and Terrell 
(1993: 3) argue that there are five central social institutions: kinship, 
religion, economics, mutual assistance and politics in the main 
activities of everyday life. As they show (see Table 3.1), one or more of 
these social institutions organise all of society's leading activities of 
everyday life. More importantly, each of them, to some degree, also 
plays a key role in the functioning of social welfare. 
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Table 3.1 Institutions, Organisations and Functions 
Social 	Key Organisational 	Primary Functions 	Social Welfare 
Institutions form 	 Functions 
	
Kinship 	Family Procreation, 	Care for dependent 
socialisation, members, 
protection, intimacy, 	interfamilial 
and emotional 	financial support 
support 
Religion 	Church 	 Spiritual 	Sectarian welfare, 
development 	health, education, 
social services 
counselling 
Economics 	Business, union 	Production, 	Employee benefits, 




Mutual 	Support group, 	Mutual aid, 	Self-help, 
assistance 	voluntary agency 	philanthropy volunteering, 
community social 
services 
Politics 	Government 	Mobilisation and 	Antipoverty, 
distribution of 	economic security, 
resources for health, education, 
collective goals 	housing services 
Source: Quoted in Gilbert et al. 1993: Table 1-1, p.3. 
According to Gilbert et al. (1993: 4-8), the family as an institution 
of welfare provision frequently provides private arrangements for 
income security and assists dependent members in noneconomic ways. 
Religious institutions exhibit the spiritual aspect of human society. 
Social welfare provided by the church ranges from informal support 
and counselling to education, health, and social service programs. 
While the primary economic institution in most OECD countries is 
the business firm, trade unions, nonprofit organisations and 
professional bodies also produce and distribute goods and services. 
Mutual assistance is the category perhaps the most distinctly focused 
on social welfare activities. Whether seen as a function of altruism or 
self-interest, they play a key role in community life. 
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The Welfare State-Society Relation 
Taking these viewpoints into account, we can try to integrate them 
into an analytical framework of the state-civil society relation (see 
Figure 3.2). From the perspective of welfare provision, the focus will be 
placed on the state and various sectors of civil society, i.e. market, 
family, voluntary sector and church. 
society 
market 








Figure 3.2 An analytical framework of the state-civil society relation 
The relationship between the state and civil society is crucial to 
understanding the development of welfare in different countries. It 
can be summarised in the following ten points: 
1 The relationship between the state and civil society is dynamic in 
that changes in civil society bring about changes in the state and vice 
versa. In Furniss' words, 'a key to understanding both determinants 
and possible futures is found in the dynamic interaction between the 
"state" and "civil society" (1986: 388). The state and civil society have 
been formed via different but interrelated processes. Braungart and 
Braungart (1990: x) suggest that 'the structure of the state, its relation 
to civil society, and its ability to engender consensus and support 
from the citizenry affect the state's willingness and ability to address 
some of these problems. In turn, the consequences of state policies 
and practices and citizen interpretations and reactions have a 
feedback effect from the state to society.' There exists a symbiotic 
relationship between modern societies and modern states: 'the state 
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is embedded in social life, whilst social processes influence the form 
and activities of the state itself (McGrew 1992: 67). 
2 The state is a political group or specialised apparatus with an 
administrative staff possessing the legitimate use of power and 
authority within a given society. Civil society is more fragmented, 
comprised of various institutions which seek their interests or 
welfare. From the welfare provision perspective, civil society mainly 
consists of the four institutions of families, markets, voluntary 
sectors and churches (Bendix et al. 1990: 117-127; Braungart and 
Braungart 1990: ix). 
3 In the sphere of the state individuals are regarded as citizens, while 
in the sphere of civil society individuals are seen as different 
members attached to various sectors of civil society. Additionally, 
the internal configuration of society is also shaped by 'the social' 
relations of class, gender, race and age (Squires 1990: 18). Thus in the 
sphere of civil society individuals are regarded diversely as 
entrepreneurs and workers, producers and consumers, men and 
women, white men and black men, and young men and old men. 
Conventional discourses are frequently confined both by a failure to 
define welfare sufficiently broadly and by a failure to pay attention to 
issues of race and gender (Bryson 1992). But the fact is that it is 
difficult to dissociate the development of welfare from the categories 
of class, race, gender and age. 
4 Within the OECD countries state types vary dramatically in terms of 
institutional structures. Yet in concentrating upon the OECD 
countries, it is important to consider the existence of quite different 
state types in other industrial societies, such as the East Asian NICs. 
Although there are variations in state types in different societies, the 
role and function of the state are ultimately shaped by the nature of 
state-civil society relations. Bendix et al. (1990) conclude that the 
nature of state-civil society interaction led to the development of 
different types of welfare policies in the United States, the United 
Kingdom and Sweden. Jessop (1990: 276) also argues, 'an adequate 
theoretical account of the state and state power can only be 
developed as part of a more general account of social relations.' 
5 'The welfare state', as a form of political economy, is shaped by its 
political and economic context. The influence of political and 
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economic relations within society could shape all levels of social 
formation (the state, markets, churches, voluntary sectors, families 
and so on); not only this, but the outgrowth of their relations is 
connected with ordinary people's everyday life and, ultimately, with 
their welfare. An exploration of the direct impact of states on 
societies would fail to grasp the relations between states and their 
citizens, and would miss key reasons why some states are more 
capable than others. Clearly, civil societies also affect states. It is 
important to explore how the structure of civil society affects state 
capabilities and how civil societies influence the nature and type of 
states (Migdal 1988: xiv). 
6 'Welfare' refers to the condition of well-being of the individuals and 
civil society groups, and is defined in relation to some idea of needs. 
While needs are recognised to be historically variable, 'they typically 
include subsistence levels of necessaries such as food and housing, 
health, protection from risk, education, and sometimes 
opportunities for work' (Smelser 1994: 93-94). Welfare is like a 
mosaic, both in its sources and in the modes of its delivery. The state 
apparently is the most important single agency of welafre in most 
industrialised countries. Yet individual welfare derives not only 
from state institutions, but also from the various sectors of civil 
society. Johnson (1990b: 145) suggests that welfare is provided by a 
variety of suppliers. These four sectors of welfare provision are: 'the 
state sector, the commercial sector, the voluntary sector and the 
informal sector of families, friends and neighbours.' As Rose (1993: 
221) puts it, 'any study of goods and services of primary importance 
to the majority of individuals must consider non-state as well as 
state sources of welfare.' 
7 If we want to look at welfare provision in advanced capitalist states 
and in the East Asian NICs, then it would be useful to use the 
analytical concept of civil society in discussing their welfare 
development. The concept of 'the welfare state' is historically and 
culturally specific and is used in a static manner. A better concept is 
that of 'welfare configuration'. That is a description of the different 
welfare provision between the state and various sectors of civil 
society in different countries. Using this concept one can capture the 
5' 
dynamics of the relationship between the state and civil society in 
welfare provision in different countries. 
8 Welfare configuration is determined to varying degrees by both the 
state and various sectors of civil society in different countries and is a 
result of historical development and changing state-civil society 
relations. One of the state's distinct features is that it marked the 
separation of politics from social relations [and civil society groups] 
and thus set up the requirement for a bond of citizenship and claim 
to special loyalty on the part of individual citizens' (Smelser 1994: 
61). Analytically, civil society is separate from the state, but 
empirically it is not completely separate from the state. In some 
areas, civil society and the state are overlapping. This also leads to 
the controversial issue of welfare provision: whether to increase or 
decrease the level of state intervention in civil society. 
9 One argument is that the state has been extending its role, and 
permeating the sphere of civil society. In this process, the state has 
eroded or replaced some functions of civil society. Concerning the 
future development of advanced capitalist states, 'the "new right" 
advocate curtailing its power whilst the left, and social democratic 
forces, continue to promote a vital role for the state in reforming 
advanced capitalist society' (McGrew 1992: 66). To some extent, the 
trend towards the privatization of welfare in many OECD countries 
can seen as an attempt to shrink state intervention, and activate civil 
society to carry out those functions previously performed by the 
state. 
10 When exploring the development of state and non-state sources of 
welfare in the developing countries, we should not neglect the 
political and economic context of those countries because their 
developmental dynamics have long been under the impact of the 
advanced capitalist world. Moreover, a full view of the state-civil 
society relation can not ignore their dynamic interaction with the 
world system, since no contemporary society is excluded from this 
system. The East Asian NICs, for example, have closely integrated 
into the global market and since the early 1970s have depended 
heavily on the capitalist world system. Their integration into the 
economies of the capitalist world system has also opened them up to 
the impact of Western democracy and welfare ideas. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
MODELS OF WELFARE CONFIGURATION: 
THE EAST ASIAN NICS AND OECD COUNTRIES 
COMPARED 
Known variously as the 'Four Little Tigers' or 'Four Little Dragons', 
Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan have rested on 
export-led manufacturing since the early 1970s and have moved into 
the ranks of the 'newly industrialising countries' (NICs). These four 
countries have achieved outstanding economic successes in the past 
three decades. Clearly, the salient economic features in the East Asian 
NICs are linked not only to their distinctive political and cultural 
features, but also to their different social welfare development. 
This chapter has two aims: describing the development of East 
Asian states and the place of welfare in them; and comparing the East 
Asian NICs and OECD countries by examining welfare expenditures 
and structure. 
The State Structure and the Social Structure 
in the East Asian NICs 
The relationship between the state and civil society with respect to 
welfare provision is clearly shown in the East Asian development 
model. As Pye (1988: 90-91) argues: 
Government's ideal, of course, is to create a bonding sense of 
family between labour, industry, and government. In return for 
pressures on labour to keep wage demands low, governments 
have insisted that employers should provide paternalistic 
security for labour; therefore, in the early stages of East industrial 
development companies rather than governments have had to 
bear the burden of welfare costs. In Korea and Taiwan, social 
security is still primarily the province of private companies, or 
even more often it is left to the families themselves. 
In the East Asian NICs, a strong and stable state was a key factor in 
facilitating past changes and creating the economic miracles. These 
four NICs have been 'development states' and sought to confirm 
political legitimacy via the pursuit of economic growth. Although 
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Hong Kong and Singapore appear to have accepted free market policies 
to a far greater degree than South Korea and Taiwan, Wades (1990) 
'governed market theory' of East Asian development shows that it is 
simply impossible to claim that free markets have been the leading 
determinants of economic growth. In fact, in Japan and the East Asian 
NICs which are so far the best examples of late industrialisation, the 
state performs a crucial role in directing and achieving the national 
goal of economic development. Indeed the governments in the East 
Asian NICs have been selectively interventionist, sometimes directing 
but more usually guiding the market, and always centring on the need 
for growth (Clark and Chan 1993: 1-18; Wade 1990). 
Some scholars also argue that through public housing and 
different welfare expenditures, the state in the East Asian NICs has 
extensively affected both price and reproduction of labour power (Lim 
1983; Castells et al. 1990; Schiffer 1991). In Hong Kong and Singapore, 
for example, the state provides the largest public housing systems in 
the world to subsidise wages and legitimate its political regimes. In the 
case of Singapore, by means of the Central Provident Fund the state 
has established a compulsory savings program of employer and 
employee contributions, while in Hong Kong using the monopoly of 
land ownership as a vital budgetary mechanism the state has also 
played a similar role in delivering a relatively extensive welfare 
provision by Asian standards. 
Recently, the most critical changes taking place in these four NICs 
are situated in the state-society relation. In the past three decades, all of 
these societies were ruled by authoritarian systems whose bureaucratic 
elites were not subject to socio-political pressures. Under the rule of a 
strong state, civil society is weak. Yet the trends of social development 
reveal that such a state-society relation is now being critically 
challenged by a more demanding civil society. This is particularly 
evident in South Korea and Taiwan, where, with the erosion of 
political consensus and bureaucratic unity, the state was obliged to 
respond to the specific needs of various groups in civil society so as to 
restructure its political legitimacy (Pye 1990: 5; Tien 1992; 1995). 
On the other hand, 'docile labour' is not an inherent feature but 
an interactive reflection between a strong state and a weak society. The 
state in the East Asian NICs frequently dealt repressively with internal 
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opposition, but such repression must be based on national ideology 
and be accepted by the populace. In recent years, both South Korea and 
Taiwan have experienced substantial worker mobilisation and the 
formation of new independent trade unions. This means that the 
state-society relation has changed and the state cannot neglect the rise 
of a demanding civil society (Henderson and Appelbaum 1992: 18). 
In South Korea and Taiwan, a higher standard of living and of 
education has unquestionably resulted in the growth of a civil society 
which demands participation in decision-making on public issues and 
policies. Even the rulers of Singapore have recognised this 'social fact'. 
However, in these societies the state is inclined to pre-empt such 
demands by incorporating the highly talented while suppressing the 
demands of the mass of the population. As a result, the problem of 
meeting this demand is likely to continue rather than disappear. A 
high standard of living and education by no means deflects the 
demands of civil society, but rather raises them. More specifically, they 
become an intermediate step and a channel for demands where the 
perception of one's worth as an equal person begins to loom large in 
individual estimation (Somjee and Somjee 1995: 203). 
The State-Society Relation in Hong Kong 
After China's defeat in the Opium War in 1842, Hong Kong became a 
British Crown Colony. Aside from occasional labour unrest, it was 
little influenced by China's internal political conflicts during the early 
twentieth century. The Japanese army invaded Hong Kong in 1941 and 
essentially destroyed its economy during the Second World War. After 
1945 the British government reinstated its rule in Hong Kong. Due to 
the approaching expiration of a ninety-nine-year lease on the New 
Territories, the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration stipulates that the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) will resume sovereignty over Hong 
Kong on July 1, 1997 as a 'Special Administrative Region'. 
The Role of the State 
As a British colony, Hong Kong had a highly centralised 
administrative machinery. Principal policies were formulated by the 
British government which appointed the colonial administration 
headed by a governor who in turn selected his advisers from local men 
of industry and finance. One of the main tasks of the governor was to 
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prevent Hong Kong becoming a financial burden on the British 
government. At the outset the colonial authorities made an effort to 
maintain law and order, and keep the port free and open to all. Such 
an effort was conducive to the later economic development of Hong 
Kong. 
Since the late 1940s the state in Hong Kong has not played as 
strong a role in economic development as it has in the other three East 
Asian NICs, and this is reflected in the state structure. Hong Kong's 
economy seems to represent laissez-faire principles and it has retained 
a pattern of minimal state intervention which has included the 
provision of infrastructural services in the past three decades. Yet the 
role of the state in the economy has been wider than is commonly 
thought. The most outstanding example of state influence on the 
economy can be found in the management of land. Using its 
ownership of land the state assists priority industries by selling them 
land or by providing them especially favourable terms such as lower 
interest rates. 
The colonial state has intervened directly from time to time to 
control perceived excesses in the market. In the 1970s, for instance, it 
checked rents for domestic premises, regulated rent rises and 
prohibited landlords from evicting sitting tenants (Burns 1991: 134). 
Like Singapore, the state in Hong Kong has been a main provider of 
public housing. After a disastrous Christmas Eve fire at Shek Kip Mei 
in 1953 that left 53,000 squatters homeless overnight, it was pressured 
to launch a housing program. By the mid-1990s about half of the 
colony's 6 million people were living in state-owned housing. It is 
hoped that 60% of Hong Kong families will own their own houses by 
the late 1990s (McLaughlin 1993). 
The public tenets of state rule in Hong Kong are: to stimulate 
growth, to reflect colonial government policies and to 'rule in the 
interest of the people' (Salaff 1990: 101). Although apparently not as 
intrusive as the other three East Asian NICs, the state in Hong Kong 
has been a crucial and growing factor in its economic miracle. From 
the viewpoint of the state-society relation, three features have been 
important to Hong Kong's economic success: a stable political 
environment that appreciated free enterprise; a strong, flexible and 
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relatively unified local business elite; and a weakly organised but 
diligent and docile labour force. 
Indeed, we should not underrate the key role of the state in Hong 
Kong in providing the necessary political stability for economic 
growth. It is particularly true that the role of the state has grown and 
become more important in recent years. Political stability in Hong 
Kong, most markedly during the 1970s, was a result of a stable state-
society relation and contributed to its economic success. To a large 
extent, such a state-society relation has been strained by Hong Kong's 
rapid economic growth. To maintain its political legitimacy and 
popular support the colonial state not only established consultative 
institutions but also sought to improve social welfare. The state in 
Hong Kong started to play a more active role in advancing working 
conditions and providing social welfare for industrial workers 
throughout the 1970s. This included enlarging the public housing 
program, dramatically expanding compulsory education, and 
improving social services (including medical care) (Burns 1991: 136). 
Widening Democracy and Emerging Civil Society 
In the mid-1960s in response to the needs of the working class the 
colonial state carried out a series of administrative reforms to advance 
government's connections with local communities and to increase 
social welfare. However, two decades later the new middle class, the 
main beneficiaries of economic growth, claimed a larger role in state 
decision-making. The rising middle class have thus become the 
supporters of the democrats in their push for democratisation in Hong 
Kong since the 1980s. Hong Kong's future after 1997 is uncertain, 
however. Incorporation into China may erode its political stability, and 
threaten Hong Kong's future economic growth in turn (Grant 1993: 
39). 
The democratisation process in Hong Kong was launched in 1985 
right after the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration came into force. In 
1988 the democrats criticised indirect election as conservative and 
limited only to the professional elites who composed less than one per 
cent of the Hong Kong population. They thus advocated the 
introduction of direct elections based on universal franchise. But the 
conservative businessmen and Chinese leaders were strongly resistant 
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to direct elections. The main reason was that they saw mass electoral 
politics as inimical to the prosperity and stability of a society in 
transition. Yet the Tiananmen event of 4 June 1989 facilitated the 
momentum for democratisation and its effect dominated formation of 
Hong Kong's political spectrum, which took shape around the issue of 
more or less democracy. 
The democrats have grasped the opportunities derived from the 
development of representative government to consolidate and extend 
since 1985. They used their position as elected legislators to criticise the 
colonial government and to articulate the discontent of the populace 
towards the government. These democrats won the support of the 
public, especially middle class professionals (Lam 1995: 57; Pepper 1995: 
57). One of the main purposes of the democrats is to obtain and 
consolidate as much as political power as possible to balance Chinese 
pressure after 1997. Thus in 1994 the United Democrats and Meeting 
Point were combined and formed a bigger party: the Democratic Party 
(DP). 
The emergence of the DP brought about a significant change in 
politics. The traditional elite bloc, coopted by the colonial government, 
was the rival of the new democrats. The traditional elites wished to 
maintain Hong Kong as a business city in favour of investment and 
production, while the new democrats encouraged a better social 
welfare system. During the 1994-95 legislative year, the colonial 
government proposed a list of unfinished business matters, in which 
approval for a proposed pension plan was an important issue. 
State Welfare Expectations: Recent Development 
With emigration, small flats and the lessening of the Chinese tradition 
of children's duty to care for their parents, more aged people are left to 
provide for themselves. Social trends in Hong Kong mean that the 
pension issue can not be postponed indefinitely and social change has 
intensified the arguments for state intervention. One striking factor is 
the growth of the ageing population. The other is its inadequate 
pension arrangements since only 30% of the workforce is covered by 
corporate pension funds, with another 5% protected by government 
pension schemes. The remainder of the workforce is unprotected and 
their conditions of employment are insecure. There is an existing 
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government social welfare assistance scheme for the elderly in Hong 
Kong, but its requirements are so austere that only a very small 
minority of the very poor qualify (Far Eastern Economic Review 
January 27, 1994: 24). 
Therefore when the colonial state announced the Old-age 
Pension Scheme (OPS) in December 1993, the response was generally 
warm if a bit startled. The OPS would provide HK$2,100 a month to 
anyone aged 65 or above. Employees and employers would each pay 
into a fund 3% of the wage bill. Likewise, the state in Hong Kong 
would throw in the money it currently spends on the elderly (about 
HK$3.5 billion) in 1994. The bill would amount to HK$13 billion in the 
first year and cover 550,000 people (The Economist April 30th 1994: 28). 
However, this new scheme was contested. Some considered that it was 
an 'unHong Kong' plan: the kind of generous but expensive social 
program that was beggaring the West. 
While they felt that the scheme was impressive in theory, they 
questioned whether Hong Kong ready for it. Some believed that with 
time running out before 1997 the British government would perhaps 
wash its hands of the problem, but beyond 1997 this scheme which 
involves extra government expenditure, seems to be unlikely to be 
given PRC approval. Others claimed it was purely a government 
manoeuvre to undermine the more popular idea of a central 
provident fund that has been urged forcefully by many interest groups 
in Hong Kong. 
In the period leading up to the PRC takeover in 1997, widening 
democracy and an emerging civil society in Hong Kong has caused a 
greater willingness to voice dissent. Under the circumstances, 
unemployment, public housing in disrepair and inappropriate welfare 
assistance were highlighted as important political issues by candidates 
for the Legislative Council (Legco) during the 1995 electoral campaigns. 
It is striking that 5 out of 19 Democrats' councillors are social workers 
and 'more than half the new members of Legco will push in favour of 
more cash payments for the elderly, single mothers and the 
unemployed' (Far Eastern Economic Review November 9, 1995: 36). 
Paradoxically, the colonial state itself may have produced the 
vigour for more entitlements. To some extent, the poor in Hong Kong 
have organised grassroots organisations as the state encouraged them 
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to do. According to the colonial government's Council of Social 
Services, there are about 370 social welfare groups in Hong Kong now 
and their number has almost tripled since 1970. On the one hand, 
these privately run groups can be seen as an expansion of the state 
welfare provision because they are subsidised with taxpayers' money 
and carry out about 85 % of the government's welfare work. On the 
other, they help people become more organised and vocal. This 
provides a means of social control for the state in that people's 
opinions can be expressed and social pressure can be reduced. 
According to Hong Kong's director of social welfare, 'welfare 
payments have increased by 33% in real terms' (Far Eastern Economic 
Review November 9, 1995: 36) since Governor Chris Patten arrived in 
1992. The colonial state also aims to increase some welfare payments. 
In the near future it will complete a review of all benefits, ranging 
from welfare to medical subsidies for the working poor. However, the 
rising tension in the state-society relation is hard to quantify. In a large 
measure, it depends on whether the state will respond fast enough to 
the demands of civil society. With respect to the future of welfare 
development in Hong Kong, it is unlikely that the government will 
deviate from its present position (McLaughlin 1993: 136). Chow (1995: 
182) argues that: 
... with the enlargement of democracy, and especially the 
establishment of political parties claiming to represent the 
interests of the people, it would no longer be possible for Hong 
Kong to return to residual-type welfare programmes. While it 
would be unlikely for Hong Kong to develop into a [Western 
style] "welfare state", the future development of social services in 
Hong Kong would probably command widest acceptance if 
policies keep in line with the prevalent welfare ideology which 
stresses, on the one hand, the self-reliance of the people and, on 
the other, the responsibility of government to look after weaker 
members. 
The State-Society Relation in Singapore 
Neo-classical economists argue that Singapore's remarkable economic 
success is the outcome of the 'free market' rather than state 
intervention. But the Singaporean development experience over the 
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past three decades reveals that the role of the state has been far from 
laissez-faire or non-interventionist. The state in Singapore aims to 
actively and flexibly respond to changing international markets and to 
intervene however or whenever necessary. Singapore's history since 
1959 is frequently quoted as an example of successful modernisation. 
Yet, it could be argued that without state intervention in the labour 
market and in the areas of social infrastructure, Singapore's success 
would not exist. To a great extent, its success has been ascribed to the 
role of the state, its leadership skills rather than to the use of any 
particular techniques for economic development. 
From the outset, the priority of state development in Singapore 
was to accumulate wealth via economic growth, rather than to 
redistribute the wealth through state welfare provisions (Siong 1994: 
52). Yet, originally a massive investment in social infrastructure was 
necessary for economic development. The Singapore government 
provides the working class with appropriate education, health care and 
housing. It not only incorporates the working class into the 
industrialising process, but also creates a disciplined, motivated and 
skilled workforce to attract much needed foreign investments. 
Social welfare provisions as a mechanism of social control have 
also been created for many purposes, including the goal of economic 
transformation. The state in Singapore is more systematic in 
incorporating social policy into its development strategy than the other 
East Asian NICs. Such a strategy relies upon state intervention in 
essential services, not only permitting the government to distribute 
the hardships of economic stabilisation more equally, but also allowing 
state officials to gain the cooperation of all main sectors of civil society 
with belt-tightening policies. In a large measure, this strategy has 
enabled Singapore to manage its national economy more effectively 
than Taiwan in response to the changing global economic 
environment which occurred in the 1970s and early 1980s (Chu 1989: 
670). 
Political stability is a near obsession for the leaders of the People 's 
Action Party (PAP). Singapore's rapid economic growth during the 
1970s offered substantial improvements in social welfare which 
included near full employment, rising wages, expanded education, 
heavily subsidised public housing, upgraded health care, and the 
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elimination of poverty. All of these not only satisfy the basic needs of 
the working class and urban middle class, but also provide a significant 
base for constant electoral votes for the PAP (Deyo 1991: 79). In this 
sense, the state in Singapore by providing extensively essential services 
seems more 'socialist' than most states in developing countries (Lim 
1983: 752-765); it 'has a significant "sui generis" welfare state' (CasteIls 
et al. 1990: 187). 
From the perspective of the state-society relation, all major policy 
initiatives in the area of public housing, education, political 
institutions, and the legal regime have had the implicit objective of 
reinforcing the regime's capacity for social control. According to 
Tremewan (1994), the state in Singapore owned some 26 per cent of the 
land area of the city-state in 1968, but now it owns more than 75 per 
cent and is authorised to gain land without restriction. Consequently, 
until 1992 87% of the population were living in public housing 
(Government of Singapore 1992b: 152). This then provided the 
government a wide range of social controls by which it could 
intervene in everyday life in Singapore. Such political power has been 
particularly used to serve political purposes. For instance, in 1985 the 
Singapore government stated that 'it would give priority to the 
upgrading and improvement of housing estates which were in PAP 
constituencies' (Cotton 1995: 559). 
The extent of state intervention in economic and social 
development varies in the East Asian NICs. While the state of the East 
Asian NICs strongly guides economic development, the level to which 
the state intervenes is different. Compared with South Korea and 
Taiwan, Singapore's state intervention in the area of the economic 
development is lesser, but in social development it is relatively 
greater. A comprehensive national pension scheme and an extensive 
public housing program are the best exemplars. However, they could 
not succeed without the adoption of the Central Provident Fund (CPF). 
The CPF is at the centre of the web of social welfare provision in 
Singapore. It started in 1955 under the colonial government, but was 
vastly expanded and changed under the PAP. As the main income 
maintenance program for the elderly, its main purpose is to enable 
Singaporeans to save for their lives after retirement. Basically, the CPF 
is a pension fund managed by the government with compulsory 
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contributions provided by employees and employers, and earning a 
rate of interest decided by the government. The CPF has functioned at 
many levels and served many objectives apart from the functions of 
social security and economic growth per se, particularly the social and 
political purpose related to the public housing program. 
Singapore's population is not homogeneous: 76% are Chinese, 
15% Malays and 6% Indians, and even the Chinese consist of some 
different dialect groups. Consequently, the potential for ethnic tension 
within Singapore society is well understood by the government, who 
have so far been able to control it. In order to integrate the non-
Chinese more entirely the state has adopted different strategies. The 
PAP has been adept at defusing ethnic as well as class issues. Its 
responsibility for some basic social welfare provisions has played a 
crucial role in dulling the divisions of ethnicity and class. Under its 
public housing policy, for example, the state regulates the percentage of 
Malays in its Housing Development Board flats to 25% to reduce 
ethnic segregation. Also, housing ownership is encouraged and 
subsidised by the state via low mortgage rates and by the provision of 
concessions for some low-income families. The aim of the state is to 
have all its public housing owned by the end of this century. 
To some extent, the weakness of civil society can be demonstrated 
by the high degree of state control. To control the circulation of foreign 
publications which the government claimed were involved in 
domestic politics, the 1986 amendment of the Newspaper and Printing 
Press Act was passed. To control the National University the 
government has a direct say in the appointment of senior 
administrators and deans of faculties, the activities of the student 
union and the content of education (Paul 1993: 296). To keep wages low 
to aid economic development the trade unions were checked in the 
early 1970s and put under the control of a tripartite National Wages 
Commission, a grouping of employers, unions and government 
officials. Even in the housing area which is seen as one of the most 
important state welfare provisions, the government has created a wide 
network of grass-root organisations and committees to interact with 
the inhabitants. 
In large measure, Singapore's political culture is inclined to 
justify its authoritarian regime by Confucianism. It is clear that 
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'Confucian' or 'Asian' values have been employed as the legitimating 
backbone of Singapore's development policy and this was specially 
evident in the 1980s as Singapore faced cultural impact from the West. 
Inevitably, when Singapore is integrated into the capitalist world 
system, it faces challenges from the Western democracies. The PAP 
government differs from the Taiwanese and South Korean 
government in its response to these challenges. The former is 
attempting to persuade its citizens that the introduction of the 
Western democracy to the East Asian countries is questionable while 
the latter two have been democratising since the late 1980s (Chua 1993, 
1994, 1995; Mauzy 1995: 179-183). 
Resistance to Western democracy is clearly embodied in a speech 
made by Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the World Trade Centre, 
Singapore, August 12, 1995. He speaks about what he sees as an 
underlying sense of cultural superiority in the American media. He 
argues that from such a sense of cultural superiority the American 
media praises Taiwan, Korea, the Philippines or Thailand for 
becoming democratic and having a free press, but assaults Singapore as 
'authoritarian, dictatorial, an over-ruled, over-restricted, stifling, 
sterile society' (The Straits Times Weekly Edition August 19 1995: 13). 
He defends the Singapore government arguing that it knows how it 
should govern its society and be responsible for Singapore's own 
survival. What Singapore needs is an open but not disordered society 
to compete internationally. If the Singapore government turns bad, its 
citizens can dismiss the government and change it at the next election. 
Also, he claims that the American media's ideas are theories not 
proven in East Asia, 'when it is proven that these countries have 
become better societies than Singapore, in five or 10 years' (ibid), 
Singapore will follow them and try to catch up. 
However, a price was paid for a rapid social transformation in 
terms of the nature of its political development. Singapore created 
what Vogel (1989) called a 'meritocracy' in the area of public decision-
making, which almost excluded from participation all except those in 
charge of policy-making. As Vogel (1989: 1064) notes, 'there is danger 
that overconfidence (critics might say arrogance) among the select elite 
may distance them from the populace, thereby reducing the feedback 
from the public to the leaders and eventually creating sufficient 
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alienation to limit the freedom of manoeuvre of the bureaucrats.' 
Under the circumstances, the state-society relation has become blurred 
rather than distinct and society in Singapore will be governed by a 
'political elite in the foreseeable future (Chan 1989). Undoubtedly, the 
challenge for this political elite is how to continue the ability of the 
state to make quick but effective decisions while becoming more 
sensitive in response to an increasingly better educated public and 
more demanding civil society. 
The ideological welfare strategy that has worked well before the 
1990s may now be challenged increasingly by the emergence of an 
affluent society and class differentiation. Similarly, ethnic tensions are 
at best temporarily concealed rather than permanently erased, and will 
affect the political stability and the economic growth of the state. The 
Malays are gradually becoming unhappy with their situation in 
Singapore: their low economic status, forced resettlement into high 
rise apartment blocks, and the government policy to keep them out of 
the armed forces. The recent campaign to advocate a national ideology 
based on Confucianism is also regarded as part of the PAP strategy to 
further exclude the Malays (Paul 1993: 300). 
Inevitably, the ordinary people's expectations will increase in line 
with the wealth of the state. The PAP government's 'levelling up' 
policy announced just before the 1991 general election agrees that there 
are gaps in Singapore society. But how the goal of 'levelling up' can be 
achieved is not clear. Even though the government has introduced 
new schemes, such as Medifund to help the poor pay hospital bills and 
Edusave to help Singaporean children, the government's idea of 
welfare provisions 'to help people help themselves' remains basically 
unchanged (Siong 1994: 51-54). 
The Singapore government is confronted with the problem of 
how to manage the welfare issues successfully, produce rapid 
economic growth and sustain social cohesion and stability. In some 
measure, the loss of three parliamentary seats and of a slipping 
popular vote in the 1991 general election not only can be seen as a 
signal of discontent from civil society, but also indicates that the 
current welfare strategy has become problematic (Mutalib 1993: 194-195; 
Siong 1994: 51). When class differentiation within Singapore society 
becomes more visible and less tolerable, it is difficult to see how the 
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government's communitarian welfare strategy can deal with the 
growth of class contradictions within a capitalist economic 
development. Inevitably, if Singapore's social cohesion and stability is 
at stake, then this will in turn influence its economic performance. 
Like the other NICs, the welfare issue will dominate the next stage of 
Singapore's development. 
The State-Society Relation in South Korea 
Many factors have fostered South Korea's rapid economic growth. 
Some cite South Korea's Confucian background as an advantage; its 
emphasis on education to promote the development of the technically 
trained personnel to design and achieve economic growth. Others cite 
South Korea's favourable international environment; the capitalist 
world system was booming just as the nation began its export 
expansion, and the United States aided its postwar economic recovery 
and provided a market to absorb south Korean exports. Some even cite 
the Korean War as a stimulant; it offered an 'international shock' to 
drive the people out of complacency and encouraged a strong sense of 
competition with North Korea. However, the functioning of these 
factors are due to South Korea's unique natural and historical 
environment which have shaped its development in a distinct way. It 
would be a distortion to cite the reasons for the country's economic 
success without giving adequate attention to the state-society relation 
in South Korea. 
Historically, Korea has had a long history as a Confucian nation. 
Choson, a typically Confucian dynasty, lasted in Korea from 1392 until 
it became a Japanese colony in 1910, and it was not independent until 
1945. Confucianism has left a legacy of the primacy of the centralised 
state and its bureaucracy. Though this legacy has served the basis of an 
interventionist state, it has left few means by which society can check 
abuses of political power (Lee 1991: 144-147). 
Japanese colonialism has also left a legacy in Korea. Under the 
Japanese rule the state continued in its position of primacy, for the 
colonial government strengthened and modernised it. The state in the 
colony played a more active role in directing the economy and 
distributing resources to meet the needs of the Japanese empire. 
During Japan's involvement in the Second World War the colonial 
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government took total control of Korea's labour and resources. By 1948 
two regimes were formed, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Later, the Korean War (1950-53) 
broke out, and during this period the relationship between the ROK 
and US broadened. American aid and economic advisers were sent to 
help ROK set out an economic plan and start postwar reconstruction 
(Harland 1992: 19-20; Lee 1991: 149-150). 
By 1958 South Korea's economy had lost its impetus. Political 
factors were probably responsible for the slowdown. The Rhee regime 
was more interested in political survival than in economic 
development, while in 1960 the government embraced a 
comprehensive seven year economic development plan for the first 
time in South Korean history. Rhee's regime was overthrown by a 
revolt in 1960 and a year or so later, Major General Park Chung Hee 
seized power in a military coup. In the postwar era, the stimulus for 
economic development in South Korea came from the state. Yet the 
leading energy for South Korean economic development started in 
1960 and it was under the policies of the Park regime (1961-79) that 
South Korea created its remarkable economic growth. 
Economic success did not prevent internal rivalries and 
factionalism, though it muted public resentment at the harshness of 
the Park regime. Park lost his strength in the face of criticism of his 
dictatorship as economic development lost its momentum in the late 
1970s. In 1979 Park was assassinated by one of his military colleagues. 
Another general, Chun Doo Hwan, took control of the government by 
force. Chun's regime proved to be even harsher than Park's. Then 
students, encouraged by middle class parents, took to the streets to 
protest against repression. Ultimately, in 1987 Chun was forced to hand 
over to another general, Roh Tae Woo, who fast acceded to the 
protesters' demands. The election in 1992 of President Kim Young 
Sam, the first nonmilitary President in some three decades, has been 
seen as a turning point in the process of democratisation in South 
Korea by some scholars (Lee 1993; Lee and Sohn 1995: 30-31; McKay 
1993: 68-69). 
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Democratisation and the Rise of Civil Society 
From the perspective of the changing state-society relation, the 
democratic transition in South Korea since the late 1980s has contained 
three key elements: liberalization of the regime, activation of civil 
society and the relative weakening of the state (Lee 1993). 
Fundamentally, liberalization refers to the loosening of direct state 
control over civil society and is a necessary condition for 
democratisation. Indeed civil society is developing, and the 
relationship between the state and civil society is being reconstructed 
in South Korea. But what social group provided the significant push to 
ensure political change? According to Lee (1993: 359), it was the new 
urban middle class, together with students and blue-collar workers. 
The new middle class formed a central social force in leading social 
movements during the late 1980s and the early 1990s. This implies that 
an educated population and a large middle class are key forces 
militating against any deterioration into chaos. 
The new types of social movements obtaining momentum in 
South Korean society can be seen as indicators for the activation of 
civil society. The distinct features of these 'civil society movements', 
such as antipollution, environmental protection and economic justice 
movements, are that they transcend class interests and their issues and 
areas are relevant to the society as a whole. In this sense civil society 
movements are not essentially against the capitalist system but rather 
stress distorted and unjust aspects of that system. The political model 
they seek is a social democratic model with an emphasis on the welfare 
state. To what extent the civil society movements will succeed is 
articulated with the future achievement of a regime rooted in the 
welfare state. As Lee (1993: 367) claims, 
If, indeed, civil society gets more activated and organised, if 
diverse movements within civil society become successful to the 
extent that they curtail the arbitrary exercise of power by the state, 
and if the "progressive coalition" by removing existing cleavages 
between labour and civil society actually emerges, then civil 
democracy with a certain degree of social welfare will be a viable 
model in Korea. 
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The state in South Korea is no longer insulated from the demands of 
civil society as it was in the earlier period. The various interest groups 
including business, students, labour, and farmers have attempted to 
exert influence on government policies in favour of their demands 
and interests. Whang (1991) thus predicts that South Korean social 
development toward the year 2000 will be reflected in broadened 
attempts to provide for all members of society. Whang (1991: 113) 
argues that: 
Despite the gradual introduction and expansion of the national 
welfare pension system, increasing welfare demands from senior 
citizens will be met by inducing the public to observe the 
responsibilities of an extended family based on traditional values 
and partly by providing tax incentives for families that support 
elderly parents. ... On the other hand, the livelihood of the 
helpless, such as the mentally and physically handicapped and 
the elderly without family support, will be protected by expanding 
the national public assistance programs, in spite of the limited 
financial resources of the government. 
However, what seems most unlikely is that South Korea will attain 
the thriving level of Western democracies in the near future. As far as 
actual effects and policy outcomes are concerned, the civil society 
movements put only limited pressures on the state. At the same time 
the governmental strategy in South Korea is not to develop and 
maintain a social infrastructure or a 'Western-style welfare state' 
package of social services but to use Confucian virtues regarding 
informal caregiving in the three-generation family as the legitimation 
for its social policy (Palley 1992: 788-789). Like the other three East 
Asian NICs , welfare development in South Korea is likely to 
maintain a family-oriented welfare provision rather than to move 
toward a 'Western-style welfare state'. This orientation can be seen in 
its recent welfare development. 
Recent Welfare Development 
The government's rationale for promoting 'Confucianism' and family 
responsibility in the East Asian NICs and Japan seems to be taken for 
granted. South Korea's political leaders also tend to believe that 
government support of income and social services programs to aid 
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members of the family, particularly the elderly, would replace family 
care and thus weaken the cultural values of Confucianism. In 
addition, the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), the dominant political 
party in South Korea, has pursued a development model that 
highlights industrial development and economic growth. 
This political-economic orientation makes it difficult to reduce 
any social stress factors via the development of a social welfare 
infrastructure because of its emphasis on economic development. Due 
to the stimulation of industrialisation by government, for example, a 
high concentration of industries and population in main cities—
particularly in Seoul and the Seoul region— housing and public-
service insufficiency has been exacerbated. Such an orientation has 
ended in 'a policy of minimal social services and income maintenance; 
it particularly offers no social programs in-home and community-
based services for intact Korean Families' (Palley 1992: 788). 
The lack of an infrastructure of social welfare and income-
maintenance policies in South Korea is bound up with its economic 
development strategy. Like its East Asian counterparts, human 
resource development in South Korea is seen a prerequisite for 
economic growth. Priority is placed on the area of education rather 
than public social service or housing, and the cost of the former is 
more than 10% of the GNP. In addition, only US$2,472,000 or 0.17% of 
the total national budget was spent on programs for the elderly in 1990, 
and public assistance and social service came to just 1% of the national 
budget (Palley 1992: 792). To a large extent, this can be seen as in 
conformity with Confucian values which emphasise the importance of 
education in maintaining social order and/or fostering essential 
development. 
In 1988 South Korea enacted two noteworthy social insurance 
schemes— the National Pension and National Health Insurance. Like 
any other country which has a public pension program, South Korea's 
public pension system is at the heart of the retirement income security 
system. The sources of funds for the National Pension Scheme (NPS) 
are contributions from employees and employers, government 
subsidies for administrative costs, and interest accruing to the 
accumulated fund. Initially, the contribution rate was fixed at 3% for 
the five years between 1988 and 1992, then was increased to 6% for five 
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years between 1993 and 1997 and finally will be 9% after 1998 (Munnell 
1993; Yoo 1993: 486). 
Under the NPS there are four sorts of benefits: old-age pension, 
invalid pension, survivor pension and lump-sum refund. The basic 
old-age pension is to be paid to those who turn 60 and have been 
insured for at least 20 years. But coverage under the NPS itself is still 
limited. This plan aims to cover all employed persons between the 
ages of 18 and 60 who are not covered under one of the other public 
pension programs. At the outset, coverage was limited to work places 
with 10 or more employees because these firms had readily available 
wages statements. From 1992, coverage was expanded to workplaces 
with 5 to 9 employees, and coverage for self-employed, including 
farmers and fishermen, is optional. The ultimate goal of the NPS is to 
cover all work places and workers. 
South Korea's health security consists of the National Health 
Insurance Scheme (NHIS) and the Medical Aid program. The NHIS is 
based on the health insurance program which was launched in 1977. It 
is a compulsory social insurance scheme to provide citizens with access 
to necessary health care and covers 93% of the population. The 
remaining 7% are the poor, who are covered by the Medical Aid 
program which was also initiated in 1977. It is a public assistance 
program for medical care supported by the government. Originally the 
health insurance program was compulsory for all firms having 500 or 
more employees. At the beginning of 1979, civil servants and private 
school teachers were contained under complementary legislation. In 
the early stages of 1988, the program was enlarged to include the self-
employed in rural areas. Finally, the self-employed in urban areas 
became insured and universal coverage was realised in the middle of 
1989 (Kwon 1993: 566). 
The NHIS system is composed of three different types of insured: 
1 All regular employees, employers, and their dependents of industrial 
enterprises employing 5 or more persons. 
2 Civil servants, all private school teachers and support staff and their 
dependents, military personnel's dependents. 
3 Self-employed, and pensioners in urban and rural areas. 
Dependents of these three types include spouse, parents, grandparents, 
children, grandchildren, father-in-law, mother-in-law, brothers and 
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sisters of the insured excluding those who make their living 
independently of the insured. 
The premium size is determined by membership, but has to fall 
within a range of 3-8 percent of the wage bills. Only the insured are 
asked to pay premiums while family dependents are free from 
payments. Contribution is equally shared by employees and employers. 
For example, if the rate set is 6%, then employees pay 3%, and 
employers match this. Contributions in the case of type 3 are paid fully 
by the insured at a flat rate on the basis of income, assets and number 
of dependents. 
The schemes that normally make social spending large, pension 
and health insurance, 'have so far accounted for relatively little of 
government spending in Korea' (Friedman and Hausman 1993: 149). 
They have certainly improved the relative position of low income 
earners. However, they were initiated in a hurry, and unexpected 
problems arose. One notable example is the financial difficulties that 
both schemes will face in the future. As some scholars have pointed 
out, the health insurance system today in South Korea is in no way an 
outcome of systematic and planned efforts (Kwon 1993: 565; Yoo 1993: 
483). 
As in the case of Taiwan, the initiative of health insurance in 
South Korea was the by-product of abrupt decision-making by a 
political leader. Therefore, it does not sufficiently take into account the 
needs of the insured and the long-term goals of the health insurance 
system. To some extent, these measures have been implemented in 
response to the growth of a demanding civil society since the 1980s. 
This historical background probably illustrates why South Korea has 
embraced a health insurance system similar to Taiwan's with a lack of 
long-term perspective. 
The State-Society Relation in Taiwan 
Taiwan returned to China and became a province of the Republic of 
China again at the end of the Second World War. Yet due to the civil 
war between the KMT (Kuomintang, or Nationalist) and the CCP 
(Chinese Communist Party), economic catastrophe seemed 
unavoidable. A huge proportation of Taiwan's resources was still 
converted to mainland China by the KMT to support the war. Under the 
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circumstances, serious inflation became a source of worsening state-
society relations. This in turn provoked the 2-28 Incident of 1947. In this 
incident, the struggle of Taiwanese people against the officials of the 
KMT spread rapidly over the whole island, and eventually the KMT 
used the army to suppress the protest. It is generally believed that some 
of the dead were the local elites. Even now the 2-28 Incident is still 
regarded as the root of the mainlanders-Taiwanese complex and the 
origin of the political opposition movement in Taiwan. 
To adequately understand the Taiwanese developmental 
experience it is essential to examine the interaction of the state and civil 
society. Traditionally, the East Asian state has been seen as strong or 
active rather than weak or passive in seeking to affect civil society. Yet 
since the state-society relation in Taiwan is a dynamic one, civil society 
has also taken a flexible response to adjust to the potential changes 
deriving from the new form of the state-society relation. After the 2-28 
Incident, the KMT built its authoritarian regime with strong control on 
the island when it was defeated in mainland China and retreated to 
Taiwan. Under the rule of the KMT, Taiwan's society has not only 
undergone impressive development towards industrialisation but has 
also experienced rapid economic growth. Essentially, economic 
development and the changing state-society relation can be divided into 
three periods in postwar Taiwan (Hsiao 1992): 
• The 'state over society' period, 1947 -62. All spheres of public life were 
totally dominated by the party-military state, and civil society 
unavoidably fell into the complete control of the KMT state apparatus. 
Political consideration was seen as the national primary goal, and 
economic rebuilding and solidity were given prime concern both for 
the political survival of the regime and for the developmental ground 
of Taiwan's society. Government policies focused on the 
development of industry for people's livelihood, such as fertilisers 
and textiles, so as to reduce imports and save foreign reserves. 
• The 'economic growth first' period, 1963-78. Economic growth was 
incorporated into the KMT state priority agenda for ruling Taiwan. By 
so doing, it performed many measures to stimulate foreign 
investments, and set up the Export Processing Zones to boost exports 
and accumulate foreign reserves. The shift of developmental strategy 
from Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) to the Export Oriented 
73 
Industrialisation (EOI) has also led to a change in social structure: 
expanding small and medium-sized enterprises, the formation of 
private capitalists, the appearance of an urban middle class and an 
increased number of working class. Because of the energy crises and 
decreasing demands of the world market since the mid-1970s, the 
government started a bold commitment to infrastructural 
development with the Ten Major Construction Projects in the late 
1970s to promote economic growth through public investments. By 
the late 1970s, political and economic forces combined to accelerate 
capitalist development. On the other hand, some 'root seeking efforts 
to redefine the nature of Taiwan's society have been engendered by 
diverse sectors of civil society, but these efforts have been made by the 
intellectuals. In short, during this period the KMT regime still 
dominated most facets of the economy, albeit that economic 
considerations permitted the advance of new economic interests 
which affected the state. Clearly civil society was riot yet mobilised 
sufficiently to question explicitly the power of the authoritarian 
regime, though the political opposition actually had already won 
support from the populace. 
• The 'struggling of the welfare state or welfare society' period, 1979-the 
present. The 1980s were another starting point of industrial 
development for the KMT state, induced by forceful government 
promotion of strategic, technology-intensive industries. The first 
science-based industrial park for Taiwan was established in 1981 in 
Hsinchu. By 1990, technology-intensive, heavy industrial and 
chemical products made up 54 percent of the nation's total exports, 
while another 40 percent represented the output of information, 
electronic and machinery industries (ROC 1993: 201). Taiwan's 
economy is entirely integrated with the global economy, and the KMT 
state has set further internationalisation and liberalization as its 
leading economic goals of the 1990s. In the last decade, economic 
development also provided a precondition for the emergence of a 
civil society. A typical feature of the rise of civil society in Taiwan is 
an increased call for the readjustment of the exis ting relationship 
between the state and civil society (Hsiao 1992: 58-59). Consequently, 
the state has begun to respond more actively to the demands of civil 
society and has introduced some welfare measures, such as the 
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National Health Insurance Scheme and the Older Farmer Pension for 
its citizens. 
The KMT party-state's control over Taiwan's civil society for the first 
three decades of its rule was hegemonic. In the 1980s, with economic 
development and rapid change, civil society in Taiwan was no longer 
passive and became more prosperous, more differentiated, and more 
fluid (Gold 1991a: 1; Hsiao 1991: 136). We can further examine Taiwan's 
welfare state development by reviewing the history of the eroding and 
restructuring of state legitimacy, the emergence of civil society, and the 
struggle of welfare state-society relations in Taiwan in the 50 years after 
World War II. 
The Eroding and Restructuring of State legitimacy 
State legitimacy has been serious challenged since the 1970s. Two 
significant events radically eroded the KMT state legitimacy. One 
occurred in 1971, when China's seat in the United Nations was lost by 
the Beijing government, forcing a withdrawal by the Taiwanese 
delegation. The other was in 1979, when the United States normalised 
diplomatic relations with Beijing. The KMT regime thus lost its 
powerful supporter which justified its monopoly of power. After this 
country after country moved its embassy from Taipei to Beijing, until 
by 1990 only about two dozen countries remain to uphold diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan. The ROC on Taiwan has seemingly lost its 
international identity, but it is a fact that many countries in the world 
still maintain economic ties with Taiwan, and in several cases both 
sides have started trade offices which play a quasi-consulate's role. 
The KMT state not only faces international changes, but also 
meets currently continuous challenges from a demanding civil society. 
The KMT regime's state legitimacy has been eroded by the impact of 
the challenges from internal civil society and the loss of external 
international identity. In such circumstances, it must make efforts to 
restructure its state legitimacy along with adequate responses to the 
demands of civil society. The rise of civil society in Taiwan is one of 
the prominent features of social change over the last decade. More 
importantly, it can be said that the growth of civil society plays a crucial 
role in Taiwan's political transition and welfare development. 
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Social Movements and Civil Society 
In the 1980s Taiwan presented a distinct and complex picture in which 
the rising of social movements and the erosion of the state regime 
combined, leading to a change in state-society relations. As Gold (1991a: 
23) observes, 'Taiwan offers a singular laboratory to examine the rise of 
social movements within civil society'. In the transition from 'hard' to 
'soft' authoritarianism (Winckler 1984), these new emerging social 
movements were a catalyst. Since the 1980s a demanding civil society 
in Taiwan has exhibited the following striking features. 
First, the changing nature of Taiwan's civil society in 1980s was 
via the mobilisation of its members to form a new kind of 
'participatory political culture' (Hsiao 1992: 70). Such a participatory 
political culture both encouraged ordinary people to participate in the 
existing system by way of collective actions and to learn from their 
actions, such as learning how to make claims on the state. 
Second, social conflicts between various classes are not the main 
source of the organised mobilising movements; instead the state very 
often became the ultimate target of social movements. Civil society, by 
virtue of social movements, has made an effort to gain more 
autonomy from the state and in turn progressively to influence the 
direction of the state, including the diverse spheres of public policy. 
Third, the KMT state has been compelled to adjust and re-adjust 
existing state-society relations so as to respond to challenges from the 
demanding civil society. The pressures from civil society could no 
longer be neglected, even though many responses from the state were 
not adequate to satisfy the demands of civil society. 
Fourth, when ordinary people were aware that the state was both 
overlooking their demands and restricting their movements, the aims 
of struggle altered to become a force for political reform and this also 
led to a rapid politicization of civil society. One observer notes that 'the 
rapid politicization of social movements was enhanced by their 
interactions with the political movement... The involvement of the 
opposition movement had important impacts on the development of 
civic organisations and social movements' (Ngo 1993: 13). 
Fifth, in restructuring state legitimacy, civil society via social 
movements also had a positive influence on future state-society 
relation. As long as the state could more effectively respond to the 
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demands of civil society, its legitimacy could be supported and 
consolidated by civil society. Both the state and civil society were 
looking for new chances to justify their positions, but how to create a 
prospect of 'double winner will, it seems, become their common goal 
in the future. 
From the Hegemonic (Warfare) State to State Involvement in Welfare 
Economic growth in Taiwan is also accompanied by some social 
problems, such as an increase in numbers of dependent elderly people, 
increasing crime rates, growing environmental damage and calls for 
housing due to overcrowding in urban areas. All these have forced the 
KMT government to give more attention to social and cultural related 
programs. For example, the government invested a total of NT$6,707 
million in public housing projects from 1956 to 1979, and public 
expenditures on education and culture as a percentage of the total 
government expenditure increased from 14.6% in 1961 to 17.2% in 1979 
(Tsai and Chang 1985: 243). The government has increasingly 
recognised that non-economic development in the modernisation 
process has an important position. The new Ten-Year Economic 
Development Plan (1980-1989) can be seen as a striking response to 
these social problems, for improvements to the general welfare and 
livelihood of the people in Taiwan became one of its developmental 
goals. 
In 1973 the first major social welfare program in Taiwan was 
passed, with financial assistance from the United Nations 
International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF). To a large extent, 
it was external pressure that drove the government to enact the 1973 
Welfare Law for the Children. This factor seems to become more 
obvious after the Republic of China on Taiwan was forced to give up 
the seat of China' and left the United Nations. Undoubtedly, the 
withdrawal of UNICEF's programs, the mid-1970s oil crisis, and 
economic depression all combined to cause a negative impact on the 
development of social welfare in general and especially the 
enforcement of the Welfare Law for the Children. When the 
worldwide economic recession led a decline in export revenue, social 
welfare programs were seen as a particularly heavy burden on the 
nation's economy. Under the circumstances, it was not surprising that 
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the government focused on a rapid economic recovery, and no social 
welfare program was enacted from 1974 to 1979. 
In 1980, the KMT government again enacted three social 
programs: Welfare Law for the Aged, Welfare Law for the Disabled and 
Social Assistance Law. Certainly the formal establishment of 
diplomatic relations between United States and the People's Republic 
of China (PRC) in 1979 was a significant challenge to the KMT regime, 
yet it is an exaggerated claim that these three social welfare programs 
were purely by-products of the crisis of the US—PRC normalisation 
declaration. This simplistic view neglects the influence of internal 
factors. From the viewpoint of state legitimacy, these enactments of 
social welfare legislation reflected the dynamic process of eroding and 
restructuring of state legitimacy under both external and internal 
pressures and the awakening of civil society. 
Specifically, in addition to economic recovery, the internal 
pressures resulting from the Chung-li Incident of 1977 and the 
Kaohsing Incident of 1979, which can be seen as two key actions of 
political dissent by civil society, also challenged the KMT regime's 
hegemony. As Gold (1991a: 16) notes, 'intellectuals, with expanding 
popular support, began to challenge the KMT's political, social and 
cultural hegemony in civil society. It was not until the KMT 
confronted a barrage of unprecedented internal and external crises, 
however, that the societal challenge bore fruit'. In this sense the 
eroding and restructuring of state legitimacy and the awakening of 
civil society gave an important boost to social welfare development in 
Taiwan. When state legitimacy was challenged by the 'double 
pressures' of the loss of international identity and the discontent of 
civil society, the government was led to use social welfare programs as 
a defence mechanism and 'a stabilising measure in dealing with 
growing internal demands from the public for a larger share of 
national wealth and power' (Tsai and Chang 1985: 254). 
We could be easily led to the conclusion, then, that Taiwan is 
shifting swiftly from a hegemonic (warfare) state to a state committed 
to extensive welfare provision. However, the lack of substance to 
welfare legislation and its poor rate of fulfilment all kept Taiwan far 
from committed to welfare. In a sense the enactment of these four 
social welfare programs prior to 1980 in Taiwan was more a result of 
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political considerations than of concern for the well-being of ordinary 
people. As Chan (1985: 351) argues: 
[T]he enactment of these laws occurred to relieve political 
pressure rather than to meet perceived social welfare needs. They 
function more as an expedient measure to avoid social unrest 
rather than as a genuine basis for the provision of welfare 
services. 
It is not surprising that all of these four Welfare Laws have been 
amended since 1993 or are being amended. This more or less reflects 
the fact that the emergence of civil society and social movements has 
seen calls for the state to bear more welfare responsibilities for distinct 
population groups since the 1980s (Chan 1992: 128). 
During the 1980s, Taiwan experienced a rapid change in its social 
structure which led to various social movements calling for more 
welfare responsibilities from the state for some groups of the 
population, such as the homeless, the disabled, the aged, and children. 
As Taiwan entered the 1990s, this pressure forced the Government to 
declare that the National Health Insurance Scheme would be fulfilled 
by 1995 from the original deadline of 2000. 
To some extent, such changes are a product of the changing state-
society relation and are also a reflection of the KMT's strategy to 
succeed in the General Elections. In this sense the eroding and 
restructuring of the KMT's state legitimacy and the rise and demands 
of civil society are an interlacing and interactive process. Clearly, the 
process of the development of civil society and of a new relationship 
between the state and society as a whole will go on through the next 
decade (Lin 1990: 174). 
Yet there is no evidence to show that Taiwan will aspire to state- 
oriented welfare, particularly a Swedish-style welfare state in the 
foreseeable future. For several reasons it will probably move towards a 
welfare society rather than towards a welfare state in the narrow sense. 
First, the traditional Chinese culture that emphasises the key role of 
the family in welfare provision will continue to operate, and any 
radical change away from this seems unlikely in the immediate future. 
Second, Taiwan heavily relies on export trade, and economic 
growth as a key means of maintaining state legitimacy. If Taiwan 
wants to maintain economic growth in a competitive world system, it 
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is likely the government will invest more capital in economic 
development rather than social welfare development. 
Third, political democratisation and politicization of civil society 
might be conducive to social welfare development, but this does not 
mean that the state will easily adopt a form of the state-oriented 
welfare. There are other means to restructure state legitimacy, the 
development of welfare is not the only choice. The Old-age Pension 
Scheme, for example, was advocated first by the Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP), but the KMT finally adopted the Elderly 
Farmers Pension Scheme to replace the Old-age Pension Scheme in 
1995. This could be seen as the by-product of political negotiation. 
Economic growth, more importantly, has been seen as a main means 
by the state in Taiwan to ensure its political stability as ordinary people 
benefit from it. 
Fourth, 'the welfare state in crisis' in Western societies will 
provide a good excuse for the government in Taiwan to maintain low 
involvement in welfare provision. It is likely the government will 
take this opportunity to warn its citizenry that the welfare state has 
faced a crisis; if Taiwan blindly embraces the welfare state, it will be 
confronted with the same problem. 
Fifth, the trend of privatization of welfare in advanced countries 
also provokes a rethinking of welfare provision and leads the state to 
encourage welfare provision in civil society as a supplementary source 
of state welfare. 
Sixth, Taiwan is closely integrated into a world system in which 
the United States and Japan occupy a key position (Chan 1988, 1990: 
147). To some extent Taiwan's policy-making is inclined to look to the 
United States and Japan, learn from their experience, and perhaps 
even follow in their footsteps. More importantly, since both are 
reluctant or lagging in state welfare, it seems unlikely that Taiwan 
would go beyond these role models to institute a 'universal or 
institutional welfare state'. 
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Economic Miracle 
The Four East Asian NICs were all poor countries in 1965, but within a 
decade many of their industries have enhanced their ability to join the 
competition of the capitalist world system. The 'Four Little Dragons' 
have increasingly matched the Japanese pace and have together 
increased their annual income per head by nearly 6% during the past 
three decades. Because 'never before has so broad and diverse a group 
of countries grown so fast for so long' (The Economist October 2nd 
1993: 16), such an amazing achievement is usually called an 'economic 
miracle' (Brick 1992; Cheng 1992; Goldstein 1991; Hsiao 1988; Lie 1991; 
Payer 1987; World Bank 1993). 
Table 4.1 Major Economic Indicators of the East Asian NICs 
Item 	Year 	Hong Singapore South Taiwan 
Kong 	 Korea 
Current GNP 	1970 	900 	950 	270 	389 
per capita (US$) 	1975 	2,180 	2,550 	580 	964 
	
1980 	5,210 	4,550 	1,620 	2,344 
1985 	6,900 	7,120 	2,320 	3,297 
1990 	11,490 	11,160 	5,400 	8,111 
1992 	15,380 	15,750 	6,790 	10,470 
1993 	18,060 	19,850 	7,660 	10,852 
Growth Rate of 	1980 	10.4 9.7 -2.2 	7.3 
Real GDP 	1985 	0.2 	-1.6 	6.9 	4.9 
1990 	3.2 8.8 9.5 4.9 
1993 	5.5 	9.9 	5.5 	6.2 
Unemployment 1976 	5.6 4.4 3.9 1.8 
Rate 	1980 	3.9 	3.5 	5.2 	1.2 
1985 	3.1 4.1 4.0 2.9 
1990 	1.3 	2.0 	2.4 	1.7 
1994 	1.9 2.6 2.4 1.6 
Average Annual 1965-80 	8.1 	5.1 	18.4 	7.6 
Rate of Inflation 1980-89 	7.1 1.5 5.0 	2.9 
1986-92 	8.8 	2.3 	6.6 3.1 
Sources: World Bank 1992, 1995a, 1995b: Table 1; ROC 1994a; Asian 
Development Bank 1994; Europa 1995: 4. 
Table 4.1 shows that the per capita share of the Gross National 
Product (GNP) in Hong Kong was $900 in 1970 and $18,060 in 1993. 
Singapore rose from dismal poverty into a city state with a per capita 
GNP of $19,850 a year by 1993. South Korea's per capita GNP rose from 
$100 in 1960 to $7,660 in 1993 (Word Bank 1992; 1995a). Likewise, 
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Taiwan's per capita GNP was $145 in 1951, and it exceeded $10,800 in 
1993. Its real per capita GNP during this period increased 74 times 
(McCord 1991: 13; ROC 1994a; Europa 1995). 
This record of sustained rapid growth has been fuelled by a very 
successful export drive which has enabled Taiwan to become the 
second largest (after Japan) foreign reserve owner in the world (see 
Table 4.2). 
Table 4.2 Foreign Reserves in the East Asian NICs 
and the Five OECD Countries 
Latest 
Foreign Reserves, $bn 
Year Ago 
Australia 11.8 Jul 12.0 
Japan 159.6 Jul 116.8 
Sweden 28.5 Jul 21.6 
UK 42.6 Mar 38.4 
USA 80.5 Jul 64.4 
Hong Kong 53.6 Jul 49.3* 
Singapore 65.7 May 52.4 
South Korea 30.9 Jul 21.5 
Taiwan 100.3 May 87.8 
Source: The Economist (1995), 9th September, pp. 115-116 
Note: * Data for Dec 1994. 
In the early 1980s the East Asian NICs' real Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) was increasing at an average annual rate of 5.8% in 
Hong Kong, of 6.5% in Singapore, of 7.6% in South Korea, and of 6.2% 
in Taiwan. During the same period the Japanese economy grew at an 
average annual rate of 2.3%, the American economy at 2.4% (Goldstein 
1991: 10). While there was an economic recession in 1985-86 in 
Singapore, its economy rapidly recovered in 1987 and in 1993 reached 
the highest rate among the four little dragons. 
All these four NICs, as Johnson (1983: 718) notes, 'brought into 
existence an entirely new phenomenon: the Pacific free enterprise 
state, which by the early 1980s was perhaps the most encouraging 
aspect of human society.' They have achieved economic growth in an 
environment characterised by full employment, low inflation, export 
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expansion and a relatively egalitarian income distribution. But none of 
this was without problems. In the 1950s Hong Kong was an 
overcrowded British colony trying to absorb a flood of refugees 
escaping from mainland China. Simultaneously, the Republic of 
China on Taiwan was struggling to retake mainland China. In 1959 the 
leaders of a military coup in South Korea were confronting a legacy of 
war and political corruption. In 1965 Singapore was facing the 
unpredicted and unwanted independence that came after a failed 
union with Malaysia. McCord (1991: 13) rightly insists that at the outset 
of their move forward, these four NICs 'lacked resources and capital. 
All had been ravaged by war and were forced to accept millions of 
penniless refugees. All depended upon sharp, uncontrollable changes 
in the world's political and economic environment.' 
What has all this prosperity done for ordinary people in these 
East Asian NICs? These four NICs managed their great advance in an 
unusually short period of time while impressively upgrading the 
income, health and welfare of their peoples. The benefits of economic 
growth have enhanced not just the minority elites, but the majority 
population. Near full employment exists and the social services also 
improve the living standards of the poorest sectors. 
With respect to health, many social indicators show that the East 
Asian NICs enjoy a similar level to the five OECD countries (see Table 
4.3). The East Asian NICs of the 1990s are characterised by a low infant 
mortality rate and a high life expectancy. It is impressive that the 
infant mortality rate has dramatically declined since 1970, although it 
is still high in South Korea. The ratio of physicians to total population 
of the East Asian NICs was far behind the five OECD countries in 1984. 
However, they had a similar proportion to that experienced by OECD 
counterparts in 1992. The numbers of acute hospital beds per 1,000 
persons in the four East Asian NICs were also comparable to the four 
OECD countries except Japan in 1992. 
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Table 4.3 Major Social Indicators of the East Asian NICs and the Five 
OECD Countries 































































































































































































































Sources: ROC 1990: 30, 1994a; Australian Bureau of Statistics 1995; 
World Bank 1992,1994; Europa 1995: 4; Mackay 1993. 
Note: # data for 1989;* data for 1990; ** data for 1991. 
Full primary schooling in Hong Kong was guaranteed by the late 
1960s and three years of secondary education provided free in the late 
1970s. In a span of less than three decades, Singapore changed from a 
British colony to a nation with the highest standard of living, second 
only to Japan in Asia, the largest public housing programs in the 
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world, a high rate of literacy, highly efficient social services, and some 
of the highest environmental standards (Somjee and Somjee 1995: 17). 
South Korea had only one university and a few colleges in 1945. Now 
it has more than one hundred universities which contributed to South 
Korea's reputation as one of the finest educational systems in the 
developing countries. In Taiwan, literacy and educational levels have 
improved speedily. In 1980 nearly all children finished primary school, 
and most then continued to junior high school. Three-fifths of junior 
high graduates entered senior high school. 
More importantly, the East Asian NICs' income distribution is 
more equitable than their counterparts in Latin America or even some 
OECD countries (see Table 4.4). The performance of the four East Asian 
NICs as regards income distribution, physical quality of life and 
human development is remarkable (see Table 4.5). 
Table 4.4 Percentage Share of Household Income by Quintiles in the 






20 `)/0 (C) 
Fourth 
20 % (D) 
Highest 
20 ')/0 (E) E/A 
Australia 
1985 4.4 11.1 17.5 24.8 42.2 9.6 
Japan 
1979 8.7 13.2 17.5 23.1 37.5 4.3 
Sweden 
1981 8.0 13.2 17.4 24.5 36.9 4.6 
UK 
1979 5.8 11.5 18.2 25.0 39.5 6.8 
1988 4.6 10.0 16.8 24.3 44.3 9.6 
USA 
1985 4.7 11.0 17.4 25.0 41.9 8.9 
Hong 
Kong 
1980 5.4 10.8 15.2 21.6 47.0 8.7 
Singapore 
1982-83 5.1 9.9 14.6 21.4 49.0 9.6 
South 
Korea 
1985 7.0 12.0 16.3 22.1 42.7 6.1 
1988 7.4 12.3 16.3 21.8 42.2 5.7 
Taiwan 
1985 8.4 13.6 17.5 22.9 37.6 4.5 
1992 7.4 13.2 17.5 23.2 38.7 5.2 
Sources: World Bank 1991: 263, 1995b: 221; ROC 1994c: 56; Friedman 
and Hausman 1993: Table 3. 
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Table 4.5 Income Distribution and Quality of Life 
in the East Asian NICs 
Gini 
Coefficient 












Hong 0.470(57) 5.3(65) 57.7(65) 11 76(60) 











South 0.334(65) 9.4(65) 35.8(65) 8 58(57) 





Taiwan 0.558(53) 5.6(60) 50.9(60) 1 63(50) 









Sources: Chowdhury and Islam 1993: Table 1.16; Haggard 1990: Tables 
9.1, 9.2 & 9.4; ROC 1994a: 61; World Bank 1991: 263. 
In Taiwan, for instance, the richest 20 per cent enjoyed an income 
15 times larger than that of the poorest 20 per cent in 1949, but by 1989 
the ratio had fallen to 4.29: 1 (McCord 1989: 209). Indeed, Taiwan has 
outperformed the other three in reducing income inequality. The 
decline of Taiwan's Gini coefficient, from 0.56 in 1953 to 0.28 in 1980, 
is probably the largest decline in the Gini in any nonsocialist nation 
since 1900' (Barrett and Chin 1987: 29). Riedel (1988) has offered income 
distribution ranks of the East Asian NICs by ranking countries 
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according to their household income shares of successive cumulative 
quintile aggregates. The rankings of these four NICs among thirty-four 
developing countries are compatible with their Gini coefficients and 
Taiwan ranks first. 
The achievement is more outstanding when one considers that 
the quality of life in the East Asian NICs has been realised in less than 
three decades. A basic needs approach to poverty, which highlights 
such social indicators as life expectancy, infant mortality and adult 
literacy, makes the East Asian NICs look even more remarkable. The 
Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) indicates that the quality of life in 
all four NICs is very close to that observed in developed countries 
(Chowdhury and Islam 1993: 26). Likewise, the East Asian NICs have 
done well in translating their economic growth into human 
development in a very short space of time. This reveals that the East 
Asian NICs have been successful in reducing income inequality for 
their societies and the range of choices open to their people is not far 
behind most of the OECD countries. 
Compared with the West, Berger (1987, 1988) sees Japan and the 
'Four Little Dragons' as a 'second case' of capitalist modernity and lists 
some of the salient economic features. They are: 
high growth rates, sustained over many years; ... high growth has 
been associated, ... with diminishing income inequality; an 
astounding improvement in the material standards of living of 
virtually the entire population; a highly active government role 
in shaping the development process... ; an underdeveloped 
welfare state (even in Japan); low tax rates and high savings 
rates... ; and an economy geared to exports. (Berger 1988: 5) 
It is incorrect to call them 'an underdeveloped welfare state' because if 
we take the welfare provisions of various sectors of civil society into 
account, then in the precise sense the East Asian NICs can at best be 
called 'underdeveloped state welfare' rather than 'an underdeveloped 
welfare state' . 
As regards social and labour policy, the state played a more vital 
role in Hong Kong and Singapore than it did in South Korea and 
Taiwan. In Castells' view (1992: 33-70), the East Asian developmental 
state depends on economic development to construct a national 
identity. Economic development is not only a goal but also a main 
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means for state leaders to secure political legitimacy. In this sense, the 
political legitimacy of these states was based on integrating their civil 
societies to underpin their development efforts. To a large extent, 
'economic miracles could not be achieved without such state 
integration of civil society into economic development. More 
importantly, in the process of economic growth various sectors of civil 
society also played a key part in welfare provisions to supplement the 
shortfall in state welfare (Tsai 1988). Many welfare problems do still 
exist, but are solved through a reliance on family values and duties. 
The traditional family, for example, can not only absorb its 
unemployed members but has also borne the problem of elderly care 
in past decades. 
However, capitalist development in the East Asian NICs is 
accompanied by changes in social structures, particularly the formation 
of the new middle class which could destabilise society if the state can 
not properly respond to its demands. Indeed, the East Asian NICs have 
experienced rapid social changes. Demographical change, such as the 
advent of an aging society and the low fertility rate, has caused various 
sectors of civil society to call for the state to take more welfare 
responsibility. This pressure from civil society has forced the state to 
change its relationship with society and led it to introduce some 
welfare schemes, such as the National Health Insurance in South 
Korea and Taiwan, the National Pension in South Korea, the Old-age 
Pension in Hong Kong, and the Old Farmer Pension in Taiwan. 
Although Singapore has its CPF to provide health care and pensions 
for its citizens, the government is still using new policies which centre 
on the core values of obedence and the family as a developmental 
strategy to confirm the state welfare system. 
The state in the East Asian NICs has taken on different strategies 
to respond to the demands of civil society and the changing state-
society relation. To maintain its economic prosperity and political 
legitimacy the state can not but take more welfare responsibilities for 
its citizens. This situation reveals that the growth of civil society has 
changed the state-society relation in these four NICs, and has provided 
the opportunity for welfare issues to enter the political agenda. 
However, this transition does not mean that the state will move 
toward a Western-style state welfare provision. Instead, it is likely that 
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the state will become more involved in welfare provision than before 
by adjusting its welfare provision relationship with various sectors of 
civil society. 
The Lessons from East Asian Development 
Many analysts who are interested in understanding the East Asian 
success ask the question: can the East Asian experience provide crucial 
lessons for developing countries? Much less attention has been paid to 
the probability that the developed countries might also learn 
something from that experience. Since Western societies have been 
growing far more slowly than those of East Asia, the lessons should 
not be restricted to the Third World's poor countries. As Berger (1987: 
141) rightly argues, 'one must try to understand East Asia in order to 
better understand the West and, for that matter, to understand and 
perhaps to predict the development of other non-Western societies in 
which industrial capitalism is emerging.' 
Although there is no simple recipe for their success, the East 
Asian NICs do provide some lessons for other developed and 
developing countries. What is the true story of East Asia's success and 
what are the lessons for the rest of the world? What are the 
relationships between patterns of economic restructuring and social 
policies in social security, health, housing, education and personal 
social services? In order to maintain the rates of economic growth, are 
there any intolerable sacrifices in the quality of life? These issues are 
not unique to the East Asian NICs but common to every region in the 
contemporary global commotion of political, economic and social 
change. 
Indeed, the spectacular economic success of the East Asian NICs 
has not only begun to dominate the development debate, but has also 
forced a rethinking of the relationship between global capitalism and 
Third World economic development (Henderson and Appelbaum 
1992: 3; The Economist November 16th 1991: 3-22; Vogel 1991). As the 
motivation of economic growth has endured, in MacPherson's words, 
'with more economies seeking to emulate the "Tigers of Asia', the 
pursuit of social policy goals into practice, will provide many examples 
of creativity and innovation in social policy and administration, as 
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well as great opportunities for the comparative study' (MacPherson 
1992: 60). 
The four NICs have achieved their rapid economic growth under 
authoritarian and often repressive regimes. Some observers thus argue 
that authoritarianism is a key element of the development process. Yet 
this does not imply a choice between development and democracy. As 
Castells et al. (1990: 6) suggests: 
[Most developing countries have authoritarian repressive 
regimes that are not able to engage in development, generally fail 
in improving the living conditions of the majority of the 
population, and they are hardly able to build any stable political 
legitimacy. ... the process of economic development, and the 
social change that goes along with it, may ultimately undermine 
the foundations of authoritarianism, opening the way for 
political democracy and social reform, as some of the current 
trends in South Korea, and to a lesser extent in Taiwan and Hong 
Kong, seem to indicate. 
In reviewing the welfare of ordinary people, it is necessary to pay 
attention to the East Asian development experience. The experience of 
the East Asian NICs is a caution against the trend in many Western 
societies to depend almost exclusively upon state welfare. In 
Singapore, for instance, the government has presented its criticisms to 
western welfare statism while providing money for education, public 
housing and health care for its citizens. The further introduction of 
welfare schemes in the East Asian NICs is unlikely to promote the 
development of a Western-style welfare state. Instead, the East Asian 
NICs are concerned about the economic consequences of the large-scale 
schemes of state intervention experienced in Western societies and 
most East Asians simply want to avoid the situation of making 
everyone eligible for a number of state benefits. 
As we have seen, the role of the state in sustaining welfare in 
modern societies is unstable rather than invariable, and the vital 
concerns of individuals, families and communities do not stem from 
political or economic values, but rather, progressively from extensive 
human values (Flora and Heidenheimer 1981; Rose 1984). Yet state 
institutions must be seen in the broad context of the state-society 
relation. In respect of the provision of welfare the state is not the only 
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way of allocating the burden, and other institutions are also involved. 
Neglecting the welfare provision of various sectors of civil society 
would cause a distorted picture of the extent of welfare provision. In 
the East Asian NICs, for example, as in many developing countries, the 
welfare role of the family and more generally the various sectors of 
civil society might be quite large and important, albeit more difficult to 
measure. 
A comparative analysis of welfare configurations can challenge 
the simple assumption that there is one best way to humanise 
economic and social relationships between all members within society. 
Moreover, a comparison of welfare configurations including OECD 
and other developing countries can further examine whether and 
under what circumstances their social policies or welfare provisions, 
counting various sectors of civil society as well, are similar or 
dissimilar. 
The issue of the state-society relation is thus crucial in discussing 
welfare configurations between different societies. This approach 
assists comparisons across countries since there are substantial 
differences in the ways that countries divide the responsibilities of 
social welfare provision among various sectors. From the perspective 
of welfare provision, institutional mechanisms as delivery systems for 
ordinary people's needs vary greatly, and different types of societies 
have different types of welfare configurations. 
State Welfare: Is Expenditure Enough? 
Conventional usage of state welfare is associated with government 
action in the areas of personal and family income, health care, 
housing, education and training, and personal care services. 
Government action includes direct welfare provision and services, and 
both the regulation and subsidisation of various sectors, such as child 
care, welfare payments and public assistance programs. State welfare 
here refers to education, health, social security and welfare, and 
housing and community amenities that consist of major categories of 
social expenditures. For two main reasons, these four categories are 
chosen to be the indicators of state welfare. First, many international 
agencies have treated these four categories as comparable indicators of 
social expenditures between countries since the mid 1970s. Second, a 
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useful measure of government policy priorities is offered by social 
expenditures as a percentage of total government expenditures. 
Table 4.6 and 4.7 show changes in social expenditures as a 
percentage of GDP, and of total government expenditures, in the East 
Asian NICs and the five OECD countries in the last two decades. This 
percentage grew moderately in all four NICs, thus revealing greater 
attention to social development since the mid-1970s. In some measure, 
this reflects the changing state-society relation and the restructuring of 
the economy and polity in the past two decades. 
Table 4.6 Social Expenditures in the East Asian NICs 
Year 









As % 	As % 





1976 5.9 48.6 3.6 20.3 5.6 26.4 
1977 5.8 45.6 6.3 31.8 3.8 24.3 5.8 25.1 
1978 6.5 45.9 6.2 32.9 3.7 23.3 5.8 25.2 
1979 7.0 50.0 5.9 31.5 4.0 23.6 5.5 25.7 
1980 7.8 50.2 5.6 29.2 4.5 25.8 6.1 26.2 
1981 7.8 45.6 7.9 34.9 4.4 26.0 6.5 26.5 
1982 8.7 47.1 7.1 34.1 6.0 31.3 7.7 29.6 
1983 9.0 49.4 7.4 33.5 4.9 28.0 7.5 31.7 
1984 8.1 52.3 8.7 32.9 4.7 27.0 7.1 32.0 
1985 8.3 52.2 9.2 33.8 4.3 26.6 6.8 32.5 
1986 8.0 52.2 11.0 38.1 4.2 26.9 7.1 32.1 
1987 7.4 53.3 10.0 29.0 4.2 27.9 6.6 32.0 
1988 7.7 54.4 8.6 38.0 4.4 29.8 7.4 34.8 
1989 8.2 52.6 7.6 34.4 4.9 30.5 9.3 29.6 
1990 8.9 54.5 6.8 32.7 5.2 31.9 7.7 28.3 
1991 8.8 54.1 7.8 36.3 4.8 29.1 8.5 28.8 
1992 8.5 53.3 7.3 37.3 4.8 28.5 9.1 28.6 
1993 9.0 52.0 4.9 29.0 9.2 29.1 
1994 9.2 54.9 4.8 27.4 
Sources: United Nations 1993; International Monetary Fund 1988, 1994; 
Asian Development Bank 1992, 1994, 1995. 
Note: TGE refers to Total Government Expenditures. 
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Table 4.7 Social Expenditures in the Five OECD Countries 
Australia 	Japan 	Sweden 	UK 	USA 






























1977 13.1 49.2 
1978 13.4 48.7 26.2 65.5 16.9 45.4 
1979 12.7 47.7 5.8 32.8 27.1 64.8 16.7 45.1 10.5 49.8 
1980 12.2 46.7 5.8 32.0 27.1 64.1 17.6 45.4 11.4 50.0 
1981 12.1 46.2 5.8 31.7 27.7 62.0 18.8 46.2 11.7 50.1 
1982 11.7 44.0 5.7 32.3 27.4 60.3 19.3 46.7 12.1 49.0 
1983 12.8 44.7 5.5 30.3 26.9 55.8 18.6 46.2 12.6 48.9 
1984 13.3 45.3 5.3 30.9 25.8 55.8 18.4 45.8 11.5 47.5 
1985 13.8 45.8 5.1 30.3 25.9 55.4 19.5 49.3 11.1 45.2 
1986 13.4 45.0 4.9 30.3 26.0 58.0 19.5 50.8 10.8 44.3 
1987 13.1 44.8 4.7 28.6 26.1 60.6 18.9 51.3 10.6 44.8 
1988 12.7 46.3 4.8 29.2 26.7 63.9 17.7 51.3 10.4 44.7 
1989 12.4 49.3 4.9 29.4 27.1 65.7 17.3 51.2 10.2 44.0 
1990 12.5 49.5 4.3 26.2 27.9 65.5 17.9 47.5 10.4 43.4 
1991 13.7 51.1 4.2 27.0 29.2 66.9 19.9 50.0 11.2 44.2 
1992 15.1 53.5 30.8 66.4 21.5 49.9 12.0 48.9 
1993 32.0 61.1 12.1 50.8 
Sources: United Nations 1988, 1990, 1994; International Monetary Fund 
1988, 1994. 
Note: ICE refers to Total Government Expenditures. 
Social expenditures dominate many OECD countries public 
finance and seem to be the least controllable outlays of government 
expenditures. Sweden has the highest proportion of social 
expenditures as a percentage of GDP among the five OECD countries. 
Compared with the five OECD countries, with the exception of Japan, 
all four NICs stand out in their relatively low social expenditures as a 
percentage of GDP. While social expenditures as a percentage of GDP in 
the East Asian NICs is still well below that in the OECD countries, the 
proportion has significantly increased in the past two decades. 
Compared with Sweden, the proportion in the East Asian NICs 
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decreased from five to eight times in the mid-1970s to three to six 
times in the early 1990s. 
According to the latest data, social expenditures as a percentage of 
total government expenditures in OECD countries with the exception 
of Japan, are over 50% (see Table 4.7). Again excluding Japan, while 
social expenditures as a proportion of total government expenditures 
kept stable in OECD countries in the last two decades, social 
expenditure increased its share of GDP. It is noteworthy that both 
percentages in Japan reduced to a level close to that in South Korea in 
the last decade. However, social expenditures as a proportion of total 
government expenditures in Hong Kong is likely to be closer to the 
pattern of its OECD counterparts. Conversely, this proportion in Japan 
is parallel with its East Asian equals. The welfare state in crisis (OECD 
1981), it needs to be stressed, only slowed down rather than reduced the 
growth of social expenditures in these OECD countries. 
While the four East Asian NICs show a similar trend in the 
growth of social expenditures, there are some differences between 
them. Overall social expenditures have made up a greater proportion 
of total government expenditures in Hong Kong and Singapore than 
in South Korea and Taiwan. It is worth noting, however, the 
proportion of social expenditures in GDP nearly doubled from 1976 to 
1993 in Taiwan. This has made the level of social expenditures as a 
percentage of GDP in Taiwan surpass that in Singapore and parallel 
that in Hong Kong since 1989. 
A further analysis of the relative emphasis given to the different 
items of social expenditures is conducive to an understanding of these 
differences across the four NICs and the five OECD countries. Table 4.8 
breaks the social expenditures during the last two decades into four 
functional categories. These data provide a starting point for 
understanding state welfare configurations in the nine countries. 
While social expenditure on education as a percentage of total 
social expenditures has fluctuated somewhat in the East Asian NICs, it 
has been much higher than in their OECD counterparts since the late 
1970s. Conversely, the five OECD countries spent over 55% of total 
social expenditures on social security and welfare, and this constituted 
the largest expenditures of total social expenditures in the last two 
decades. 
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Table 4.8 Major Categories of Social Expenditures as a Percentage of 
Total Social Expenditures in the East Asian NICs and Five 
OECD Countries 
Social 	Housing & 
Country Year 	Education 	Health 	Security & 	Community 
	
Welfare Amenities 
Hong 	1977 	38.9 	18.0 	9.6 	33.5 
Kong 	1980 	30.6 15.0 8.8 45.6 
1985 	33.4 	16.6 	11.5 	38.5 
1990 	31.0 17.9 11.1 40.0 
1994 	31.1 	20.2 	11.8 	36.9 
Singapore 1977 	45.7 23.2 4.2 26.9 
1980 	50.1 	23.9 	4.6 	21.4 
1985 	63.9 19.1 4.7 12.3 
1990 	60.8 	14.0 	6.5 	18.7 
1992 	59.6 16.3 6.2 17.9 
South 	1977 	69.0 	7.1 	20.7 	3.2 
Korea 	1980 	66.3 4.7 24.6 4.4 
1985 	69.5 	5.4 	21.3 	3.8 
1990 	61.0 6.1 28.2 4.7 
1994 	56.6 	3.4 	37.2 	2.8 
Taiwan 	1977 	57.8 9.2 30.7 2.3 
1980 	57.6 	9.2 	30.5 	2.7 
1985 	51.1 8.0 37.5 3.4 
1990 	61.8 	6.0 	29.3 	2.9 
1994 	57.9 5.5 34.5 2.1 
Australia 1977 	19.4 	22.2 	55.7 	2.7 
1980 	17.6 21.4 59.3 1.7 
1985 	15.7 	20.6 	59.9 	3.8 
1990 	13.7 25.7 57.0 3.6 
1992 	13.5 	23.5 	60.2 	2.8 
Japan 	1979 	33.9 4.5 56.5 5.1 
1980 	33.5 	4.3 	56.6 	5.6 
1985 	30.6 4.2 59.3 5.9 
1990 	29.8 	4.2 	60.9 	5.1 
1991 	29.3 4.2 61.3 5.2 
Sweden 	1978 	16.5 	3.9 	75.3 	4.3 
1980 	16.3 3.4 75.7 4.6 
1985 	15.7 	2.1 	75.5 	6.7 
1990 	13.3 1.4 78.6 6.7 
1993 	12.0 	0.7 	77.8 	9.5 
UK 	1978 4.9 28.3 59.1 7.7 
1980 	5.1 	29.4 	58.2 	7.3 
1985 5.4 25.8 63.5 5.3 
1990 	6.8 	29.5 	58.0 	5.7 
1992 6.7 28.1 59.3 5.9 
USA 	1979 	5.8 	21.1 	67.7 	5.4 
1980 5.3 20.9 68.2 5.6 
1985 	4.0 	25.0 	64.4 	6.6 
1990 4.0 31.1 58.9 6.0 
1993 	3.9 	33.6 	57.3 	5.2 
Sources: Asian Development Bank 1992, 1994; International Monetary 
Fund 1988, 1994; ROC 1994b; United Nations 1990; 1994. 
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Among four major categories of social expenditures in the East 
Asian NICs, with the exception of education, the pattern of social 
expenditures in South Korea are similar to that in Taiwan, and the 
Hong Kong pattern is parallel with Singapore. More specifically, Hong 
Kong and Singapore stand out in their greater emphasis on health, and 
housing and community amenities, and their lower outlays on social 
security and welfare than those in South Korea and Taiwan. 
Housing programs in Hong Kong have been extended so that 
their previous simple function of directing resources to those without 
shelter now cover much more varied objectives (Chow 1995). The 
Hong Kong government is responsible for one of the largest public 
housing systems and low-rent housing programs in the world. The 
most outstanding feature of the distribution of social expenditures in 
Hong Kong is its high proportion of spending on housing and 
community amenities. This spending has been the largest of total 
social expenditures since 1980, making expenditure on housing and 
community amenities in Hong Kong the highest of these nine 
countries. 
Compared with South Korea, Taiwan is striking in its spending 
on social security and welfare. Whereas Taiwan's social expenditure 
on social security and welfare was higher than that of South Korea 
before 1991, only a few years later, this outlay in South Korea exceeded 
that in Taiwan. As far as total social expenditures were concerned, 
South Korea's increases in social security and welfare, in some 
measure, went hand in hand with its decreased spending on education 
in the last decade. Likewise, Singapore's greater emphasis on education 
contrasted with Hong Kong's stronger commitment to social security 
and welfare, and housing and community amenities. 
Singapore has significantly increased its social expenditures on 
education since the mid-1970s. These outlays have been used by the 
state to expand vocational and technical training as an essential tool to 
advance its industrialisation. It should be noted in this respect that 
Singapore's housing expenditures grew impressively in the context of 
a main reconstruction project during 1986 and 1989. The achievement 
of the massive public housing projects can explain to some extent the 
reduction of social expenditures on housing after this. 
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Table 4.9 indicates that Taiwan has a much higher level of central 
government expenditures as a percentage of GDP than its East Asian 
counterparts, Australia, and USA. But why did Taiwan have a lower 
percentage of social expenditures in GDP, compared with the four 
Western OECD Countries? To answer this question, it is necessary to 
examine the composition of total government expenditures by 
functions, including general public services and public order, defense, 
education, health, social security and welfare, housing and community 
amenities, economic affairs and services, and other expenditures (see 
Table 4.10). 
Table 4.9 Total Government Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP in 
the East Asian NICs and the Five OECD Countries 
Year HK Sin SK Tai Aus Jap Swe UK USA 
1977 12.6 20.0 15.6 23.2 26.5 37.1 37.2 21.7 
1978 14.2 18.9 15.6 22.9 27.6 40.0 37.2 21.3 
1979 14.0 18.6 16.7 21.3 26.6 17.5 41.8 37.1 21.0 
1980 15.6 19.2 17.3 23.2 26.1 18.1 42.3 38.7 22.8 
1981 17.2 22.7 17.1 24.4 26.1 18.2 44.7 40.8 23.4 
1982 18.5 20.7 19.1 26.0 26.5 17.5 45.6 41.4 24.8 
1983 18.2 22.0 16.7 23.7 28.6 18.1 48.1 40.2 25.4 
1984 15.5 26.3 16.4 22.2 29.4 17.3 46.1 40.1 23.9 
1985 16.0 27.2 16.3 21.0 30.1 16.8 46.7 39.5 24.6 
1986 15.3 28.8 15.6 22.2 29.8 16.0 44.9 38.3 24.5 
1987 14.0 34.3 15.1 20.5 29.3 16.6 43.0 36.8 23.7 
1988 14.2 22.6 14.6 21.3 27.6 16.5 41.8 34.6 23.3 
1989 15.6 22.0 16.0 31.5 25.1 16.6 41.2 33.8 23.1 
1990 16.3 21.0 16.2 27.1 25.2 16.3 42.6 37.6 23.9 
1991 16.2 21.4 16.5 29.5 26.9 15.6 43.7 39.8 25.4 
1992 15.9 19.4 17.0 31.8 28.2 46.3 43.2 24.6 
1993 17.3 16.9 31.7 52.3 23.8 
Sources: Asian Development Bank 1992, 1994; International Monetary 
Fund 1988, 1994; ROC 1994b; United Nations 1990; 1994. 
Note: HK= Hong Kong; Sin= Singapore; SK= South Korea; Tai= 
Taiwan; Aus= Australia; Jap= Japan; Swe= Sweden; UK= the 
United Kingdom; USA= the United States of America. 
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Table 4.10 Total Government Expenditures by Functions in the East 
Asian NICs and the Five OECD Countries 
	
Social 	Housing & 	Economic 
Country Year Education Health Security & Community Defense Affairs & General Others 
Welfare Amenities Services  
Hong 	1977 	17.7 	8.2 	4.4 	15.3 	4.2 	27.2 	13.4 	9.6 
Kong 	1980 	15.3 7.5 4.4 22.9 7.2 23.8 	11.0 	7.9 
1985 	17.4 	8.7 	6.0 	20.1 	3.4 	19.3 15.7 	9.4 
1990 	16.9 9.8 6.1 21.8 1.7 18.0 	13.2 	12.5 




























South 	1977 	16.8 	1.7 	5.0 
Korea 	1980 	17.1 1.2 6.4 
1985 	18.4 	1.4 	5.7 
1990 	19.5 2.0 9.0 
1994 	15.5 	0.9 	10.2 
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UK 	1978 	2.2 	12.9 	26.8 	3.5 	13.0 	7.5 	7.0 	27.1 
1980 	2.3 13.3 	26.4 3.3 13.6 7.4 6.4 	27.3 
1985 	2.1 	12.6 	28.7 	1.7 	13.3 	8.7 	6.2 	26.7 
1990 	3.2 14.0 	27.5 2.7 11.5 9.9 7.9 	23.3 
1992 	3.3 	14.0 	29.6 	2.9 	9.9 	6.6 	7.6 	26.1 
USA 	1979 	2.9 	10.5 	33.7 	2.7 	21.5 	11.4 	5.7 	11.6 
1980 	2.6 10.4 	34.1 2.8 21.2 10.4 5.8 	12.7 
1985 	1.8 	11.3 	29.1 	2.5 	24.9 	8.3 	5.2 	16.9 
1990 	1.7 13.5 	25.6 2.6 22.6 10.2 7.6 	16.2 
1993 	2.0 	17.1 	29.1 	2.6 	19.3 	6.2 	9.4 	14.3 
Sources: Asian Development Bank 1992, 1994; International Monetary Fund 
1988, 1994; ROC 1990: 24 & 31, 1994b; United Nations 1990; 1994; 
The Democratic Progressive Party 1993: Table 6. 





















































The proportion of total government expenditure on education 
and economic affairs and services is higher in the East Asian NICs 
than in their OECD counterparts. It is likely that education and 
economic affairs and services are considered key expenditures in 
pursuing economic development in these four NICs. With the 
exception of Hong Kong, expenditures on defense in East Asian NICs 
are well above their OECD counterparts. While defense expenditures 
in Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan decreased from one third to 
one fifth of total government expenditures in the last two decades, a 
concern with an outside military threat has played a key part in the 
allocation of total government expenditures. This may explain the fact 
that social expenditures as a percentage of total government 
expenditures are low in most East Asian NICs, but total government 
expenditures as a proportion of GDP are relatively high. 
Summary 
Analyses of public expenditures alone is not enough to adequately 
measure welfare configuration and its consequences. State welfare is 
too narrow to deal with civil society welfare provision. It is argued that 
excessive dependence on evidence from state welfare (public 
expenditures) results in a distorted understanding of policy outcomes, 
let alone understanding of welfare configurations of the state and 
various sectors of civil society. This is because such expenditure is only 
one of the means available to the state to achieve its goals, and because 
different countries utilise quite different mixes of policy instruments 
in pursuing their similar policy goals. More importantly, while 
government policy plays a key role in welfare provision, state welfare 
in any country is not the only source of welfare provision. 
Consequently, an examination of the welfare state, in a broader sense, 
should concern welfare configurations of the state and various sectors 
of civil society: 
... however difficult and however tentative is our progress in 
overcoming the practical problems of devising adequate 
measures of the outcomes and relating such outcomes to the 
variety of means by which they are achieved, such a research 
focus makes a greater contribution to our understanding of 
comparative government activity than does expenditure research 
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which tells us about only one of the means to such policy ends 
and, to the extent that it claims more, actually distorts the reality 
it purports to explain. (Castles 1994: 18) 
Using the perspective of the welfare state-society relation, the study can 
investigate welfare configurations in different welfare areas, such as 
child care, education, elderly care, health care, housing, and social 
security in different countries. In many respects these different welfare 
areas are different from each other in terms of the role of the state and 
various sectors of civil society in welfare provisions. I have chosen to 
explore two different welfare areas in the next part of this thesis to 
demonstrate the utility of the concept of welfare configuration. 
The choice of these specific areas is, in part, pragmatic: data is 
both reliable and available. However pragmatism was not the only 
rationale for choice. 
Education in most countries has become mass in character, highly 
regulated by the state. More specifically, it is selected because in most 
countries it is a major area of state intervention (although, as 
demonstrated above the proportion of expenditure on education 
varies dramatically between OECD countries and the East Asian NICs). 
Moreover, it is particularly evident that the export-oriented 
industrialisation in the East Asian NICs has centred on the effective 
utilisation of human capital investment through education. 
Child care, on the other hand, is an issue of ex tending 
significance to the state and various sectors of civil society in welfare 
provision. It is chosen as an indicator of major changes occurring in 
civil society in terms of the growth of female employment in both 
OECD countries and the East Asian NICs. Child care has shifted from 
being a peripheral matter to a high profile, vigorously debated political 
and social policy issue, in particular in the Western OECD countries. 
However, It is widely seen as central to economic and social objectives 
in both OECD countries and the East Asian NICs. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
WELFARE CONFIGURATION OF EDUCATION 
Education is a critical area of the state and civil society expenditure and 
attracts considerable public debate. The availability of sufficient 
resources of education is not necessarily an assurance of quality, but it 
does have an important impact in terms of access to education 
provision. While the state is a major source for education provision in 
modern societies, the various other sectors of civil society are also 
involved and cannot be neglected. 
The objective of this chapter is to explore welfare configurations 
by examining education provision in Australia, Sweden, the USA, 
Singapore and Taiwan. By so doing, we can examine the nexus 
between welfare provision of education between the state and various 
sectors of civil society in these five countries. 
Education in Australia 
The governments of the six states and the two territories in Australia 
have as their main responsibility education, including the 
administration and substantial funding of primary, secondary and 
technical and further education. The Australian Constitution also 
empowers the Commonwealth government to make grants to the 
states and to place conditions upon such grants. Aside from its 
financial role the Commonwealth is involved in advancing national 
consistency and coherence in the provision of education across 
Australia. The Commonwealth thus plays a key role in education 
policy, programs and funding. 
In primary education, major stress is placed on the development 
of basic language and literacy skills, simple arithmetic, moral and 
social education, health training and some creative activities. In 
secondary education, in some systems, the first one or two years of 
secondary school consists of a general program which is followed by all 
students, although there may be some electives. In senior secondary 
years, a wider range of options is available in the larger schools and 
there is a growing trend towards encouraging individual schools to 
develop courses suited to the needs and interests of their students, 
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subject to accreditation and moderation procedures. Students' 
eligibility to enter higher education institutions is assessed during, or 
at the end of, the final two years of secondary schooling 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1994b: 308-309). 
School attendance is compulsory throughout Australia between 
the ages of 6 and 15 years (16 years in Tasmania). Primary and 
secondary education is free in government schools in all States and 
Territories. Most state governments offer financial assistance to 
parents under specified conditions for educational expenses. Assistance 
includes different kinds of scholarships, transport and boarding 
allowances, many of which are aimed to help low income families. 
The Commonwealth also provides many schemes of assistance to 
promote access to education. It was estimated that 236,938 secondary 
students aged 16 and over from low income families received 
assistance in 1993 under AUSTUDY (Commonwealth of Australia 
1994b: 313). 
The major responsibility for funding government schools lies 
with state governments which provide about 90% of schools running 
costs and the Commonwealth contributes some 10%. While the states 
provide about 35% of public funding for non-government schools, the 
Commonwealth is the primary source providing around 65% 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1992a, 1994b). 
Non-government schools run under conditions determined by 
government authorities, usually registration boards, in each state and 
territory. Most of the non-government schools in Australia are under 
the patronage of, or operated by, religious denominations. The 
majority of non-government schools are Catholic and there is a 
Catholic Education Commission in each state and at the national level. 
The majority of these non-government schools receive substantial 
public funding (up to 80% of recurrent costs) from the 
Commonwealth, state and territory Governments (Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation 1994: 3). 
The dual public/private schooling system of Australian 
education has its roots in the beginning of European colonisation of 
the continent two hundred years ago and emerged from a conflict 
between state and church (Anderson 1988, 1991). With the first fleets of 
Europeans to occupy Australia came spiritual authority from the 
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Church of England. The church saw itself as the custodian of morals 
and manners as well as of the religious welfare of the new residents, 
thus becoming involved in providing schooling for the young. 
However, this monopoly over faith was challenged by representatives 
of the churches in Rome and Scotland. They asserted their 
responsibility for a large number of Irish and Scots whose 
transgressions had led them to be transported New South Wales. The 
state was stimulated to provide schooling because of years of 
denominational squabbling and educational neglect of a large 
proportion of population (Anderson 1988, 1991). 
The Catholic school system was established in the late nineteenth 
century. In 1879 Roman Catholic bishops pronounced that Catholic 
parents had to send their children to Catholic schools (Anderson 1988: 
216). This led parishes to provide a complete and separate school 
system for all Catholic children. The development of this system was 
very successful in Australia, where some 55% of children of Catholic 
parents attended Catholic schools in the mid-1950s (Anderson 1991: 
153). 
Public funding for private schools did not emerge until the mid-
1950s. Since the creation of free, compulsory and secular public schools 
in the 1870s, governments progressively cut off aid for private schools. 
In spite of depending almost totally on private funding, the Catholic 
schools grew, and educated 18% of all children by the mid-1950s. At the 
same time non-Catholic private schools educated just over 5% of 
students. This proportion of children attending non-government 
schools in Australia in the period before public funding has been far 
higher than in Anglo-American or Scandinavian countries (Anderson 
1991: 153). 
The issue of educational choice without financial penalty was 
complicated until very recently. The pressure of rapidly growing 
enrolments had critically affected all schools, with Catholic schools in 
particular being affected. During the 1960s public funding for private 
schools was introduced in Australia. By the late 1960s the 
Commonwealth Government was making per capita grants to private 
schools and the issue of 'state aid had re-emerged as among the most 
important in domestic politics. 
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In 1974 the Whitlam Government embraced a recommendation 
of the Karmel report' that the criteria of funding should be based on 
the level of need. This decision was associated with a substantial 
growth in the general level of Commonwealth grants for private 
schools (Crittenden 1989: 78). The shift of students to non-government 
schools took place at the same time as the Commonwealth's support 
for these kind of schools began to grow. Support was formalised by the 
Labour Government of 1972-75, and the Conservative Coalition 
Government of 1975-83 kept increasing finance in this period. While 
the incoming Labour Government introduced some changes in the 
distribution of funds, the favourable treatment of non-government 
schools still persists to this day. 
In 1990, for instance, the Commonwealth distributed a 3.21 times 
greater funding amount per student in private than in state schools, 
$1,498 and $466, respectively (Graycar and Jamrozik 1993: 262). The 
Commonwealth has further declared that similar arrangements apply 
for recurrent funding for non-government schools beyond 1992. These 
arrangements are based on the features of the present successful 
scheme and will provide real increases for the neediest schools and 
maintain funding for schools in other categories. 
The ideal of producing true equality of opportunity has been a 
basic educational policy of the Commonwealth since the early 1970s 
(Crittenden 1989: 89-90). Yet, the Australian students in tertiary 
education, especially in university, disproportionately come from 
higher income families and from non-government schools (Anderson 
and Vervoorn 1983: 130-166; Galvin and West 1988: 105-109). By May 
1990 the ratio of university enrolments was 2.37 times in favour of 
students from non-government schools (Graycar and Jamrozik 1993: 
262). 
Data from the 1986 Census of Population and Housing 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1992b) shows a strong link between 
family income and participation in some areas of post-compulsory 
education. School students aged 15-24 years from lower income groups 
I Professor Peter Karmel was appointed to chair the Australian Schools Commission in 
1972. His report in May 1973 set the pattern for the Commonwealth action that has 
been followed by successive governments. 
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in 1986 were more likely to attend government schools and less likely 
to attend non-government schools. Also, they tended to have lower 
rates of attendance at tertiary institutions. 
There are substantial differences between government and non-
government schools in the proportion at which students transfer to 
higher education. The proportion of students from non-government 
schools enrolling in higher education in the year after leaving school 
is much higher than those from government schools. In 1991 about 
66% of the former attended higher education, compared with 49% of 
the latter (Commonwealth of Australia 1992b: 135). 
By examining the operation of the Australian education system 
in the late 1980s, Galvin and West (1988: 109) concluded the following: 
• Compared to similar countries, Australians are poorly educated, 
especially at the upper secondary and tertiary levels. 
• The system is unequal, because chances of success are affected more 
by socioeconomic status than by natural ability. The system can be 
divided into three main parts, each with markedly different 
retention (or success) rates: private non-Catholic, private Catholic 
and State schools. 
• Education has an important bearing on the types of jobs available, 
and the income and social standing that come with such jobs. This 
relationship can be summarised as: the more highly qualified, the 
better access to social and economic resources. 
Table 5.1 indicates the number of schools and students by type in 
Australia in 1990. Of the total schools, three-fourths were government 
schools, and one-forth were non-government. In respect to the 
number of full-time students attending schools, the trend was similar 
to the former. Of a total of 3,041,657 students, 72% attended 
government schools, and 28% non-government. The proportion of 
students attending government schools to those attending non-
government schools in 1993 was the same as that in 1990, while the 
number of total students increased in 1993 (Commonwealth of 
Australia 1992a, 1994b). The number of full-time students attending 
non-government schools in 1993 increased by 0.6% from the 864,883 
attending in 1992, while the number of full-time students attending 
government schools decreased by 0.3% (6,027) from the 2,234,083 
attending in 1992. 
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Anglican Catholic Other Total* 




Males 1,123,008 44,297 298,412 82,795 425,504 1,548,512 
Females 1,070,339 37,821 297,287 87,698 422,806 1,493,145 
Persons 2,193,347 82,118 595,699 170,493 848,310 3,041,657 
Source: Commonwealth of Australia 1992a: 305. 
Note: * Includes special schools administered by government 
authorities other than the State Departments of Education in 
Victoria and Western Australia. 
Education in Sweden 
Prior to World War II, in the old education system in Sweden pupils 
were divided into two groups at an early age: a closed academically 
oriented training system and poor primary education system. Yet this 
system was much criticised before the Second World War so that by 
the end of 1945 measures were introduced to modernise this system 
(Olsson 1990: 136). The control of Swedish schools is strongly 
centralised and much of the conduct of state schools is closely 
supervised via legislation, regulations and curricula. Educational 
reforms have led to a comprehensive system of compulsory education 
since the 1950s. Through the influence of educational progressivism, 
structural dualism was turned into a political issue that resulted in the 
expansion of common schooling to six years in 1950 (Rust 1988). The 
reforms have also placed less stress on examinations and more 
emphasis on continuous assessment. 
Since the 1960s the objectives of education have been centred on 
'social upbringing' (Department of Employment, Education and 
Training, Australia 1992: 2). To construct a common base in cultural 
and political knowledge and values, all students were offered as much 
general education as possible. The nine-year compulsory 
1 0 6 
comprehensive education for all students aged 7 to 16 was decided in 
1962 and fully implemented during the 1972/73 school year (Olsson 
1990: 137; OECD 1995: 42). 
The aim of primary education, as laid down in the 1962 school 
law, is to afford knowledge to students, '... help them exercise their 
abilities and encourage them to become capable and responsible 
members of a democratic society' (Rust 1988: 1173). The main goals of 
the compulsory school in Sweden, recently decided on by the 
parliament, are laid down in Section 1 of the new School Act, valid 
from July 1 1991: 
Education in the compulsory school shall aim at providing 
students with the knowledge and skills and the additional 
training needed to participate in society. All this shall provide the 
basis for further education in the upper secondary school. (quoted 
in OECD 1995: 43) 
After compulsory school, students enter an integrated upper secondary 
school system. The labour market in the 1960s was capable of absorbing 
50% of all 16 year-olds, but by 1985 only 1% had jobs in the open labour 
market. In the mid-1970s upper secondary schools were receiving 
about 70% of compulsory school-leavers. One decade later more than 
90% of all compulsory school-leavers go on to upper secondary school. 
The upper secondary and vocational schools were combined to 
form an 'integrated upper secondary school' for those aged 16 to 20 in 
the mid-1960s. This implied that the length of schooling grew from an 
average of 7 years in the 1950s to 11 years in the early 1970s. Post-
compulsory education was reformed in 1971, with the aim of 
diminishing the differences between theoretical and practical studies. 
The result was an integrated upper secondary school incl -uding all post-
compulsory training courses within a new system. All co -urses of upper 
secondary school are broadly vocationally oriented, where 'vocational' 
is taken to mean preparation for a specific program in higher 
education. 
In accordance with the new School Act, extensive changes were 
made to the upper secondary system via legislation passed in 1991. 
Upper secondary education will comprise 16 nationally defined three-
year programs. Only two programs, science and social science, will be 
university entrance programs and 14 programs will be vocational 
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programs preparing students for the workforce. All programs will 
qualify students for entry into higher education. 
Higher education in Sweden retains the traditional European 
notion of specialisation but still offers opportunity to gain education 
via a 'building blocks approach, thus enabling as many students as 
possible to receive some level of higher education. In other words, 
higher education prepares students for highly specialised professions 
and, while the liberal arts, social sciences and natural sciences continue 
to educate broadly, they are also moving in the direction of 
professional studies. 
Swedish education is funded by the government, albeit from 
diverse sources. Responsibility for higher education is shared by the 
Central government, the county councils and some municipalities. 
There exists a blend of local and central government funding. Funds 
for individual study programs and single courses are allocated by 
regional boards, while funds for research and for general programs are 
offered directly to the institutions. Higher education institutions run 
by country councils and municipalities receive Central government 
subsidies. The basic principle of government funding is that 
institutions determine how the funds are spent within the aims 
defined centrally. 
Educational expenditure in 1982-83, for example, shows that 63% 
was provided by the Central government, 33% by local government, 
with the remaining 4% via 24 large regional centres called 'Landsing' 
(Department of Employment, Education and Training, Australia 1992: 
4). In 1989/90, for example, the expenditure for compulsory schooling 
was distributed almost equally between the Central government and 
the municipalities (49% and 51% respectively). For upper secondary 
school, the Central government was responsible for 55%, county 
councils for 8% and municipalities for 37% of the expenditure. As to 
universities and colleges, 96% of the expenditures were paid by the 
Central government (OECD 1995: 83). 
The rapid growth of education expenditure occurred in the 
middle of the postwar period when the compulsory school system was 
established. In real terms schooling, according to Olsson (1990: 137), 
absorbed five times more resources in the late 1970s than it had done 
three decades earlier. Before 1962 the period of compulsory schooling 
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was reduced to 7 years. However, recently, parents have been given the 
option of allowing their children to start school from the age of 6. It is 
expected that all municipalities will be able to provide this option by 
1997. 
Education in Sweden is free at compulsory, upper secondary and 
higher education levels. In compulsory schools, teaching materials, 
school meals and school transport are also free. In most municipalities, 
books and meals are free for students Private education does not play a 
key part in the Swedish education system. There are very few private 
schools and education is dominated by the public system. The 
Stockholm School of Economics is the only major private institution 
with official recognition and substantial Central government support 
at the higher education level (Department of Employment, Education 
and Training, Australia 1992: 2; OECD 1995). 
The comprehensive approach, combined with the Swedish 
tradition of education being a public responsibility, did not create a 
climate favourable to private schools. Historically, the Education Act of 
1927 mandated that private schools would no longer receive state aid 
for the first six years of schooling (Rust 1988: 1172). While the number 
of private or free schools has grown, going from 61 in 19 91/92 to 124 in 
1992/93, these schools recruit less than 2% of the student population, 
in particular in large cities. 
To attain the right to run a private school, two basic conditions 
have to be met: first, the school is essentially in line with the national 
goals and guidelines for comprehensive schools; and second, these 
schools are supervised by the proper State authorities (OECD 1995). Yet 
for a long time recognition of a private school did not mean any 
Central government or municipal grants. Only if the government 
considered that the school complemented the comprehensive school, 
were such grants distributed. But grants are still so limited that the 
private schools find it difficult to compete with the public schools. 
According to a parliamentary decision in 1991, while private schools 
that have been recognised receive Central Government grants to the 
same extent as public schools, it still depends on the individual 
municipality to decide to what extent a private school will be treated as 
an equal alternative to a public school (OECD 1995: 89). 
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To decentralise decision-making powers concerning the 
administration of schools to individual municipalities and schools, 
significant changes have been made since the 1970s. During the 1980s, 
educational policies in Sweden moved towards increasing 
decentralisation and management by objectives. Legislation passed in 
1991. carries this process further by giving municipalities full 
responsibility for all personnel in schools. The reforms thus created an 
education system where, while the state can define its goals and assess 
its outcomes local agencies have a free choice of methods in operating 
their institutions. The new patterns of development and change in 
education reflect a broader and more substantial transformation of 
values and structures in Sweden. 
Education in the USA 
The 1950s was a period of important educational growth and 
experienced substantial federal activity in every area. Bierlein (1993: 1) 
writes that: 'when the nation's superiority or economic vitality is 
threatened, education becomes a focal point.' For example, when the 
Soviet satellite Sputnik was launched in 1957, Americans blamed their 
public education. The Congress, in response, passed the National 
Defence Education Act of 1957, which provided more than US $4 
billion covering 10 categories to reestablish technological superiority 
(Kurian 1988: 1350). 
The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965 was 
the next most important federal educational legislation. It could be 
seen as the result of President L. B. Johnson's War on Poverty. 
Financial assistance was provided for special education programs to 
local communities having a large proportion of children from low-
income families, for school library resources, textbooks and teaching 
materials, for educational research and training, for supplementary 
educational centres and programs to meet local needs of primary and 
secondary education, and for strengthening state departments of 
education ( Kurian 1988; Bierlein 1993). 
Under President Reagan's Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
1981 (OBRA), most of the welfare expenditures were cut, including 
education expenditure. A clear-cut strategy was promulgated to reduce 
government spending on education and to restrict federal funding to 
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those parts of education that state and local governments had not 
precisely specified. The OBRA repealed the ESEA of 1965 and replaced 
it with the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act. This act 
reduced the assistance to children from low-income families, and 
consolidated appropriations for special programs into block grants to 
the states, with the proviso that 80% of the funding should be 
distributed to local school districts in accordance with the number of 
enrolments in these districts. One of the major consequences of 
reduced funding was that elementary-secondary grant-in-aid programs 
reduced remedial education for the disadvantaged. 
During the 1980s and into the 1990s, education has become a top 
political agenda at both national and state levels. Formal national 
educational aims have been established for the first time in America's 
history, and President Bush's America 2000: An Education Strategy set 
six national educational goals by the year 2000: 
1. All children in America will start school ready to learn. 
2. The high school graduation rate will increase to at least 90%. 
3. American students will leave Grades 4, 8, and 12 having 
demonstrated competency in challenging subject matter 
including English, mathematics, science, history, and 
geography; and every school in America will ensure that all 
students learn to use their minds well, so they may be prepared 
for responsible citizenship, further learning, and productive 
employment in our modern economy. 
4. US. students will be first in the world in science and 
mathematics achievement. 
5. Every adult American will be literate and will possess the 
knowledge and skills necessary to compete in a global economy 
and exercise the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. 
6. Every school in America will be free of drugs and violence and 
will offer a disciplined environment conducive to learning. 
(quoted in Bierlein 1993: 60) 
The American 2000 has attempted to focus state attention on 
achieving these aims. This strategy is consistent with the new 
federalism ideal because of its concomitant low additional federal 
funding for education. The states and local communities are 
responsible for restructuring the educational system. By 1992, 32 states 
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and hundreds of local communities have announced themselves 
America 2000 states or communities. 
This strategy also proposes a national research and development 
agenda financed by private businesses, rather than the federal 
government. It calls for the establishment of a non-profit New 
American Schools Development Corporation (NASDC) to raise money 
and fund between 20 to 30 design teams. Many business organisations 
and various groups try to marshall great societal forces to reconstruct 
the American educational system to reach a balance in the principles of 
equality, efficiency, liberty and excellence. The NASDC raised some US 
$50 million, and 11 design teams were selected during May 1992. On 
the other hand, this strategy calls for Congress to appropriate more 
than US $535 million for the creation of 535-plus New American 
Schools, one in each congressional district (Bierlein 1993). 
By and large, many felt the America 2000 program was too 
simplistic in nature and was part of a political agenda rather than an 
educational reform agenda. That is, it was a plan for re-electing the 
President but not a plan for American education. Some, however, 
believed that it would continue to be part of the national and state 
debate in that the strategy was pushed by governors and other reform 
leaders, not just the president's office. 
Education in the USA is organised on three basic levels: the 
elementary (including preschool and primary), the secondary and post-
secondary. Vocational training is available at both secondary and post-
secondary levels. The period of compulsory education varies among 
states, but most states require attendance between the ages of 7 and 16 
years. Public education is free in every state from elementary school to 
high school and equality of access is assured by various laws. All public 
primary schools are coeducational, and in theory, if not in practice, 
desegregated. Since 1957 the federal government has had a policy of 
encouraging desegregation in schools, despite problems caused by 
residential patterns. Some state authorities have imposed inter-district 
busing of students with the goal of preventing racial segregation. 
There are hundreds of different education systems rather than a 
centralised or nationally directed system in the USA. The public 
system is supervised by official policies and regulations, and the 
private by licensing procedures or charters. The different states have 
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their own systems of public education and differ in the ways in which 
they regulate their private schools. Many private schools in America 
have traditionally affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church, and at 
the beginning of the 1991/92 academic year 4.5 million students 
enrolled at elementary level and 1.4 million at secondary level (Europa 
1993: 325). This results in a great difference in education systems which 
are bound by a common commitment to knowledge and freedom. 
The number of private schools in the USA has increased steadily 
since the 1970s. Enrolments grew from 5,363,000 in 1970-71 to 5,700,000 
in 1984-85. With a declining birth rate, the total number of public and 
private school enrolments reduced in the same period, but private 
school enrolments increased from 11% of all school enrolments in 
1970-71 to 13% in 1984-85. However, this proportion in USA is still 
lower than in Australia where 26% of primary-secondary students 
attended non-government schools in 1986 (Windschuttle 1988: 5). 
Institutions of higher education rely on a combination of public 
and private sources for their financial support (see Table 5.2). Of the 
government sources in 1981-82, states contributed the largest 
proportion of the funds for public institutions and the federal 
government provided the most for private institutions. In 1981-82, 
state revenues comprised 44% of all funding for public four-year 
institutions and 50% for public two-year institutions, but only 2% for 
private institutions. The federal revenue share for higher education 
decreased from 19% in 1970-71 to 13% in 1981-82. The decline was 
evident at public four-year institutions where the federal share 
dropped from 20 % to 13%. The Federal share of revenues for private 
four-year institutions also declined, but still remained a larger 
percentage of total revenues at these institutions than at public four-
year institutions (Kurian 1988: 1371-1372). 
While student fees were the second most important source of 
funding for public institutions, they were the most important funding 
source for private institutions. Private four-year institutions obtained 
37% of their revenues from tuition, compared to only 13% for public 
institutions, while private two-year institutions received about two 
thirds of their revenues from tuition. Private philanthropy is another 
source of institutional support. The primary sources of private gifts 
include alumni and other individuals, private foundations, 
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corporations and religious groups. Private institutions receive about 
10% of their total income from these sources and public institutions 
receive only 2% (Kurian 1988). 
Table 5.2 School Expenditures, by Source of Funds in Constant 
(1989-90) Dollars in the USA, 1970-1990 
Source of Founds 
and Type of School 
1970 1980 1990 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Public 80.7 82.9 81.2 
Private 19.3 17.1 18.8 
Elementary and Secondary 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Public 89.7 93.1 92.2 
Private 10.3 7.0 7.8 
Higher Education 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Public 64.0 66.3 64.1 
Private 36.0 33.7 35.9 
Source: US. Department of Commerce, Social and Economie€ and 
Statistics Administration, Bureau of the Census 1993: 150. 
As we can see in Table 5.2, government was the main source of 
funds for elementary and secondary levels of education. However, 
more than one-third of funding of higher education was derived from 
the private sector. 
Education in Singapore 
Prior to the People's Action Party (PAP) taking up power, the 
education system in Singapore was characterised by state non-
intervention. Many schools were 'independent and Chinese-medium 
schools in particular remained outside government supervision. Since 
the mid-1950s, enrolments in Chinese schools have inexorably 
decreased. 
Under the PAP, the state became more involved in education and 
gave it a high priority. The PAP sought to preserve mother-tongue 
primary education and avoided decultration via a policy of 
bilingualism in the 1960s. Yet bilingualism clearly lowered English 
standards and failure and dropout rates were unacceptably high by the 
late 1970s (Milne and Mauzy 1990: 19). In this period, intensifying 
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economic challenges began to emerge and these in turn were to affect 
educational practice in a number of ways. 
The PAP government has always been keenly sensitive to the 
significance of education to the state and has constantly given the 
matter of education close scrutiny. In the mid-1970s, a high-powered 
task force was commissioned by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, and led 
by Goh Keng Swee, the Deputy Prime Minister, to examine the 
education system. The 'Report of the Ministry of Education, 1978', the 
so-called 'Goh Report', developed a new education system in 1980 
under Goh's direction as Minister of Education. 
The 'Goh Report' discovered an unacceptably high level of 
'educational wastage' from dropouts and failures. These students were 
unemployable, they argued, because the goal of full bilingualism was 
beyond the abilities of many students. The report thus called for 
increased streaming at the primary level and plotted several paths at 
the secondary level based on examination performance. Streaming had 
two main purposes: to identity the most gifted students, give them a 
demanding and challenging curriculum, and place them at the best 
schools with the best facilities; and to locate the weakest students and 
shift them into extended monolingual, vocationally oriented schools, 
thus decreasing failure and dropout rates. In between these poles, 
students were streamed into 'normal' and 'extended bilingual 
streams. 
The 'Goh Report' retained the goal of bilingualism, with mother 
tongue becoming the choice of students or parents. Identified in the 
'Goh Report' was the notion of incorporating moral education into the 
curriculum as a counter to the intrusion of 'less desirable' features of 
Western culture. The state in Singapore also believes that the 
instruction of social norms, values and moral character plays a key role 
in formal education. In expressing concern over the possible loss of 
traditional values, the 'Goh Report' stressed that: 
A society unguided by moral values can hardly be expected to 
remain cohesive under stress. It is a commitment to a common 
set of values that will determine the degree to which people of 
recent migrant origin will be willing and able to defend their 
collective interest. They will not be able to do this unless 
individuals belonging to the group are able to discern that an 
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enlightened view of their long-term self-interest often conflicts 
with their desire for immediate gain. 
... while moral education would help to give school children a set 
of values which could guide them in their adult life, this may not 
be sufficient to provide the cultural ballast to withstand the stress 
of living in a fast changing society exposed to influences, good 
and bad, of an open society such as ours. A people of recent 
migrant origin need to know more of their cultural roots. With 
the large scale movement to education in English, the risk of 
deculturization cannot be ignored. One way to overcoming the 
danger of deculturization is to teach children the historical 
origins of their culture. (quoted in Tham 1989: 486) 
Further, moral education has been instituted in the instruction of 
pupils in traditional values, particularly the value of filial piety which 
encourages adult children to look after their aged relatives and parents, 
rather than leave the burden to the state (Lim 1989). Consequently, 
moral education is taught at primary level to ensure that pupils have 
a clear understanding of core Asian values and national identity' 
(Government of Singapore 1992a: 163). The state in Singapore declared 
in 1982 that the purpose of moral education was to ensure that 
succeeding generations would continue to know right from wrong and 
would have the intellectual tools with which to judge Western values. 
In the mid-1980s, the government announced that it would 
reintroduce some independent schools. This plan was not only in 
accordance with the thinking behind the state's 'privatization drive, 
but also aimed to incorporate some educational features of good 
schools in the UK and the USA. Also, the government stated in 1989 
that it was phasing out the teaching of religious knowledge as a 
compulsory subject replacing it with an extended civics/moral 
education program in secondary schools in 1992. Further, the state in 
Singapore has showed that it may shift away from the 
British/American model to a German/Swiss model of education with 
more emphasis on technical and vocational education and with no 
university possibilities for the majority. 
Today, children in Singapore normally undergo at least 10 years 
of general education, including six years of primary education and four 
years of secondary education. As stated above, a fundamental feature of 
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Singapore's education system is the bilingual policy where each 
student learns English and his mother tongue (Government of 
Singapore 1992a, 1992b). Essentially, English in Singapore is viewed as 
the language of commerce, technology and administration. Mother 
tongue instruction and the teaching of Eastern value systems were 
incorporated into the education system to avoid rootlessness. The 
learning of the mother tongue was expected to enable Singapore's 
students to keep in touch with their heritage and cultural values. 
It is reasonable to expect that the Singapore government will 
continue to give highest priority to solving economic problems as a 
base for social development. In other words, while the state in 
Singapore will strive to realise greater order, efficiency and collective 
meaning in every Singaporean's everyday life, at the same time it will 
continue to make the education system the major prop of its economic 
development. Lee Kuan Yew has stated that: 
If we are to achieve our full human potential translated into 
sophisticated industrial goods we manufacture or the services we 
provide we must [have] more students with good general 
grounding and greater trainability for specific jobs. While we 
cannot alter the innate qualities of our people, we shall make the 
most of these qualities by teaching and training in subjects and 
skills relevant to today's needs and in anticipation of tomorrow's 
development. (The Straits Times, 9 July 1979, quoted in 
Gopinathan 1987: 210) 
Education in Singapore is seen as a nation-building device that can 
secure political legitimacy via direct ideological socialisation and 
promotion of the multiracial Singaporean national identity. The 
utilitarian purpose of education clearly is to create a good person and 
useful citizen (Milne and Mauzy 1990: 21-22; Pugh: 69). Put another 
way: 
The Singapore education system aims to bring out the best in all 
children, instilling in them sound moral values so that they will 
grow up to be responsible adults — loyal to their country, 
concerned for their family and able to earn a living. (Government 
of Singapore 1992a: 163) 
By and large, the education system in Singapore, according to 
Gopinathan (1987: 201-202), has three main objectives. First, it aims to 
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lessen the effects of inter-ethnic diversity and to provide a frame of 
common experiences for promoting a sense of identity with and 
loyalty to Singapore. Second, it provides the knowledge, skills and 
values that will lead to active and purposeful contributions to 
national, economic and social development. And third, it advances 
participation and equality of opportunity for all ethnic and social 
groups via provision of access, on the basis of merit, to all levels of 
education system. 
Singapore government expenditures on education have been 
mostly oriented towards social investment rather than consumption 
goals. For the moment, it is likely that the human-capital approach 
will remain dominant, although human-capital appreciation is by no 
means the only objective of the education system in Singapore (Lim 
1989: 181). Recently a report of the Singapore government 
recommended that 'education is a long-term investment in 
Singapore's future. ... This means that both parents and the 
government will need to invest more each year' (Ministry of Trade 
and Industry, Singapore 1993: 81). 
Table 5.3 Government Expenditure on Education 
in the East Asian Countries 
Country 	Period 	Government Education 
Expenditure as % of GDP 
Singapore 	1980-92 	 3.7 
Japan 	 1980-90 5.2 
Hong Kong 	1980-91 	 2.2 
South Korea 	1980-92 3.1 
Taiwan 	 1980-91 	 4.5 
Source: Ministry of Trade and Industry, Singapore 1993: Table 8.5. 
The Singapore government has heavily invested in education. Its 
expenditure on education is comparable to that in other East Asian 
countries (see Table 5.3). The government plans to increase this 
expenditure to 5% of GDP in the future. This investment appears to 
have paid off, as evidenced by the increasing proportion of each cohort 
of students who enter higher education. In 1980, only 5% of the 
student cohort went to the university and 8% to the polytechnics. By 
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1992, the proportions had risen to 16% for universities and 29% for 
polytechnics (Lim 1989: 179; Ministry of Trade and Industry, Singapore 
1993). 
Government bears all development costs of schools and other 
educational institutions, and subsidises their operating costs at a very 
high rate— 98-100% for primary, secondary schools and junior 
colleges, 94% for institutes of technical education and 83% for 
polytechnics (Ministry of Trade and Industry, Singapore 1993: 79). 
Table 5.4 indicates the division of educational provision between 
the public and the private sectors. While the total number of schools 
reduced from 1982 to 1992, government schools as a proportion of total 
schools increased from 65% to 72% during the same period. As far as 
the number of students attending government schools was concerned, 
the government schools shared a similar proportion of total students 
from 1982 to 1992. 
Table 5.4 Schools and Students by Type of School in Singapore, 
1982-1992 
1982 1987 1992 
Total Schools 470 391 354 
Government 305 282 256 
Government-aided & Independent 159 104 93 
Private 6 5 5 
Total Students 463,625 464,460 444,748 
Government 346,671 347,414 328,189 
Government-aided & Independent 115,000 115,110 114,771 
Private 1,954 1,936 1,788 
Source: Government of Singapore 1992b: 290-293. 
In the private sector, there are two types of school. One is 
operated by the voluntary and the market sectors, but receives 
government financial support. The other is operated and supported by 
the private sector without any government subsidy. The former was 
the second most important education provider, and there were one 
quarter of total students attending these schools from 1982 to 1992. The 
latter played a minor role in education provision. 
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Education in Taiwan 
Education in Taiwan can be classified into five stages: preschool 
education, primary education, secondary education, higher education , 
and social education (special). Preschool education is provided to 
toddlers aged 3 to 5 at the kindergartens. Primary education is provided 
to students aged 6 to 11 at elementary schools. Secondary education is 
provided to students aged 12 to 17 at the junior high, senior high, and 
vocational senior schools (including the first three years of the 5-year 
junior colleges). Higher education is provided to students aged 18 to 21 
at the colleges/universities and above (ROC 1994b: 71-72). 
The aim of education in Taiwan is stipulated in Article 158, 
Section Five, the Constitution of the Republic of China: 
Education and culture shall aim at the development among the 
citizens of the national spirit, the spirit of self-government, 
national morality, good physique, scientific knowledge and the 
ability to earn a living. (quoted in ROC 1994d: Appendix III: 
Constitution of the Republic of China and the Additional 
Articles, p.726) 
Other Articles related to education in Section Five are summarised as 
follows: 
• All citizens shall have an equal opportunity to receive an education; 
• Primary education shall be compulsory for all children of school age 
from 6 to 12 years and to all citizens above school age who have not 
received primary education through free supplementary education 
programs; 
• Free textbooks shall be provided by the government to children from 
low-income families; 
• All public and private educational and cultural institutions in the 
country shall, in accordance with law, be subject to state supervision; 
• Special grants from the central government shall be made to aid 
frontier regions and economically poor areas, in developing 
educational programs; 
• No less than 15% of the total national budget, 25% of the total 
provincial budgets, and 35% of the total county and municipal 
budgets shall be appropriated for education. 
The government provides a free and mandatory education to all 
citizens through nine years of elementary and junior high schools. 
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The compulsory education system was extended from 6 to 9 years in 
1968 (Meyer 1988: 21; Cheng 1993: 224; Liu and Armer 1993: 316; ROC 
1995: 336). Before 1968, to pay tuition fees and pass entrance 
examinations were two requirements of entering junior high school, 
which prevented a great number of motivated primary graduates from 
continuing their education. The government policy changes offered 
further educational opportunity for many primary graduates who 
otherwise would have entered the labour market directly (Liu and 
Armer 1993: 316). 
However, why did the state in Taiwan seek to accelerate the 
extension of junior high school? One answer is that the extension of 
education was linked with the features of the economic structure in 
Taiwan. The extension of junior high education was due to the state 
using the policy to meet the manpower needs of economic 
development. Labour-intensive production was a major feature of 
economic transformation at an early industrial stage and it required a 
mass labour force with basic skills. In Taiwan, labour-intensive 
production in the 1960s and the 1970s required these workers in large 
numbers. The industries could absorb workers with some basic 
education and skills rather than with advanced knowledge and 
technical skills related to higher education. As Liu and Armer (1993: 
316-317) suggest: 
[T]here was no such state effort to expand mass schooling at the 
senior high or tertiary levels because the economy did not require 
large numbers of technically trained and highly skilled workers. 
Public pressure for expansion of higher education was largely 
resisted or diverted to expansion of vocational schools at the 
senior high and junior college levels as separate streams from the 
existing highly selective academic high schools and colleges. 
While junior high school graduates in Taiwan have three options to 
continue their education (to attend three-year senior high school, 
three-year senior vocational school or five year junior college), senior 
high school is usually the first choice for students planning to enter 
college or university2 . Yet because of limited space, only about one- 
2 Large numbers of private cram schools have cropped up in Taiwan, mostly to help 
students prepare for the competitive entrance examinations into high school and 
university. By conservative estimates, more than 50% of all junior high school students 
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fourth of students are admitted into senior high school (ROC 1995: 
342). The demand for higher education is even stronger than senior 
high school education (Liu and Armer 1993: 318; ROC 1995: 343). 
Senior high school education focuses heavily on the highly 
competitive Joint University Entrance Examination. Test scores 
determine the college or university and the major area of study to 
which students are assigned. 
For most students, the only route for admission into university 
remains the Joint University Entrance Examination. Each year, more 
than 100,000 students take the Joint University Entrance Examination 
and between 60 and 80% of those who seek admission to higher 
education are unsuccessful (Liu and Armer 1993: 319). In 1993, about 
44% of high school students who took the examination were accepted 
into a college or university (ROC 1995: 343). Although the middle and 
upper class account for the majority of the users of Taiwan's higher 
education, the lower and middle classes also are able to gain entry. 
While the Joint University Entrance Examination is a system much 
criticised, it still tenaciously retains and is widely believed to combine 
equity with quality control (Cheng 1993: 254-257; ROC 1995: 343). 
The high school entrance examination has been increasingly 
criticised recently because it places much stress on students, and 
because the teaching style heavily emphasises test-taking skills rather 
than promoting independent thinking and individual creativity. An 
education reform movement among parents, teachers and students 
has developed seeking specific changes in the current system. On April 
10th, 1994, more than twenty thousand people turned up for Taiwan's 
first large-scale march for education reform. A group of teachers and 
supporters established an April Tenth Education Reformers' League to 
press the government to speed up education reforms. Suggested 
changes include broadening the current educational system to focus 
less on preparation for examination, more on the development of the 
individual, and abolishing long-held regulations, such as dress codes 
and sanitation checks (ROC 1995: 336-340). 
attend these schools regularly. Some students attend various classes or meet with 
private tutors several nights a week, on weekends, and during summer vacation (ROC 
1995: 345). 
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About 50,000 students end their formal education after 
completing the compulsory education system each year. Recently, 
there has been some discussions within the government of extending 
to a ten-year compulsory system. Making an effort to better prepare 
these students to enter the labour market, the government introduced 
a Tenth-Year National Compulsory Education Based upon Vocational 
Education Program in the 1993-94 school year. Under this experimental 
program, junior high students who do not plan to continue their 
education can graduate from junior high school with a specific 
vocational skill. The government subsidises the extra tenth year of 
schooling. The plan was implemented on a three-year trial basis 
during the 1993-94 school year and will be re-evaluated before the 1996-
97 school year (ROC 1995: 341). 
The state in Taiwan spends more money on education than any 
other categoriy except defence. The education budget in fiscal year 1993 
was US$15.5 billion, 41% of which went to compulsory education, 6% 
to senior high education, 7% to vocational education, 7% to junior 
college education, and 16% to university and college education (ROC 
1995: 335-336). For fiscal year 1994, 19.1% of total government 
expenditure (US$13.7 billion) was distributed to education (ROC 1994b: 
97; ROC 1995: 336). In higher education, the state in Taiwan heavily 
subsidised its public universities, and encouraged students from poor 
families to compete in the Joint University Entrance Examination. It 
also encouraged the private sector to establish higher education 
institutions to alleviate the government's financial burden (Cheng 
1993: 255). 
Table 5.5 indicates the division of education provision between 
the public and the private sectors in Taiwan. While the number of 
total elementary and secondary schools increased from 1970 to 1993, 
the proportion of public schools to private schools was stagnant during 
the same period. As far as the number of students attending public and 
private schools is concerned, the proportion of students attending 
public schools compared to students in private schools changed from 
95% to 5% in 1970 to 88% to 12% in 1993. The private sector has 
increased its role in both primary and secondary education provision 
in the past two decades, although the state remains the most important 
education provider in Taiwan. At the level of higher education, the 
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proportion of public colleges and universities increased from 46% in 
1970 to 55% in 1993. However, the share of students of public colleges 
and universities reduced from 48% to 42% in the same period. 
Table 5.5 Education Institutions and Students by Type of Education 
Institution in Taiwan, 1970-1993 
1970 1980 1993 
Total Numbers of 3,204 3,451 3,640 
Elementary and Secondary Schools 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Public 2,994 3,208 3,395 
93.5 93.0 93.3 
Private 210 243 245 
6.5 7.0 6.7 
Total Students in 3,600,002 3,839,273 4,052,278 
Elementary and Secondary Schools 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Public 3,408,333 3,521,845 3,558,112 
94.7 91.7 87.8 
Private 191,669 317,428 494,166 
5.3 8.3 12.2 
Total Numbers of 22 27 51 
Colleges and Universities 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Public 10 14 28 
45.5 51.9 54.9 
Private 12 13 23 
54.5 48.1 45.1 
Total Students in 92,850 153,088 285,982 
Colleges and Universities 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Public 44,166 61,803 120,901 
47.6 40.4 42.3 
Private 48,684 91,285 165,081 
52.4 59.6 57.7 
Sources: Calculated from ROC 1994a: 114-121; ROC 1994b: 73-83. 
From the perspective of education provision, there are two types 
of education institutions in the private sector. These are operated by 
the voluntary and the market sectors, but receive government 
financial subsidies. Because of the limitation of statistical data, the 
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proportion of the voluntary to the market sectors is not available. 
However, as far as the overall structure of educational institutions is 
concerned, it is reasonable to anticipate that the private sector, 
including the market and the voluntary sector, plays a minor role in 
education provision in Taiwan, compared with the public sector (see 
Table 5.5). 
Welfare Configuration: Models of Educational Provision 
Government education policy can influence the overall use of 
education provision. Education policies in different countries not only 
represent the level of state intervention, but also reflect various mixes 
of public and private responsibility. While the state is an important 
education provider in most countries, various sectors of civil society 
have their roles in education provision. More specifically, an 
individual's access to education provision is shaped by different 
welfare configurations of education in different countries. 
Table 5.6 Percentage Share of Total Household Consumption in 
Australia, Sweden, the USA, Singapore and Taiwan 
Food Clothing 	Gross Rents; 







Australia 13 5 21 10 8 13 30 
Sweden 13 5 19 11 8 11 33 
USA 13 6 18 14 8 14 27 
Singapore 19 8 11 7 12 13 30 
Taiwan 36 5 23 5 14 10 7 
Sources: World Bank 1991: 223; ROC 1994a: 63-65. 
Note: Data refer to either 1980 or 1985. 
It is difficult to measure the role of the family in education 
provision in contemporary societies because of the institutionalisation 
of school education. However, this does not mean the family plays no 
role in education provision. The share of total household expenditure 
on education offers a supplementary and useful indicator to measure 
welfare configurations between the state and various sectors of civil 
society in different countries. Table 5.6 shows percentage share of total 
household consumption in the five countries analysed in this chapter. 
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Continuum of Education Provision 
As far as total household consumption on education was concerned, 
both Singapore and Taiwan are higher than their three OECD 
counterparts, Australia, Sweden and the USA. 
The variety of education provision available offers a comparison 
of the state and various sectors of civil society between countries, 
although this comparison can only be approximate. Based on the 
above analysis, welfare configurations of education provision in 
Australia, Sweden, the USA, Singapore and Taiwan can be 
summarised as follows (see Figure 5.1): 
Figure 5.1 Welfare Configurations of Education Provision in Australia, 
Sweden, the USA, Singapore and Taiwan 
Model I: The Australian Education Provision 
The Australian education system is similar to the American system in 
that educational selection is based on performance criteria and in that 
it is seen to operate for the benefit of the individual rather than for the 
collective benefit of society. It is closer to a sponsored selection process 
due to it being more centrally organised and administrated than that in 
America. While Australia's publicly funded sector runs in a fashion 
similar to American educational systems, it retains a very significant 
independent and religious school sector which runs much as the UK 
system (Waters and Crook 1993: 324). 
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The largest area of education spending for the Commonwealth 
was in tertiary education, reflecting Commonwealth responsibilities in 
this area. Primary and secondary education, however, represented the 
largest area of education spending for State and local authorities 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1992b: 143). 
Model II: The Swedish Education Provision 
One of the most prominent features of education in Sweden is that 
education is free at compulsory, upper secondary and higher education 
levels. The Swedish education system has traditionally been organised 
within the state (public) sector. Education in Sweden has two functions 
in relation to the state (public) sector: first, almost all education is 
provided within the state sector; and second, the public sector has been 
more efficient than the private sector in absorbing individuals with a 
higher education background (OECD 1995c: 15). Investments in 
education and training for all citizens have been integral components 
in developing welfare provisions in Sweden. 
Private schools can exist only if they have the same general 
purposes as public schools and aid the public sector to meet its goals. 
Further, they must follow school law as forcefully as do the public 
schools. Public subvention of private schools is common, but 
government and local communities decide this on a school-to-school 
basis. As a result, there are very few private schools existing at 
compulsory and post-compulsory level (OECD 1995c). Also, private 
institutions of the higher education are not a key aspect of Swedish 
education, with the exception of the Stockholm School of Economics. 
Learning options are provided in accordance with the principle of 
equal access for all citizens regardless of ethnic, social background and 
residential locality (OECD 1995c: 39). 
Model III: The American Education Provision 
The educational system in the USA is not a centralised or nationally 
directed system. Rather, its control is decentralised to the states. Unlike 
Australia which also operates a decentralised education system, the 
USA seems more dependent upon state and local school authorities 
than Australia. Having lived under a strong British monarchy, 
according to Bierlein (1993: 18), 'America's forefathers were reluctant 
to grant a single national entity the authority over something as 
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influential as education, and therefore consciously chose to give this 
responsibility to the states.' 
While Congress and the federal government have no formalised 
authority to operate education programs, they play a key part in 
establishing education policies that influence this country's education 
provision. This is reflected in the fact that the government has been 
the largest fund provider in elementary and secondary education. 
However, a unique feature of education provision in the USA is 
highlighted by its higher education sector. More than one-third of 
funding of higher education was from the private sector revealing that 
the private sector plays a relatively more significant role in higher 
education than that in Australia, Singapore and Sweden. 
Model IV: The Singaporean and Taiwanese Education Provision 
An important feature of the Singapore educational system is the 
multiplicity of goals which it has been continuously called upon to 
meet. It is likely that many of the educational policies in Singapore 
have not been only for academic purposes. Rather, they are also shaped 
by economic, social and political goals that the educational system is 
expected to serve (Lim 1989; Tham 1989; Milne and Mauzy 1990). In 
their analysis of the effect of education on economic growth in Taiwan, 
Liu and Armer (1993: 321) also conclude that: 
[T]he state can be an effective mechanism in the feedback 
processes between the educational and economic systems. A 
strong, relatively autonomous state can help regulate the supply 
of the educational system to meet the manpower demand from 
the economic system. However, state action is also conditioned by 
the economic structure and public pressures. Thus, the economic 
effects of educational expansion is affected by the interaction 
among the political, economic, and educational systems. 
The educational system in Singapore has been subject to 
experimentation with many and varied changes being implemented 
from time to time and in accordance with shifting government 
priorities. The government, for example, at first stressed national 
integration and the promotion of a national identity as an aim of the 
school system. Later it turned to focus on bilingualism as a means of 
preserving traditional cultures and cultural values (Lim 1989: 179). 
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The state in Singapore thus views education as a nation-building 
mechanism and imposes orderly change in the educational system to 
achieve social and economic goals. In Taiwan, basic norms and values 
to which the young have traditionally been socialised will of necessity 
undergo fundamental transformation. However, 'appropriately 
restructured, education will continue to play a vital if indeterminate 
role in promoting modernity, national development, and whatever 
new sense of collective political identity emerges within the social 
order' (Lucas 1982: 223). 
Like Taiwan, moral education in Singapore is seen as an 
important component of formal education (Meyer 1988; Lim 1989; 
Government of Singapore 1992b; ROC 1995). Consequently, mother-
tongue instruction and teaching of Eastern values were incorporated 
into the education system to promote a multiracial Singaporean 
national identity and to strengthen its political legitimacy. 
Streaming is the most prominent feature of education in 
Singapore because of the idea that every person is born with different 
intellectual abilities and should be properly educated and trained to 
realise his or her maximum potential. The state in Singapore clearly 
desires, and has largely achieved, a literate society with an intellectual 
elite and a skilled labour force. Like other East Asian NICs, access to 
higher education in Singapore and Taiwan is also crucial for creating a 
meritocratic bureaucracy which in turn has implications for the 
credibility of economic policy (Cheng 1993: 220). 
From the perspective of the welfare state-society relation, the total 
household consumption on education in Singapore and Taiwan is 
much higher than in Australia, Sweden and the USA. One of the main 
reasons is that essentially, the aim of the government's policy is based 
on the principle that the best kind of education for Singaporeans and 
Taiwanese is to make labour most productive of material and 
pecuniary gains. Under this circumstance, most Singaporeans see 
education as the best means to equip a person to find a well-paid job 
and to maintain a decent standard of living (Ho 1989: 686). Likewise, 
higher education in Taiwan has been seen as prerequisite for well-paid 
employment. The popularisation of higher learning in Taiwan has 
been attained at the cost of encouraging more and more students to 
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prepare themselves for higher education despite the fact that result 
will not attain their goal (Lucas 1982: 219). 
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CHAPTER SIX 
WELFARE CONFIGURATION OF CHILD CARE 
Child care provision aims to complement parental care, providing for 
the care of children and promoting their social, cognitive and personal 
development when parents, especially the mothers, are engaged in 
other activities, such as employment, education and community 
affairs. The provision of adequate child care is important for the 
efficient operation of the economy, but it also is important in 
achieving equity objectives. Child care policies have developed in 
response to social and demographic changes. These transformations 
continue to be driven by two major trends: the rise of female labour 
force participation and the increasing demand for quality in child care 
programs (Commonwealth of Australia 1994a: 12). More specifically, 
the rise of female paid employment together with an increasing 
awareness of the importance of early education and socialisation for 
young children has contributed to the growth of demand for child care 
provision. 
For these reasons, child care is an important issue for both 
governments and various sectors of civil society. It is crucial that a 
government defines its role in welfare provision and produces a policy 
to meet the needs generated by social change. Governments play 
diverse roles in child care, in direct provision of day care centres, 
indirect financial subsidies and regulation of various sectors of civil 
society. The role of the state and various providers in the field of child 
care form different welfare configurations and lead to variations in 
child care provision in different countries. 
The objective of this chapter is to examine and account for 
welfare configurations of child care provision in the East Asian NICs 
and OECD countries. There are four sections in this chapter. The first 
section explores child care provision in the five OECD countries. The 
second section focuses on child care provision in the East Asian NICs. 
The third section builds models of the welfare configurations of child 
care provision in these nine countries. Finally, I attempt to account for 
the reasons that the family as a source of child care provision in the 
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East Asian countries is stronger than their four Western OECD 
counterparts. 
Child Care in the Five OECD Countries 
Child Care in Australia 
Child care provision in Australia has its origin in the philanthropic 
activities of the middle and upper classes. Kindergartens and day 
nurseries were established by groups of urban reformers in the densely 
populated inner suburbs of Australia's major cities in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These two kinds of 
provision were closely related but differed in some basic ways. 
Kindergartens were not intended to relieve women's responsibility of 
care. Instead, they were to 'reform' working class children via 
supervised activities and home visits. Day nurseries were clearly 
aimed to meet the child care needs of working mothers who supported 
themselves and their children. Subsequently, as the educational value 
of kindergartens was perceived, they began to thrive in middle class 
suburbs (Fox 1991: 149; Graycar and Jamrozik 1993: 231). Both kinds of 
care were provided, mostly by the non-government sector, until the 
mid-1960s. State governments provided various levels of assistance to 
preschools, but the organisations of services remained outside 
government control for many decades (Brennan and O'Donnell 1986: 
xii; Commonwealth of Australia 1993 ). 
The issue of child care became the subject of intensive political 
debate in the late 1960s and the early 1970s (Brennan and O'Donnel 
1986; Cass and Baldock 1988: xix; Graycar and Jamrozik 1993: 231). The 
passing of the Child Care Act in 1972 marked the formal entry of the 
Commonwealth Government into the field of child care welfare 
provision. The Act provided financial support for the establishment 
and operation of child care centres, and fee subsidies to low-income 
families (Commonwealth of Australia 1993: 130; Lever 1988: 14). 
Under this act, however, assistance could be provided only to 
centre-based long day care services and had to be channelled by non-
profit organisations or local authorities. The Whitlam Government of 
1972-75 intended to initiate the Children's Commission. There were 
two main purposes of child care provision. One was to provide a 
universal provision for all children under 6. The other was to be a 
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means to reduce inequality. During this period, state child care was 
pushed into the public agenda, where it would remain despite a few 
subsequent problems. 
However, the commission did not come into existence before the 
Whitlam government lost office in 1975. A positive move on the child 
care issue had been taken towards the end of the Coalition 
Government, 1975-83. The responsibility of preschooling was 
progressively shifted from the Federal government to the State 
governments, with the Commonwealth ceasing to fund preschools 
directly, instead providing block grants to the States for child care 
provision (Commonwealth of Australia 1993, 1994a; Graycar and 
Jamrozik 1993: 233). 
While public child care provision had developed slowly, the 
improvement in child care facilities also increased workforce 
participation rates of mothers with young children. Consequently, 
family day care rather than centred-based long day care was the main 
type to be extended. The Commonwealth funds had been allocated 
merely on the basis of submissions from community groups, and this 
led to a relatively inequitable pattern of provision and incurred 
pressure from a range of organisations. 
A policy backing up a universal system of child care provision 
was established again when Labor came to power in 1983. The 
intention and policy soon changed, however. The emphasis moved 
towards giving priority to making child care services accessible to 
working mothers, or of parents undertaking vocational training to 
enter the workforce (Encel and Campbell 1991: 144). A needs-based 
planning approach was thus accepted by the Commonwealth in 1984. 
Simultaneously, income-related fee subsidies were launched for 
families using non-profit provisions and the priority-of-access 
guidelines were centred more explicitly on working parents. The 
rationale for this priority ranking is the limited source of public funds 
that could be used to support child care costs (Commonwealth of 
Australia 1994a: 4). Therefore, child care policy has become an arm of 
employment policy, and a new form of occupational welfare subsidised 
directly by the government (Graycar and Jamrozik 1993: 233-234). 
Changes were introduced to the method of funding non-profit 
long day care centres in 1986. The changes in funding arrangements 
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and later modifications to the Commonwealth's program have led to a 
broader and more equitable spread of Commonwealth funds across a 
wider and more various range of provisions and child care users. This 
has been accompanied by a significant increase in Commonwealth 
expenditure on child care. In the 1990s employers and private 
investors were encouraged to enter child care provision. The 
Commonwealth fee relief scheme was extended to out of school hours 
care, private long day care, employer sponsored centres, and the 
previously unfunded voluntary sector. The Federal government 
recently introduced a Child Care cash rebate and Home Child Care 
allowance. These schemes recognised child care as legitimate costs and 
enabled both parents to work or to choose to look after their children at 
home, for which a target was set to meet the needs of work related 
child care by the next century. 
The private child care industry shows that the market can 
provide care, if there is a demand for the service from those with a 
capacity to pay. The ABS (1989) survey in 1988 in Australia found that 
there were 608 licensed commercial long-day-care centres running and 
providing 27,000 places (Jones 1990: 238). It is likely that the private 
sector (market) will continue to play a key role in child care in the 
future, and may increase its share of the provision. Because 
government regulations on the child care industry have changed, 
private child care centres are allowed to receive subsidies. This makes 
such centres more profitable than before. The number of private long 
day care centres has extended rapidly since 1991 as the introduction of 
Children Assistance was expanded to the commercial child care sector. 
In June 1991, it was estimated that some 36,700 private and 
employer/non-profit long day care places were operating, about 32,300 
of which were in private centres. By 1994, there were almost 71,000 
privately operated long day care places (Commonwealth of Australia 
1994a: 28). 
In 1992 there were 1.8 million families with children under 12 
years. For 35% of these, grandparents were the main providers of 
informal child care. Yet grandparents were more likely to be the 
providers of informal child care for younger children aged under 2 
years (46%) than for older children aged 5-11 (26%). In 1993, 600,000 
children aged 0-11 used formal child care arrangements and nearly 
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909,000 children used informal child care arrangements. However, 
formal child care arrangements accounted for 40% of child care use in 
1993, up from 33% in 1987 (Commonwealth of Australia 1994a: 35). 
Table 6.1 Percentage of Services, Type of Sponsorship by the Type of 
Formal Care, Australia, 30 June 1992 
Type of Long Day Family Day Other Outside 
Sponsorship Carea Care Formal School 
Careb Hours Care 
State 19.2 55.3 44.6c 28.2 
Voluntary sector 30.4 44.7 55.0 71.8 
Market 50.4 0 0.4 0 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: Calculated from Commonwealth of Australia 1993: Table 4.3. 
Notes: a Including all long day care in Children's Services Program 
(CSP), ie. community-based and private. 
b including occasional care, Multifunctional Aboriginal 
Children's Services and other multifunctional services. 
c including State government administration of neighbourhood 
models. 
Table 6.1 indicates current child care provision in three sectors. 
The state sector includes local and state governments. Its share in 
different types of child care services varied from 19% in long day care 
to 55% in family day care. The voluntary sector contained non-profit, 
religious, and charitable organisations. It had its highest percent in 
outside school hours care (72%), and lowest in long day care (30%). The 
Market sector referred to privately owned child care services. It mainly 
concentrated on long day care, but was almost non-existent in the 
other three types of child care services. By and large, the state 
accounted for 36.8% of total child care services, the voluntary sector 
50.5%, and the market 12.7%. 
Child Care in Japan 
Up until the Second World War, it was traditionally believed that 
Japanese children belonged to the house (or the head of the house). 
With the enactment of the Child Welfare Law in 1947, children's 
rights were acknowledged, and the concept of child welfare was 
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established. The day nursery system as one kind of institution was 
stipulated in the Child Welfare Law, and was established under the 
authorisation of the prefectural governor and admissions were the 
responsibility of the public. 
In the case of day nurseries, since they were closely tied to the 
community, the local municipality was given the responsibility and 
obligation for authority for admission and disbursement of operational 
expenses. The national government set the standards for the amount 
of disbursement to the day nursery from the local municipality and the 
fee charged to the guardians for nursery care to be paid to the 
municipality. The fee was decided in proportion to the guardian's 
capability to support. When a new day nursery was set up, the national 
government subsidised 50% of the standardised expenses, and the 
prefecture 25%. 
In 1948, there were 1,476 day nurseries, and 135,503 children 
enrolled. From the later half of the 1960s, there was a striking growth 
in enrolment and there were 22,747 day nurseries with the capacity of 
2,008,153 children in 1989 (Japanese National Committee 1990: 49). 
There were special measures to provide child care in remote areas 
where national standards were not appropriate. With the exception of 
services provided under a national scheme, some local entities had 
other types of services, such as the provision of home nursery welfare 
workers, where experienced mothers were entrusted with the care of a 
small number of children at home. Separate guidelines were applied 
for the establishment of a nursery facility by a private enterprise in its 
own location. 
To respond to the demands of their workers, corporations such as 
Sony and Mitsubishi have introduced day care centres in new 
administrative and plant facilities (Barton 1991: 35). Many social 
welfare juridical persons operate institutions and provide social 
welfare activities. The majority of these are child welfare-related 
institutions, such as day nurseries. The prefectural governors and the 
Minister for Health and Welfare supervise and administer these social 
welfare juridical persons, and provide them with special financial 
assistance (Japanese National Committee 1990: 14). 
In Japan there are around 1.8 million children in 23,000 public 
and private day nurseries which are registered and subsidised under 
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the Child Welfare Law. It is estimated, however, there are roughly 
6,000 day nurseries which are not authorised by the state (Japanese 
National Committee 1990: 108). Non-authorised nursery facilities have 
existed from the past, in the form of cooperative nurseries in the 
community. In the early 1980s, fatal accidents occurred repeatedly at 
the so-called 'baby hotels which were run by commercial companies 
having poor facilities and which kept the babies for long periods until 
late at night. While investigations have been carried out annually 
since 1981 on equipment and operation of the baby hotels having a 
capacity of 10 or more, 63.1% of baby hotels still did not meet the 
standard guidelines for the services in 1988. 
To strengthen the guidance and supervision of the services 
concerned, 'the Priority for the Baby and Infant Care' was established 
by the Ministry of Health and Welfare in 1989. It consists of three main 
checkpoints: nursery care, meal services and health services. Recently, 
the Ministry of Health and Wealth has been trying to secure budget to 
promote assistance to young mothers in distress from child rearing by 
adding other functions to existing authorised day nurseries. The plan 
defines a day nursery as a centre of care in the community, and 
includes the practice of short-term care, emergency care and 
counselling and guidance at day nurseries. 
An ideal Japanese wife is still a full-time mother, despite the fact 
that working mothers have become as common as housewives. In 
most families, it is usually the mother who does the child-rearing 
which is an almost full-time occupation right into the school-years for 
many mothers (Boocock 1991; Shwalb et al. 1992; Bowring and 
Kornicki 1993; Tanaka 1995). It is common for grandparents to be 
involved as caregivers if they live close to or with the child's family. 
Shwalb et al. (1992: 342) show that about one third of working mothers 
in Japan use grandparents as child care providers. This makes 
grandparents the second most utilised child care resource for working 
mothers after day nurseries. While nuclear families now predominate 
in urban areas, much of the family ideology remains, with expectations 
of reciprocity between generations. Amongst living members, there is 
an idea that the older generation cares for the younger one and they 
receive respect in exchange for the nurture as children grow up 
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The rate of maternal employment in Japan has traditionally been 
very low. Children were initially cared for by their mothers and then 
enrolled in education-oriented preschool programs. Recent increases 
in the numbers of divorces and employed women have caused slow 
but significant growth in the number of facilities provided to children 
under 3, and a rise of the public consciousness of the national need for 
child care provision. However, the number of Japanese children under 
3 receiving out-of-home care is smaller than that of Japan's OECD 
counterparts (Lamb and Sternberg 1992). In response to insufficient 
child care and the desire for more familial and smaller-scale facilities, 
the use of such alternatives as homecare workers, unlicensed child 
care, baby hotels, company-run day nurseries and so forth is likely to 
grow (Shwalb et al. 1992). 
Child Care in Sweden 
Child care policy in Sweden has developed in two clearly 
• supplementary directions. First it has vastly increased public 
investment in day care to support out-of-home care for parents in paid 
employment. Second, it has given parents very substantial statutory 
rights to paid parental leave to support parental care in the home. In 
the first instance, the state subsidises care by others, and it supports 
employed parents' care for their children in the second. Both policies 
are devised mainly to benefit parents in paid employment and their 
children, rather than all parents who are in paid employment or not 
(Ginsburg 1992: 53). 
Child care services in Sweden extended markedly in the 1960s 
and the 1970s with the growth of female labour force participation and 
the concern for protecting children's welfare under circumstances of 
rapid social change. The growth of women's paid employment, the rise 
of gender equality, and the women's movement have made a distinct 
impact on social policy concerning the welfare provision of child care. 
Between 1973 and 1985, a family policy stressing large expansion of 
public child care was supported by a parliamentary majority and the 
number of children in day care grew by a factor of 12 (Hwang and 
Broberg 1992: 34). 
In the mid-1980s some 60% of children between the ages of 1 and 
7 were in public child care programs, and another 13% were in private 
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care (Kindlund 1988, quoted in Kamerman 1991: 185). The demand for 
child care services was still well beyond the supply because about 80% 
of the working mothers with children under age 7 and about 45% of 
children under 7 received public day care in 1987 (OECD 1988: 129-172; 
Moss 1989: Table 2). The state in Sweden was thus committed to 
expand the supply of child care and announced that, by 1991, all 18- 
month-old and older children were to be guaranteed a place in a child 
care centre (Kamerman 1991: 185). 
Neither leaving day care to parents alone nor leaving it to the 
free market has been the national policy in Sweden. There are also 
non-profit parent cooperatives and day care centres operated by both 
religious and secular organisations and a few private enterprise day 
care centres that do not receive state subsidy (Ochiltree 1991: 39; Hwang 
and Broberg 1992: 37-38). However, private initiatives in day care 
provision have played a relatively smaller role in Sweden than most 
other countries. Private ventures were also opposed in child care 
throughout the 1980s. Cooperative or voluntary efforts at day care 
have been almost nonexistent in Sweden, due to 'a Social Democratic 
distrust of anything that smacks of private charity or voluntarism' 
(Wolfe 1989: 20). 
When we consider the variation in national public-private mixes 
in day care in terms of the distribution of running costs, the 
distributive patterns are rather similar. The state sector, including the 
state and the municipality, comprises the largest contributor, covering 
about 90% of the total costs of child care, while the family as the 
consumer contributes less than 11% of the costs in Sweden (see Leira 
1992: Table 3.1). 
Children under 7 with parents in paid employment in 1967 were 
largely cared for at home by relatives or partners (Berfenstam and 
William-Olsson 1973: Table 13). By 1987, 34% of children under 3 
received care in municipal nurseries or from salaried childminders, 
while of all children under 7, 43% were cared for at home, 10% were in 
paid private care, and 47% were cared for by municipal care (Broberg 
and Hwang 1991: Table 5.6). Hwang and Broberg (1992) also found that 
about two thirds of all preschool children with two working or 
studying parents and about 85% of those with a working single parent 
were in public day care. After the late 1980s, municipal day care became 
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the most common form of child care in Sweden. The Swedish 
government recently committed itself to a more generous maternity 
leave for eighteen months, a policy that would greatly lower 
dependence on public day care for infants. While about a third of 
children in Sweden remain at home with their mothers, that minority 
is likely to continue to reduce (Wolfe 1989: 15). 
Child Care in the UK 
The urgent need to encourage women into factory employment in aid 
of the war effort led to a rapid growth in nursery provision during the 
Second World War (Moss 1991; Ochiltree 1991; Ginsburg 1992). At the 
end of the war, many nurseries closed, although many women 
remained at work. The closure of nurseries was the outcome of a 
central government policy which decided to hand responsibility to 
local authorities and reduce the grant. By the early 1950s, only a few 
hundred local authority nurseries survived. 
While the number of child care places began to grow again in 
1969, there were still fewer than half the number of places that were 
available in 1945, and the criteria for admission were narrow. State 
intervention in day care provision was limited. Public provision of 
child care mostly comprised nurseries provided by local authorities. 
The basic function of day nurseries was to support children and 
families in need. The limited number of free or low-cost places in 
community-sponsored day nurseries were largely for children who 
were 'at risk' or from disadvantaged families where parents were 
regarded as unable to cope. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the increasing proportion of working 
mothers, the stress placed by child development experts on the long-
term advantages of quality child care for children, and the implication 
of equal employment opportunity policy for day care provision built 
up considerable pressures on the child care policy. Under pressure for 
public provision of day care, however, Mrs. Thatcher rejected 'the need 
for a national child care policy, saying it could lead to "a whole 
generation of creche children... [who] never understood the security of 
home" (The Guardian, May 18th 1990: 2, quoted in Ginsburg 1992: 
173). She believed that the welfare state did too little to persuade 
mothers to stay at home to look after their children. The Thatcher 
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government chose to maintain a policy of minimal involvement, 
depending on child care employers and the market to provide child 
care. 
Although the idea that day care was a private issue might have 
affected earlier policy orientation, this fact became clear in the 1980s. 
The privatisation of child care provision has been a consistent policy 
in the UK since the 1980s. In 1984, the Secretary of State for Health and 
Social Security argued that a shift towards increasing the privatisation 
of child care provision would be proper. Statutory authorities, he 
observed, would keep an 'overall strategic view and responsibility in 
the community but would see themselves rather less as services-
providing agencies and rather more as enablers of voluntary and 
private provision' (quoted in Ergas 1990: 179). In a recent interview, 
Angela Rumbold, chair of the Ministerial Group on Women's Issues, 
declared: 
I am antipathetic to the notion that there should be universal 
access to child care: 'creches for all'. It simply exacerbates the trend 
that we have had of seeing that it is possible if you've got 
responsibilities to put them on to the state. ... If you have to work 
you do and if you have to find child care you find it. When I say 
"have" I mean if you really want it. (Family Policy Bulletin 1991, 
quoted in Ochiltree 1991: 40) 
With the privatisation of welfare provision, the Conservative 
Government in power in the 1990s has urged the private sector to take 
responsibility for many services that were once provided by the state. 
The government has viewed child care as a civil society ( private) 
rather than state (public) responsibility. Child care provision by civil 
society thus plays a crucial and growing role in the United Kingdom. 
Government has defined its role in the development of day care 
for employed parents as marginal, involving the continuance of 
some degree of regulation together with encouragement and 
guidance to others to make provision. In particular, it looks to 
employers and the private market to provide the necessary 
services and to introduce other measures ... that will assist 
working mothers. (Moss 1991: 138) 
The role of the state is to encourage employers and others to provide 
child care and to regulate the market via the application of minimum 
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standards to private services. The outcome will be very considerable 
growth in workplace and market-oriented nursery care. Private 
childminding was the most common form of child care arrangements 
for children under 3, and the number of places has doubled over the 
past two decades (Ginsburg 1992). There were 144,908 places with 
registered childminders in 1985, a growth of more than 60% from 1975. 
Between 1985 and 1988, the number of registered childminders 
increased by 28%. However, it was estimated that about 20% of 
childminders were unregistered (Ochiltree 1991). Above all, the 
number of private nurseries grew by 49% and the greater part of this 
expansion was markedly in for-profit nurseries (Melhuish and Moss 
1992: 171). 
In the early 1990s, the British child care system thus gradually 
became dominated by private providers with a small, segregated and 
almost static public nursery sector. Due to the special 'welfare' needs 
and limited role of public provision of child care, most day care for 
children under 3 is private, with no public funding involved and 
working parents with children under 3 depend nearly fully on the 
market or their families. The family as a care system provided by 
relatives (particularly maternal grandmothers) remains by far the most 
commonly used form of care. For the rest, private childminders have 
been the main form of care (Hill 1991: 97; Moss 1991: 122). 
Child Care in the USA 
The economic depression of the 1930s led the federal government to 
play a direct role in day care provision. As in the United Kingdom, to 
enable women to work in the war factories the federal government 
became involved in providing day care and dramatically increased its 
child care funds during World War II (Phillips 1991; Haskins 1992). Its 
involvement was crisis-driven and temporary because many centres 
lost their federal funds with the end of the war. 
Direct governmental subsidies for day care began anew in 1962 
and 'Head Start' programs were launched in 1964. To extend tax 
expenditures for child care a series of fiscal measures was endorsed and 
this continued throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Ergas 1990: 174). The 
Comprehensive Child Development Act was passed by the Congress in 
1971, but the Act was vetoed by President Nixon due to its expansion of 
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federal funds to support day care for the middle class (Phillips 1991; 
Ginsburg 1992; Lamb, Sternberg and Ketterlinus 1992). He argued that 
the sanctity of the family and of motherhood had to be defended from 
the intervention of the state. It would constitute improper interference 
into the private sphere and family responsibility if government 
supported child care provision. Nixon expressed the policy very 
precisely: 
For the Federal Government to plunge headlong financially into 
supporting child development would commit the vast moral 
authority of the National Government to the side of communal 
approaches to child rearing over the family-centred approach. 
(quoted in Lamb, Sternberg and Ketterlinus 1992: 212) 
According to Phillips (1991: 173), the role of the federal government in 
day care in the post-war era has evolved into three components: 
provision for low-income families in the context of welfare legislation; 
support for Head Start which provides comprehensive care and 
education for low-income children with the long-term goal of 
preventing poverty; and support for day care via the tax system. These 
three components remain today, and are joined by the participation of 
state and local governments. 
In the United States, with the exception of low-income families 
which receive targeted subsidies, issues of extending provision of child 
care are left mostly to market forces or to individual states (Hofferth 
and Deich 1994: 441). Recently, a significant privatisation of day care 
has appeared and further confirmed this trend. President Bush stated: 
Employers have a major role in helping parents find needed child 
care, but I do not support give-aways of taxpayer dollars to get 
business to recognise what it already knows: that it must provide 
assistance for more and better child care. Workers demand it; 
productivity demands it; a business bottomline demands it. 
(quoted in OECD 1990: 147) 
The demographic and political pressures became strong in the late 
1980s and brought Congress to the brink of approving federal financial 
support for nationwide child care. In 1990 the Congress approved the 
Child Care Bill which aimed to move federal funding away from tax 
credits and towards services for low-income groups, with an injection 
of $5 billion a year and more in the future to advance and extend child 
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care provision. However, President Bush vetoed the Bill in order to 
keep the budget deficit down (Ginsburg 1992: 126). 
The existence of market-oriented centres is one of the unique 
features of the day care industry in the USA. The contribution of 
government funding to day care centres income decreased from 29% 
in 1977 to 17% in 1988, with a quarter of the market-oriented centres 
receiving federal funds. The number of child care places in the market-
oriented sector has more than doubled since the mid-1970s. The 
number of children in the market-oriented day care centres rose from 
37% in 1977 to 51% in 1988 (Ginsburg 1992: 125). Within the market-
oriented sector, more than 2,000 centres are run by chains; 1,200 centres 
are operated by Kinder-Care Learning Centres, the largest of the chains, 
in over forty states (Phillips 1991: 165). 
Table 6.2 Day Care Arrangements for Children under Age 3 of 
Employed Mothers in the USA, 1965-85 
Type of Care and Maternal 1965 1977 1982 1985 
Employment Status 
Relatives 
Part-time 56 47 49 35 
Full -time 49 43 41 
Sitter, in-home 
Part-time 19 15 12 9 
Full-time 22 8 8 
Family Day Care Home 
Part-time 23 28 33 34 
Full - time 24 38 36 
Day Care Centre 
Part-time 2 9 9 22 
Full-time 6 11 16 
Source: Phillips 1991: Table 9.2. 
Note: 1985 data are not disaggregated by part-time/full-time 
employment. 
Table 6.2 reveals that there was a marked decrease in the 
proportion of day care undertaken by the family, and a corresponding 
growth in the proportion by family day care homes (childminders) and 
in particular by day care centres for children under age 3 in the period 
of 1965-85. There are two types of day care centres: the market-oriented 
(for-profit) sector used mostly by middle-income families, and the 
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voluntary-oriented (non-profit) sector, privately administered by 
churches, charitable organisations and so on, and usually run in 
partnership with the public authorities. 
Child Care in the East Asian NICs 
The welfare provision of child care demonstrates the tension 
between social change and social values. In modern societies, the need 
for social care is provoked by industrialisation and urbanisation. 
Traditional values continue to expect that women should take care of 
domestic responsibilities among which child care is of major 
importance. However, as more women enter the labour force and 
older women remain in the labour force longer than before, those who 
traditionally provided child care at home will become insufficient to 
meet demand. For that reason, 'we find side by side pressure on 
women to support the ideology of motherhood and home life, and at 
the same time to fight for equal opportunity in the workplace' 
(Baldock 1988a: 51). 
Women's 'double burden'—as breadwinner and child carer— is 
too heavy to carry because of the lack of availability of informal carers, 
and they will be forced to seek an alternative, formal child care 
provision. Indeed, there is no society or country where the basic 
demand for non-parental care has not been driven by economic forces' 
(Lamb and Sternberg 1992: 4). The demand and supply of child care, 
propelled by economic factors, remains a key force. This is particularly 
true for the East Asian NICs. 
Child Care in Hong Kong 
The Hong Kong Government has not accepted child care as its 
responsibility. Rather, child care was viewed as a ,non-statutory 
responsibility and the family was the primary provider. It insisted that 
the voluntary sector had to share this responsibility. Welfare provision 
by the voluntary sector can strengthen the government's notion that 
welfare is a non-statutory responsibility in spite of the fact that 
voluntary sectors are financed by the government. This assumption 
was used by the government to justify its minimalist policy as to child 
care, except for the provision of places for children from deprived 
families. Many government statements have made this clear, for 
example: 
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The welfare programs of Hong Kong have been designed and 
developed with cognizance of the innate local values of concern 
for the family, commitment to self-improvement, self-reliance, 
mutual support and generosity, reluctance to be dependent upon 
'welfare', high respect for social order and a combination of 
ingenuity and resourcefulness. (Hong Kong Government 1991: 
14) 
In the immediate fifteen years after the Second World War, the care of 
abandoned babies was the major child welfare concern of the Hong 
Kong government. By the 1960s, the most extensive needs in the area 
of child welfare shifted from abandoned children to day care for pre-
school children of working mothers (Social Welfare Department, 
Hong Kong Government 1963). Under the sponsorship of the United 
Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), 62 day 
care centres were established in 1967. Full-day child care nurseries 
significantly increased from 1,280 in 1958-9 to 6,497 in 1965-6. In 1966, 
the voluntary sector started to receive a government subsidy for 
running day nurseries and 13,300 places were available, but only on the 
condition that the children admitted were from deprived families. 
Fifteen years later, in 1981, only 12,200 places were available, 
however. This revealed that the situation had not advanced at all. In 
1982, the government changed its policy from a subsidy to voluntary 
day nurseries to fee assistance to parents (Hong Kong Government 
1981). The shift in government financial assistance allowed for 
significant growth in child care welfare provision by the voluntary 
sector. Yet under the new policy, only families with problems or those 
who were means tested could receive aid, and non-eligible families 
had to pay in full. The expansion of child care services was not 
essentially followed by an increase of the government expenditures on 
child care provision due to government financial commitment being 
kept at a minimum (Ngo 1992: 476). 
Table 6.3 shows that most young children have used informal day 
care: from 99.5% in 1961 to 94.5% in 1986. Few of them have had any 
formal type of day care. While there was a significant increase in day 
nurseries in the voluntary sector from 0.5% in 1961 to 3.6% in 1986, 
this increase merely shared a small proportion in total child care 
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welfare provision. The portion of children under six who used day 
nurseries provided by the market was even smaller. 
Table 6.3 The Provision and Percentage of Under-sixes Receiving 
Different Types of Child Day Care in Hong Kong 
1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 
Population 0 -5 549,300 615,200 469,000 450,000 466,500 478,100 
Voluntary Day 
Nurseries 
No. of Children 2,600 13,300 11,300a 12,200 17,300 
To 0.5 2.2 2,4 2.6 3.6 
Private Day 12,400b 
Nurseries 2.7 
No. of Children — — — 5,200 9,100 
% — — — 1.1 1.9 
No Formal 99.5 97.8 97.6 97.3 96.3 94.5 
Type of Care (%) 
Source: Wong 1992: Table 3. 
Notes: a Figure as at July 1972. 
b Figure of financial year 1976-7, and including voluntary and 
private day nurseries. 
Like the other three East Asian NICs, welfare concerns in Hong 
Kong are subsumed under economic considerations. The child care 
welfare provision could not but be shaped by this type of government 
welfare ideology. Since the late 1980s, with the pressure of an acute 
labour shortage, the issue of child care for working mothers has been 
revived and the government has had to consider re-establishing day 
creches. However, the government still stresses that young children 
should be cared for by their mothers. 
It is likely that the policy underlying any alternative form of 
provision and financing of day creches will be modelled on the 
existing scheme. While pressure from the labour market has forced the 
government to make a minor administrative adjustment which has 
enabled it to secure a higher level of provision for a minimum of 
financial commitment, the government has not changed its stance on 
child care welfare provision (Wong 1992: 398). 
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Child Care in Singapore 
Two distinct state policies in Singapore have aimed to relieve the 
burdens faced by working mothers in child care. One is to promote 
extended family living arrangements through public housing policies. 
The other is the provision of child care centres as an alternative non-
maternal strategy of care. By so doing, the state has become involved in 
the traditionally private sphere of the family and child care 
arrangements. The state has been successful in realising its goals in 
reversing the trend toward a decline of traditional family structure and 
creating a greater number of formal child care centres. 
The Singapore government's approach to child care has been 
different from its typical style of direct intervention in various aspects 
of people's everyday life. It has not directly provided child care for its 
citizens in the past three decades (Quah 1994: 127). Instead, with rapid 
social and economic changes, the state in Singapore has played a 
relatively active role in directly financing child care services and 
formulating policies to ease the potential negative effects of 
modernisation on the traditional family structure (Huang and Yeoh 
1994: 51). 
To encourage population growth and to allow more working 
mothers to enter the workforce, the state has been deeply involved in 
overseeing child care provision since the 1980s. The Ministry of 
Community Development (MCD) supervises the development of 
child care facilities as part of the government's effort. It oversees the 
supply of, and the demand for, child care centres, co-ordinates plans for 
their development, and ensures that child care centres meet the 
standards laid down in the Chid Care Centres Act. Moreover, the MCD 
co-ordinates training programs for child care centre personnel and 
operates a child care information service that answers public enquires 
about child care and provides free consultative services to potential 
child care centre operators. 
The state in Singapore urges individuals, organisations and 
employers in the public and private sectors to establish child care 
centres. To develop and extend such centres, the state also provides 
financial and other support to the voluntary sector. Financial support 
includes capital grants to convert void deck spaces in public housing 
estates into child care centres, and to furnish and equip them. As an 
148 
incentive for private entrepreneurs to institute child care centres, 
premises in public housing estates are rented out to them. 
To promote muti-generational arrangements, the state has 
introduced some incentives since the late 1970s, including specially 
designed flats, priority allocation, smaller down-payments and 
extended loan repayments. One of the benefits of the multi-tier scheme 
was that it made it possible for grandparents to care for their 
grandchildren when working mothers were not at home. State policies 
seem to have had some effect on reversing the trends toward nuclear 
family living arrangements. The percentage of extended nuclear and 
multi-nuclear family households increased from 18% in 1981 to 20% in 
1987 (Huang and Yeoh 1994). 
To encourage working mothers to enter the workforce and to 
influence child care options, the state in Singapore subsidises working 
mothers and single fathers who place their children in approved 
centres. The monthly subsidy is currently S$65 for half-day care or 
S$130 for full-day care for each child. Further, a monthly levy (S$300) is 
imposed on parents who use foreign maids as a child care 
option(Huang and Yeoh 1994: 57). The 1990 census of population 
indicated that 83% of the children below 12 years old are cared for by 
the family (including 64% by their parents at home and 19% by 
grandparents or other immediate family members), 8% by hired maids 
at home, and only 9% have other child care arrangements (Quah 1994: 
134). It was estimated that the population of children under 7 was 
357,500 in 1991 (Singapore 1992b: 30-31). At the end of 1991, there were 
285 child care centres which provided a total of 19,294 places 
(Government of Singapore 1992a: 191). This meant that about 6% of 
under 7s were cared for in child care centres in 1991. 
Table 6.4 shows that the state in Singapore has changed its role in 
child care services in the last decade, from a main provider of child 
care to a supplementary provider, by encouraging the involvement of 
the voluntary sector and the market. Child care provision between the 
state, the voluntary sector and the market has dramatically changed in 
the full-day program between 1987-1989. Before 1987 the state was the 
main provider of child care services. Child care places in the voluntary 
sector exceeded those provided by the state in 1987. However, since 
1989 the market has dominated in full-day child care provision. The 
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growth rate of places of child care varied greatly between these three 
sectors from 1982-1992. The provision of child care grew 2.5 times in 
the state sector, 12.8 times in the voluntary sector, and 253 times in the 
market sector. 
Table 6.4 Enrolment in Child Care Centres in Singapore, 1982-1992 
(persons) 
Year 




State 	Voluntary Market 
Half-day 
Program 
1982 1,406 1,406 950 421 35 
1983 1,862 1,734 904 741 89 128 
1984 2,375 1,919 915 778 226 456 
1985 2,918 2,157 905 829 423 761 
1986 3,756 2,799 1,166 1,069 564 957 
1987 5,659 4,537 1,380 1,874 1,283 1,122 
1988 8,044 6,651 1,559 2,586 2,506 1,393 
1989 10,201 8,633 1,850 3,249 3,534 1,568 
1990 12,474 11,105 1,904 3,961 5,240 1,369 
1991 16,109 14,337 2,160 4,787 7,390 1,772 
1992 18,732 16,613 2,355 5,391 8,867 2,119 
Source: Calculated from Government of Singapore 1992b: Table 18.3. 
Notes: The state includes People's Association and National Trades 
Union Congress. The market includes private and workplace 
which includes three centres set up by employers at workplace 
but run by private operators. 
This shift reflects in some measure the trend of the government 
towards privatisation since the mid-1980s (Booth 1994; Siong 1994). 
Also, it demonstrates the fact that the state in Singapore has eschewed, 
as far as possible, direct intervention in the provision of child care. The 
role of the state has changed from 'provider to that of watchdog, broker 
and consultant in the provision of child care services' (Quah 1994: 134). 
Like the other three East Asian NICs, the state in Singapore seems to 
minimise its role in child care provision, although more than the 
others, it actively encourages the market and the voluntary sector to 
establish child care centres. 
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Child Care in South Korea 
As in other East Asian countries, the family in South Korea has 
traditionally been the basic unit of caregiving (Sung 1992; Park and 
Dimigen 1994). There have been clearly differentiated roles between 
husbands and wives. Only a few wives work outside the home. 
However, as the number of working mothers with pre-school children 
is growing, the pressure to extend child care facilities is becoming a key 
issue in both welfare services and working conditions (Korean 
Overseas Information Service 1990: 489). 
To meet the increasing needs of working mothers for child care, 
the state in South Korea initiated a day nursery program in 1990, but 
additional facilities were still needed. With the enactment in 1991 of 
the Law on Nursery of Infants, the foundation was laid to promote day 
nurseries for working mothers. The implementation rules of this Law 
made it obligatory on industrial firms with 500 or more employees to 
create day nurseries (Republic of Korea 1992: 229). As many as twenty 
major corporations in South Korea now provide free or low-cost day 
care to workers, largely because the demand for qualified technical help 
is acute in the biotechnology and semiconductor markets (Barton 1991: 
35). 
By September 1991, there were 3,562 facilities to care for 85,400 
infants, including 476 public facilities, 1,061 private facilities and 2,006 
facilities operated by companies. At the same time, there were 87,000 
infants of needy families cared for by state-financed day nurseries. It 
was estimated that the population of children under 7 was 5,575,000 in 
1990. (World Bank 1994). This meant that about 5% of the under 7s 
were cared for in day nurseries in 1991. The family, in large measure, 
plays a key role in providing child care for young children. 
In early 1992, 10 billion won in public funds was spent to create 71 
nurseries near industrial estates as a means of easing the manpower 
shortage suffered by industrial companies (Republic of Korea 1992: 231- 
232). To ease the shortage, the state finalised a three-year plan in 1994 
which will establish 7,590 nurseries to accommodate 427,000 babies by 
the end of 1997 at a total cost of 1.3 trillion won. The government 
established 1,485 nurseries in 1994 to provide child care for an 
additional 66,000 babies and it also paid for the nursery charges of 
70,000 children of poor families (Republic of Korea 1995: 211). Like 
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other East Asian NICs, however, the growth of state child care 
provision is still limited, with a heavy dependence on the family. 
Child Care in Taiwan 
With an increase in the number of single parent families and double-
income nuclear families, the demand for child care provision has 
grown rapidly. In particular, the increase of women's paid 
employment, (although the female labour force participation rate is 
still lower than its Western counterparts), highlights the need for child 
care provision. After examining the changing roles of women in 
Taiwan, Chiang (1989: 102) suggests: 
Although women's contribution to economic development has 
been recognised, an adequate support system for working women, 
such as child-care facilities, has not been actively implemented. In 
the absence of firm commitment or action regarding women's 
issues, the government should revise its policies toward 
incorporating women's needs in development and planning. 
Child-care services should be given a high priority, so that the 
new generation will not be ignored by working parents or dual-
career couples. 
The government has begun to respond to the demand for public child 
care provision since 1991. The Child Welfare Law and its enforcement 
rules, the Measures for the Establishment of Nurseries and the 
Measures on Foster Homes for Children, mandate the creation of child 
care centres across the island. By 1993, 19 public child day care centres, 
1,319 private nursery centres, and 2,429 community nurseries had been 
established to accommodate over 240,000 children a year (ROC 1995). 
Moreover, to correspond to the schedules of working mothers, after-
school classes in primary schools were set up to care for children up to 
eight years of age. 
Some policy initiatives were introduced at the same time. They 
included the establishment of child protective networks, child sickness 
and medical allowance, nursery workers and childminders' training 
programs, and standard nursery schools. For full-day care centres, the 
basic facilities, space regulations, personnel qualification and the 
number of staff must satisfy minimal legal standards. To accommodate 
children from low-income families, all child care centres must allow a 
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quota of at least 10% of the children free of charge. Local social welfare 
bureaus also provide grants and rewards to well-managed day care 
centres under the Social Services Promotion Incentive Plan. The result 
of these initiatives should be assessed in the future (ROC 1994d; the 
Ministry of Interior, ROC 1993: 6-9). 
While the number of child care centres is increasing, recent data 
(ROC 1994a) shows that the child care arrangements of the last child 
under 3 heavily rely on the family, with the government playing only 
a minimal role. The age of the youngest child seems to be the factor 
most likely to affect working mothers' probability of being in the 
workforce. Kamerman (1994: 5) suggests that 'almost all of these 
working mother [in Taiwan] have child care needs now met largely by 
grandmothers or through informal, unregulated, and unregistered 
family day care.' 
Table 6.5 Ways of Caring for the Last Child Under 3 Years Old in Taiwan 
Ways of Caring for (%) 








1981 100 83.99 13.42 1.17 1.14 0.29 
1982 100 83.18 13.85 1.37 1.36 0.23 
1983 100 79.62 17.40 1.67 1.18 0.13 
1984 100 78.99 18.04 1.34 1.35 0.28 
1985 100 76.96 19.70 1.43 1.54 0.38 
1986 100 77.89 18.85 1.46 1.62 0.18 
1987 100 76.37 19.61 1.78 2.13 0.11 
1988 100 75.19 20.43 1.67 2.53 0.17 
1990 100 72.93 21.88 2.15 2.86 0.17 
1993 100 75.30 19.04 1.02 4.36 0.29 
Source: ROC 1994a: Table 8. 
Note: The subjects of the survey were married women aged 15 or over. 
Beginning in 1993, it referred to aged 15-64 married women 
only. 
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Table 6.5 indicates that the family accounted for over 94% of child 
care arrangements in the past decade. While children under 3 cared for 
by their mothers dropped from 84% in 1981 to 75.3% in 1993, those 
cared for by relatives increased from 13.4% to 19% in the same period. 
The market provision increased from 2.3% in 1981 to 5.4% in 1993. The 
provision of child care from the state and the voluntary sector was less 
than 0.4% from 1981 to 1993. 
By 1991, there were 3,887 nursery schools which cared for 230,726 
children, and 2,505 kindergartens for 237,285 children. The total 
number of children cared for in Taiwan was about 470,000. The total 
population of children under 6 was 1,940,000 in 1991. Thus about 
1,470,000 (75.8%) children under 6 were cared for by the family (Wang 
1994: 129). 
Welfare Configuration: Models of Child Care Provision 
Welfare configuration is to a large extent a function of the welfare 
state-society relation. It forms different welfare networks in different 
countries. In other words, an individual's access to welfare provision 
is affected by particular welfare configurations. Some social 
phenomena like a rising number of young working mothers, an 
increase in the rate of divorce and separation, and a higher percentage 
of elderly people may enlarge the welfare network. Further, the family 
may remove many of its responsibilities to the other welfare provision 
sectors (Chow 1983, 1985: 65-66, 1986, 1992, 1993). 
It is argued that welfare provision in different countries is not 
confined to the state, though state intervention or government policy 
plays a crucial role in welfare provision. An examination of the 
welfare state, in a broader sense, should concern the state-society 
relation rather than the state per se. Similarly, from the perspective of 
the state-society relation, child care provision as a part of the welfare 
state is characterised by three main features: 
• Child care policies in different countries not only reflect various 
mixes of public and private responsibility, but also represent 
divisions of child care welfare provision between the state and civil 
society. The amount of government assistance and how it is given 
varies from country to country. These differences reflect the various 
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perspectives on the roles of the state and various sectors of civil 
society in child care provision. 
• The family rather than the state plays a significant role in child care 
arrangements in most countries, with the exception of Sweden, 
which has a universal, comprehensive and state-oriented child care 
system. Child care provision by the state is merely one of many 
different sources. A variety of informal child care arrangements 
coming from the family, ie from parents, grandparents or relatives, 
are still the main form of care. 
• The extent and nature of state intervention shape the environments 
in which young children are cared for. Government child care policy 
can affect both the overall use of child care arrangements and its 
distribution between the different forms of care and the different 
types of family. The different levels of state intervention and the 
variety of provision available make any comparison of the state with 
various sectors of civil society across countries quite a complex 
matter, and thus these comparisons can only be approximate. 
Based on the above analysis, welfare configurations on child care 
provision in different countries can be summarised as Figure 6.1. 
The development of child care policies may be linked to 
numerous factors, but the lessening of the functions of the family in 
providing child care is the most significant factor. When female 
participation in the labour force increases, and family structures 
experience significant transformation, the issue of child care becomes 
the subject of hot public debate. The establishment of out-of-home care 
for children has developed from similar demographic and social 
trends experienced in many industrialised countries. While there are 
some similarities in the development of child care policies across 
different countries, there are some distinct differences. Different 
countries have set various priorities to respond to these trends. The 
impacts of these trends on the family in child care provision in 
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Figure 6.1 Welfare Configurations of Child Care Provision in the East 
Asian NICs and the Five OECD Countries 
These differences reflect different state-society relationships, and 
form different welfare configurations in different countries. The 
division of responsibilities of welfare provision of child care is shaped 
by the interaction of the state and civil society. Based on the different 
welfare configurations of state-society provision, four models of child 
care welfare provision can be identified as follows: 
• Model I: Maximum state (public) responsibility— state-oriented 
welfare provision 
The maximum state responsibility model applies to countries which 
recognise the educational value of out-of-home care. In this model 
child care is seen as a societal responsibility and is mainly provided by 
the state. Sweden best illustrates the arrangements typical of this 
model. Through the National Board of Health and Welfare, central 
government determines the national goals as regards the level of 
provision, while responsibility for planning and for establishing child 
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care services is decentralised to the local governments. Leira (1993: 337) 
suggests: 
ideologically, central and local government intervention in the 
care and socialisation of pre-school children was rooted in the 
strong egalitarian traditions of the Nordic welfare states. State-
sponsored day care was projected as a benefit for all children, and 
as an experience that could offer children a chance for more equal 
opportunities, despite differences in social background. 
Regarding child care, Swedish policies mainly centre on the concept 
that "the nation's children" constitute a national resource and 
responsibility' (Ergas 1990: 176). The basic assumption in Sweden has 
been that the state should provide child care for all, which also meant 
higher standards for all. Child care provision should be available for 
all, and state provision is a necessity to enable women to fully 
participate in the labour market. The Preschool Educational Program 
sets out four main tasks for Swedish public child care. They include 
establishing an educational program for child care for all children; 
creating safe and secure child care for children of parents who work or 
study; assuming special responsibility for children with special needs; 
and making an effort to achieve equality between men and women 
(Bridgeland et al. 1985; Hwang and Broberg 1992: 37). 
Although the provision of child care does not rely entirely on the 
state, two distinct features distinguish Sweden from those countries 
which belong to the other models. First, Sweden stresses universal 
access to child care . Second, it advocates the direct provision of public 
child care services, and leaves private, market-oriented provision as 
the second choice. The expenditures of the Swedish government 
expenditure on child care grew steadily from 0.8% of GDP in 1975 to 
1.9% in 1987 (OECD 1990). The basic aim of Swedish policy thus is to 
create an integrated system linking employment, education and child 
care provision with universal coverage rather than that of a safety-net 
to assist the 'disadvantaged' family. 
• Model II: Maximum civil society (private) responsibility— family-
market-oriented welfare provision 
The line of argument in the United Kingdom and the United States 
has been that child care is a non-statutory responsibility, and thus the 
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state should intervene as little as possible. Its main argument has been 
that 'if the market needs women to work then the market will provide 
these women with child care. ... if child care is of poor quality then the 
mothers will not purchase it' (Commonwealth of Australia 1994a: 14). 
While child care policies in these two countries differ significantly, 
they have three common goals: first, to establish a safety-net of child 
care provision for the needy family and children at risk of abuse or 
neglect; second, to urge the use of non-statutory, in particular market-
oriented or voluntary sector services; and third, to ensure a minimal 
level of quality for child care provision (Broberg and Hwang 1992; 
Bronfenbrenner 1992; OECD 1990: 139). 
Two major features distinguish this model from the other 
models. One is that the direct funding provided for child care is aimed 
at selected groups. The other is to encourage private and voluntary 
sectors to provide child care. In the USA, there is no national child care 
system, but federal policy acts at two levels. First, it sets up regulations 
and offers funding to state and local governments for child care 
provision for children and families in need of special assistance. 
Second, to encourage the provision of child care by the private sectors, 
it provides indirect subsidies via tax relief to reduce their costs. In the 
UK, government policy also encourages the private and voluntary 
sectors to provide child care services. However, unlike the US, the 
government of the UK adopts limited public child care provision and 
provides public subsidies rather than using tax policies to voluntary 
care givers. Overall in the absence of public provision, employed 
parents needing child care have to depend on social networks (in 
particular relatives) and the market (mainly childminders). 
• Model III: Maximum civil society (private) responsibility— family-
voluntary-oriented welfare provision 
The formal child care in this model includes provision operated 
directly by state and local government, voluntary community-based 
provision which receives public funding, and licensed market 
provision. Informal arrangements, that is the family, also play a key 
part in the welfare configuration of child care provision (Ergas 1990: 
180-181). Women's child care provides an informal and private 
welfare system which allows the cost of state welfare to be minimised. 
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The expansion of women's unpaid caring work in welfare provision of 
the voluntary sector also takes into consideration the minimisation of 
public expenditure on formal welfare provision (Cass and Baldock 
1988; Baldock 1988b, 1990). As Baldock (1988b: 279) argues that: 
[V]olunteer work fulfils an essential economic and ideological 
function for the state in providing social welfare services which 
could be provided by governments. These functions become of 
crucial importance during times of economic crisis when 
governments reduce welfare spending and the voluntary sector is 
placed under considerable pressure to increase services in these 
welfare areas. 
In Australia, there is more formal child care available than in the UK 
and the USA. Unlike the UK and the USA, Australian children from 
all, rather than just disadvantaged families, can attend public-funded 
child care centres and access family day care (Ochiltree 1991: 41). In this 
sense, Australia is a different model, nearer to Sweden than to the UK 
and USA. Child care places in the state provision are allotted according 
to criteria reflecting priorities. Priority is given to the children of 
working parents. Australia has spent relatively little of its national 
resources on child care while its real expenditures have significantly 
increased four times from 0.02% of GDP in 1975 to 0.08% in 1987 (OECD 
1990: 141). 
Although a universal child care system may be held up as an 
ideal, it is unlikely that Australia will provide universal public child 
care services like Sweden in the foreseeable future. The situation in 
Australia now is similar to that in Sweden in the 1960s. At the time, 
Sweden was rich and reached political consensus and continuity in the 
public provision of child care while Australia is now in recession and 
has not achieved similar political consensus and continuity. Because of 
the economic constraints and the discontinuous policies, Australian 
child care provision has been oscillating between universal and 
selective orientations. 
• Model IV: Maximum civil society (private) responsibility— family-
oriented welfare provision 
In this model, child care is viewed as a non-statutory responsibility and 
largely provided by the family. Japan and the East Asian NICs are the 
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countries closest to the maximum civil society responsibility— family-
oriented welfare provision. In family-oriented welfare provision the 
state argues that the responsibilities of child care should be left to the 
family rather than the state, and parental care is better than out-of-
home care for young children. As with family-market-oriented welfare 
provision, its basic assumption was also used to justify the 
government's minimalist policy regarding child care provision. Thus, 
the family-oriented welfare provision is highlighted by the fact that 
government minimises its role in child care, and heavily relies on the 
family to provide child care. 
Government policy in Japan, for example, is to provide child care 
for families which cannot supply any for themselves or where both 
parents work. Through the Minister of Health and Welfare, the 
Japanese government subsidises the costs of the day care centres. 
While municipal authorities are responsible for operating the services, 
the prefectures assume the task of licensing and advocating new 
centres. Central government expenditures on child care were reduced 
from 0.13% of GDP in 1977 to 0.06% in 1987. This trend also reflected in 
the fact that the share of central government in the costs of the services 
fell from 80% before 1985 to 50% in 1986 (OECD 1990: 142). 
In this model, in cases where homes are larger and there is room 
for grandparents to live with the next two generations, taking care of 
the children is often a grandmother's responsibility, although growing 
mobility and restricted living space means that this practice is 
declining. This common feature also distinguishes this model from 
the other models. The differences among Japan and the East Asian 
NICs are more institutional than social. The allocation of resources of 
extra-familial care and the extent to which public policies affect the 
child care arrangements are different in some ways. However, these 
differences are not as dramatic as the similarities. 
Family-oriented Welfare Provision: the East Asian Model? 
It is noteworthy that the family continues to be a primary source of 
child care in the East Asian countries. Analysing nine countries, 
including Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, with impressive growth 
records, Lodge and Vogel (1987) conclude that Asian societies are likely 
to have major long-term advantages over the West due to their 
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stronger family systems. This study confirms their argument. Four 
significant factors regarding the family structure contribute to the 
maintenance of the function of child care provision by the East Asian 
family, and reflect the characteristics of the family-oriented welfare 
provision, compared with the Western OECD countries. These four 
key factors include female labour force participation, total fertility rate, 
average household size, and the proportion of elderly people living 
with their children. All of them highlight the fact that the East Asian 
family is a more accessible child care provider than its counterpart in 
the Western OECD countries. 
Table 6.6 Three Basic Components of the Family in the East Asian 
NICs and Five OECD Countries 
Item Year HK Sin SK Tai Aus Jap Swe UK USA 
Female 
Labour Force 
Participation 1993 46.5 50.6 47.3 44.9 51.7 50.3 77.3 52.8 55.7 
Rate 
Total Fertility 1970 3.3 3.1 4.3 4.0 2.9 2.1 1.9 2.4 2.5 
Rate 1975 2.5 2.1 3.3 2.8 2.2 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 
1980 2.0 1.7 2.6 2.5 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.9 1.8 
1985 1.6 1.8 2.5 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.8 
1990 1.5 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.6 1.9 1.8 1.9 
1993 1.2 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.5 2.1 1.8 2.1 
Average 
Household 1970-75 4.0 5.4 5.0 5.5 3.3 3.4 2.4 2.9 3.1 
Size 1980-85 3.9 4.7 4.5 4.6 3.0 3.2 2.3 2.8 2.7 
Sources: World Bank 1992, 1995a; ROC 1994a; Australian Bureau of 
Statistics 1994, 1995. 
Note: HK= Hong Kong; Sin= Singapore; SK= South Korea; Tai= 
Taiwan; Aus= Australia; Jap= Japan; Swe= Sweden; UK= the 
United Kingdom; USA= the United States of America. 
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The female labour force participation rate in the East Asian NICs 
was lower than that in OECD Countries (see Table 6.6). This implies 
that East Asian mothers themselves can care for children. Total 
fertility rate in the East Asian NICs has been declining dramatically in 
the past two decades, and became lower than that in OECD countries in 
1993. The implication of the lower total fertility rate is that fewer 
children need be cared for. The average household size in the East 
Asian NICs, however, was larger than that in OECD countries. 
The proportion of elderly people living with their children has 
been one significant difference between the Western OECD countries 
and the East Asian Countries (see Table 6.7). Recently, the proportion 
of elderly people living with their children was less than one quarter 
in the Western OECD countries compared with over three-fifths in the 
East Asian countries. Larger average household size and the higher 
proportion of elderly people living with their children indicate that 
child care may be provided by relatives, in particular from 
grandparents. 
Table 6.7 Percentage of Elderly People Living with Their Children 
Country 	 Year 
Australia (60+) 	 1979 	 24 
1987 25 
Japan 	 1953 	 80 
1960 82 
1974 	 75 
1985 65 
Sweden 	 1954 	 27 
1975 9 
1986 	 5 
United Kingdom 	 1962 42 
1980 	 16 
United States 	 1952 33 
1962 	 28 
1984 19 
1987 	 15 
Hong Kong 	 1991 61 
Singapore (60+) 	 1986 	 72-79 
South Korea (60+) 1988 75.7 
Taiwan 	 1986 	 70.2 
1993 67.2 
Sources: OECD 1994b: Table 2.1; ROC 1994: 50; ROC 1994d: 286; Choi 
1992: Table 9.3; Kinsella 1995: 45; United Nations 1993: 67. 
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Recent studies also support the conclusion that child care 
provision is closely related to women's employment. Sundstrom 
(1993) found that the expansion of child care facilities for pre-school 
children and in particular for young school children in the 1980s was 
likely to stimulate the growth in full-time work and longer part-time 
work among working mothers in Sweden. Responsibility for pre-
school children remains a key reason for women to leave the labour 
market. In Australia, 
... it may be assumed that many more women would engage in 
full-time or part-time employment if the opportunities (and these 
include the availability of childcare) were given to them. (Baldock 
1988a: 31) 
The pattern of Japanese female labour force participation today forms 
an 'M-shaped model'. Young women enter the work force after the 
completion of their formal education, continue to work after marriage 
until having their first child, return to the labour market as part-
timers after children are in school, and stay there until their children 
complete education. Kumagai (1995: 150-151) argues that this 
experience can be seen as the result of women's attempt to balance 
both traditional (child carer) and modern (employed worker) roles. 
The percentage of female employees in Japan in the 25-34 age 
bracket which is the major age for childbirth and child care of young 
children, has remained markedly lower than that in many OECD 
countries. Japanese survey data comparing respondents in several 
countries, including Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the 
United States, reveal a larger acceptance of sex role division of labour 
in Japan than elsewhere: 
The husband should go out to work, the wife should stay at 
home. (Seventy-one percent of the Japanese respondents were in 
favour of this proportion, followed by ... 34% in the US., ... 26% in 
the United Kingdom, and 14% in Sweden). 
After marriage, the wife should look after her husband, children 
and others in the family. (Seventy-two percent of the Japanese 
respondents were in favour, followed by ... 18% in the U.S., 10% 
in the United Kingdom, and 6% in Sweden). (quoted in Boocock 
1991: 72) 
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Like Japanese women, Ngo (1992: 476) found that married women 
with young children in Hong Kong are not expected to work outside 
while leaving their children at home. Married women have to 
shoulder the work and family responsibility 'since their husbands 
severely limit their participation in child care and household chores.' 
Lee and Sun (1995) also found that marriage in Taiwan has been the 
major cause of women leaving the labour force. Among 15-64 year old 
women, 30% of those employed before marriage quit jobs after their 
marriage, and only some 20% of them reentered the labour force later. 
A substantial proportion of women stopped working due to 
childbearing; 14% of those who worked before marriage quit jobs 
because of child-birth. For these mothers, the average period before re-
starting work was close to 6 years after quitting. By the same token, 
child care and related household chores in Singapore are the main 
reason given by female workers for leaving the labour force (Quah 
1994). 
Dramatic changes in the family structure also affect child care 
provision. For example, by 1992, 27% of children in the U.S. were 
living with one parent and the median child born now will spend 
time in a single parent home. This situation can be seen as a reflection 
of less marriage, higher divorce, lower fertility, and other changes that 
alter the behaviours of people. Among families with children, only 
19% were two parent households where the father was employed in 
the labour market and the mother did not work outside the home. 
Over the past three decades the number of working mothers has been 
dramatically increasing from less than 30% in 1960 to nearly 70% now 
(Ellwood 1993: 3). One implication of these trends is that day care 
facilities become vital as fewer parents stay at home to care for their 
children. 
By comparing the social support system in South Korea (extended 
family system) with that in Scotland (nuclear family system) after 
childbirth, Park and Dimigen (1994) found that the cultures differ in 
the kind of social support that they provide. During the postnatal 
period the South Korean mothers received much more and much 
longer support than the Scottish mothers, although the latter valued 
their support more than the former. As soon as the Scottish mothers 
arrive home from hospital, they can expect their husbands support. 
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Yet as their husbands go to work they will have to cope on their own 
during most of the day. Relatives and friends may come to visit them, 
but regular, constant help is not expected. A South Korean mother, 
however, is expected to rest completely after childbirth to recover her 
strength. Infant care and household chores are carried out by relatives 
from the extended family. Members of the extended family have an 
obligation to provide support because of the strong family ties. 
The presence of grandparents and other relatives eases parents of 
some of the burden and effort of child care, as well as spreading its 
economic costs. Morgan and Hirosima (1983) concluded that extended 
residence fits nicely with certain elements of modern Japanese society, 
providing substantial benefits for both young couples and their 
parents. The incompatibility of the mother's role and paidwork was 
greatly diminished by the child care and housework assistance parents 
provided. Thus, mothers in extended households had more children 
and were more likely to have paid employment. A study (Stokes, 
LeClere and Hsieh 1987) also demonstrates that extended families are 
still widespread in Taiwan, despite notable social and economic 
development over the past three decades. About 40% of married 
couples with wives in the childbearing years continue to live in 
extended families. Women living in extended families are much more 
likely to receive family help with child care (22%) than those living in 
nuclear families (9%). This difference illustrates that extended families 
do spread the responsibilities of child care. 
Many working mothers living in multi-generational families in 
Singapore rely on co-resident grandparents and relatives for child care 
help. In their field study, Huang and Yeoh (1994) show that seven out 
of every ten women with multi-generational living arrangements do 
rely on co-resident grandmothers for regular help in child care, either 
as the main or secondary care-giver. By contrast, only one in five of the 
working mothers in nuclear households rely on the grandparents as 
the main childminder. They are more likely than those with multi-
generational living arrangements to use a child care centre (16.3%) or 
rely on maids (17.4%) or combine these two options (22.5%). 
Similarly, 47.6% of the elderly people age 65 and over lived in 
three generation households in South Korea (National Statistical 
Office 1992, quoted in Palley and Usui 1995: 243). Such a living 
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arrangement provides the possibility of reciprocity between 
generations. Elderly people may provide help with child care and 
household chores for their married children. Research also shows that 
more than one-third of the elderly in an industrial area in Hong Kong 
help in care for their grandchildren (Chow 1983: 587). Thus, help 
provided by elderly people to other family members is as important as 
the support that they receive from them. 
The need for family welfare provision, including child care, 
clearly varies dependent on the family system and the circumstances 
under which the family lives. In some measure, low levels of state 
welfare provision in Japan and the East Asian NICs may drive the 
elderly, the disabled, the unemployed and single mothers to depend on 
their families for support. This is the preferred pattern by a majority of 
these people, and is accepted by many families. 
Traditionally, the family in Confucian society played a key part in 
the life of the family members and still often retains primary 
responsibilities for the well-being of the individuals. The governments 
in these countries have maintained Confucian ideologies which leave 
the caregiving function of young children and the elderly as the major 
responsibility of the family (Palley and Usui 1995: 253). In his 
comparative study of the development of social welfare services in 
three Chinese societies, Chan (1984) concludes: 
The functions of family have been encouraged and been 
reinforced to look after its dependent members. Thus, most of the 
social welfare services have been primarily designed as a 
supplementary function to that of family, instead of being an 
alternative function to replace the family. ... social morals derived 
from traditional Chinese culture of filial piety to care for the 
elderly and the children at home are strengthened through 
various national policies. (Chan 1984: 416) 
The state which expresses such values as in Japan and the East Asian 
NICs is inclined to minimise state welfare provision, urging instead 
individual self-reliance, supported by the family, which itself should 
be kept strong to play a key role in welfare provision. The support 
provided by the family in Japan and the East Asian NICs for their 
members is enabling these countries to move towards family-oriented 
rather than state-oriented welfare provision. While critics of state 
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welfare provision argue that the state is thereby abandoning its social 
responsibilities, one thrust of state welfare policy has made this 
possible by providing the institutional framework at the local level to 
enable families to continue to play their roles, rather than leaving the 




WHY IS IT DIFFERENT IN THE EAST ASIAN NICS 
COMPARED TO THE OECD COUNTRIES? 
In the previous three chapters I explored state welfare in the East Asian 
NICs and the five OECD countries, and examined the welfare 
configurations of education provision and child care provision among 
them. It is argued that in the study of the welfare state analysis should 
go beyond exploring state welfare, because the state is not the only 
source of welfare provision for individuals. Comparison of the welfare 
configurations of child care and education in these countries reveals 
that the state and various sectors of civil society share the 
responsibility of welfare to varying degrees. 
This chapter continues to focus on the differences by analysing 
the history of welfare development in the East Asian NICs and the five 
OECD countries. It is argued that cross-national variation in social 
expenditures is closely associated with corresponding differences in 
state-society relations. More specifically the different articulation 
between the state and civil society among these countries, to some 
extent, is a key to explaining these differences. As far as the practices of 
state welfare and welfare configurations of child care and education 
between the state and various sectors of civil society are concerned, two 
central questions will be raised: What are the differences of social 
expenditures? How do we account for these differences? 
The Differences of Welfare Expenditure: How and Why 
The structure of social expenditures in the five OECD and the East 
Asian NICs shows a distinctive difference in that the former spend far 
more on social security and welfare, but relatively less on education. 
The five OECD countries spent more than half of total social 
expenditures on social security and welfare, and this constituted the 
largest proportion of total social expenditures in the last two decades. 
Social expenditure on education as a percentage of their total social 
expenditures has fluctuated somewhat in the East Asian NICs, but it 
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has been much higher than in their OECD counterparts since the late 
1970s. 
The composition of total government expenditures by functions 
also reveals that the proportion of total government expenditures on 
education and economic affairs and services is higher in the East Asian 
NICs than in their OECD counterparts. It is noteworthy that with the 
exception of Hong Kong, expenditures on defence in East Asian NICs 
are well above their OECD counterparts. This implies that concern 
with an inter-state military threat in the East Asian NICs has played a 
crucial part in the allocation of total government expenditures 
(CasteIls 1992: 58-62; Deyo 1992b: 292-293; Lee 1993: 112; Weiss and 
Hobson 1995: 183-190). 
Compared to the Western OECD countries, state welfare 
development in the East Asian NICs over the last three decades was 
much lower (Berger 1988: 5; Pye 1988: 90-91; Jones 1990, 1993; Lee 1993: 
112). There are some possible reasons for this 'underdeveloped' state 
welfare performance. From a perspective which examines state-society 
relations, these potential reasons include the construction of civil 
society, the role of trade unions, the extent of the development of 
social citizenship, the orientation of development strategy and the 
influence of the external environment (see Table 7.1). 
Table 7.1 Five Patterns of Differences of the State-Society Relation in 
the Five OECD Countires and the East Asian NICs 
OECD Countries 	East Asian NICs 
Civil Society 	 Bottom up Top down 
Trade Union Strong 	 Weak 
Social Citizenship 	Achieved Granted 
Development Strategy Even 	 Uneven 
Security 	 Social National 
The five OECD countries and the East Asian NICs show their 
differences along these dimensions. These five dimensions are 
described in the rest of this chapter. 
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Analysis of the Differences of Welfare Development 
Bottom up vs. Top down Civil Society 
Through its actions or inactions, the state effectively constructs the 
dynamic character of state-society relations. The state shapes the 
construction of civil society due to its power to define and redefine the 
legal and political boundaries between the public and private spheres 
(McGrew 1992: 69). However, this does not mean that civil society 
cannot exert its influence to affect government policies. Rather, it 
depends on the nature of the state-society relation and the construction 
of civil society. 
Through its powers to make law as well as its taxation and social 
welfare expenditure, the state is deeply involved in the various sectors 
of and the formation of civil society. The state in different countries 
also differs significantly in terms of the nature of its welfare provision. 
Some countries have a comprehensive welfare regime, while others 
have limited state welfare provision (Flora 1986; Rose and Shiratori 
1986; Esping-Andersen 1990; Mishra 1990; Pfaller et al. 1991; Bryson 
1992: 69-120; Castles and Mitchell 1992; Ginsburg 1992). Bendix et al. 
(1990: 141) argue that: 
The United States represents an example of the ability of 
corporate interests to use their power and ideological hegemony 
in civil society to influence the timing and content of public 
policy. ... Sweden offers another example of the permeation of 
public policy principles by the norms of a group in civil society. ... 
it is the 'working class"— which achieves hegemony first in civil 
society, then in political office— that directs state welfare policy 
toward solidarity and away from "market" principles. 
The state in Sweden is viewed as the 'benefactor of the common 
people'(Bryson 1992: 111). On many aspects of social policy, Sweden 
compared well with other countries (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965; 
Titmuss 1974; Esping-Andersen 1990; Ginsburg 1992; Gould 1993). 
Tomasson (1970) described Sweden as a 'prototype of modern society'. 
Furniss and Tilton (1977) viewed it as 'the archetype of the modern 
welfare state'. Private education and even private child care still play 
an insignificant role in Sweden. An important feature of the Swedish 
welfare state is that all social benefits are available to all residents, 
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whether or not they are Swedish citizens (Bryson 1992: 115). This can 
be partially explained by the fact that state intervention can assure a 
high quality of welfare provision. It is clearly recognised that support 
for state provisions by the better-off is dependent on high standards of 
service (Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1987). 
The modern Swedish welfare state is a post-Second World War 
construction, albeit there were some early social welfare provisions. In 
ideological terms the Swedish welfare state reflects the outcome of a 
series of political compromises made by Social Democrats (Korpi 1983; 
Esping-Andersen 1990; Olsson 1990) . The Social Democratic project has 
become the nation's project (Heclo and Marsden 1986). Equally 
important, the compromises have mostly been made possible by 
economic growth. This has allowed the government to appropriate 
some of the growth for redistribution via the public sector (Bryson 
1992). 
While the construction of civil society in Sweden is stronger than 
the other four OECD countries examined, one should not minimise 
the crucial importance of civil society in these OECD countries. It is a 
key force which has pushed the development of 'the welfare state'. A 
civil society as a vigorously emergent social force means that new 
social movements and activities carried out spontaneously and self-
consciously by members of society, go beyond the sphere of state 
activities (Cohen and Arato 1992; Held 1989; Keane 1988a, 1988b; Offe 
1985; Shils 1991; Taylor 1990; Tester 1992; Turner 1990, 1994: 23). In 
these societies, civil society is characterised by the existence of a liberal 
democracy and state sanctions allowing for trade unions (Ramesh 
1995b: 50). Working class movements and their political 
representatives play a significant role in forcing recalcitrant 
governments to adopt policies that advance the interests of labour 
(Esping-Andersen 1990; Myles 1989; Korpi 1983): a 'bottom up' civil 
society can exert its influence to affect government policies. 
Unlike their OECD counterparts, the East Asian NICs were ruled 
by authoritarian systems whose bureaucratic elites were not subject to 
socio-political pressures (Cotton 1994: 41; Gold 1986; Goldstein 1991: 19; 
Haggard 1989: 129-141; Haggard and Pang 1994: 48-49; Koo 1993a: 4). 
Under the rule of a strong state, civil society tends to be 'top down' and 
has been weak in the past three decades (Burns 1991: 112 - 130, 1993; 
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Gold 1986, 1991a, 1991b, 1995; Lee 1991; Lee 1993; Ngo 1993; Paul 1993: 
295-298; Heng 1994; Lam 1995; Pepper 1995). As Jones (1993: 203) argues: 
Whatever the regime title, whatever the legal structures, 
whatever the voting arrangements if any, whatever citizen rights 
might be formally laid down, all [East Asian NICs] have in 
practice functioned as exercises in 'top down consensus' by 
persuasion and/or imposition. 
The power of the state in Singapore, for example, is considerable and 
controlled by the PAP. To implement its program of industrialisation 
and nation-building and to sustain the PAP's monopoly over political 
power, the state has controlled the institutions which articulate the 
interests of society, such as the mass media, the educational system and 
the trade unions (Milne and Mauzy 1990; Castells 1992; Deyo 1987, 
1992a, 1992b; Henderson and Appelbaum 1992; Paul 1993; Somjee and 
Somjee 1995: 17-29). Like the other three East Asian NICs, the 
attainment of state autonomy highlights the relative weakness of civil 
society forces (Weiss and Hobson 1995: 164). To some extent, the 
weakness of civil society can be demonstrated by the high degree of 
state control (Deyo et al. 1987; Haggard 1989: 135-137; Heng 1994: 9-14; 
Paul 1993: 295-296). 
A weak and 'top down' civil society enables states in the East 
Asian NICs to formulate policy goals independently of particular 
groups, and change the social structure (Cumings 1987: 50-51; Castells 
1992; Pang 1992: 42-48; Weiss and Hobson 1995). In other words, 'the 
state clearly overpowers civil society with an impressive capacity to 
penetrate into society and mold the behavior of social groups and 
individuals' (Koo 1993a: 1). In these societies the state is inclined to 
pre-empt demands from below by giving decision-making roles to the 
highly talented and suppressing the demands of those who ask for 
participation (Somjee and Somjee 1995: 203). As a result, the problem 
of meeting this demand is likely to continue rather than disappear. 
A higher standard of living and education by no means deflects 
the demands of civil society, but rather raises them. In the East Asian 
NICs, with the exception of Singapore, a higher standard of living and 
of education has resulted in the growth of a civil society demanding 
participation in decision-making on public issues and policies (Hsiao 
1990, 1991, 1992; Lee 1993; Hsiao and Koo 1995; Ku 1995a, 1995b). Even 
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the rulers of Singapore have recognised this 'social fact' (Somjee and 
Somjee 1995: 203). 
A demanding civil society has clearly put political pressure on the 
state, in particular in South Korea and Taiwan since the 1980s. The 
presence in both countries and in Hong Kong of a relatively large, 
well-educated middle class exerts pressure on the state for political 
democratization (Koo 1987; Castells 1992; Lee 1993; Lam 1995: 57; 
Pepper 1995: 57). The trends of social development reveal that the old 
state dominated state-society relationship is now being crucially 
challenged by a more demanding civil society. This may account for 
the consistent expansion of social expenditures and the introduction of 
social policies in recent years. 
Strong vs. Weak Trade Unions 
Trade unions have played a relatively significant role in demanding 
welfare provisons in Western OECD countries (Stephens 1979; Korpi 
1983; Myles 1989). This is especially evident in terms of labour 
relations. In Sweden, the strength of the labour movement, combined 
with a clearly articulated social democratic strategy of social 
amelioration, has resulted in the formation of a humane welfare 
society (Castles 1989: 68) or a 'transition from capitalism to socialism' 
(Stephens 1979). For Korpi, Stephens and Castles, the activities of the 
state are the reflection of power relations in civil society; 'to 
understand public policy one must determine who exercises 
hegemony in civil society' (Tilton 1986: 19). Furniss (1986: 395) argues 
that: 
Politically, ... welfare goals often were articulated and gains 
achieved through mobilized working class power in civil society. 
This mobilization in Northern Europe was performed by social 
democratic parties and trade union organizations. 
The proportion of the unionised workforce in the USA has been far 
lower than in Northern Europe and Western Europe, and organised 
labour has been much less cohesive and centralised (Mishra 1993: 29- 
30). To some extent, this explains the reason for lower social 
expenditures in the USA than in Sweden. 
Employees in trade unions in Japan are poorly organised. Only a 
third of all workers belonged to trade unions in 1975 and over two- 
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thirds of employees were neither employed for life nor unionised in 
the 1980s (Gould 1993). Since 80% of all trade unions are enterprise 
unions, Rengol obviously speaks mainly for them (Eccleston 1989: 
260). Although the loyalty of the workers to their firms can be seen as 
the basis for labour discipline in Japan, to some extent, 'it is due to the 
low level of unionisation, the fragmentation of trade-union 
organisation, and the dominance of enterprise trade unions' (Gould 
1993: 23). 
The East Asian NICs resemble Japan in their tranquil labour 
relations, but they have attained this object through more directly 
authoritarian means (Deyo et al 1987; Haggard 1989: 135-137; Johnson 
1987: 150). Democracy in the East Asian NICs was severely restricted in 
the past three decades. Unlike their Western OECD counterparts, 
unions in the East Asian NICs have been banned or state-sponsored, 
and this means they lacked their potential to push for the 
development of welfare. The state in the East Asian NICs sought to 
prevent the organized mobilization of labour, 'not so much because 
they feared a wages explosion but because, situated in the geopolitical 
fault line of the Cold War, they feared the national security 
implications of domestic unrest' (Weiss and Hobson 1995: 147). Deyo 
(1987: 182) suggests that: 
Labor's political weakness is, of course, of a piece with the broader 
political exclusion under East Asian authoritarian regimes. 
Under single-party systems in Singapore and Taiwan, as under 
military-based rule in South Korea, authoritarian regimes have 
contained and suppressed political opposition. Even in laissez-
faire Hong Kong, autocratic colonial rule has presented few 
opportunities for political representation for the popular sectors. 
In South Korea and Taiwan, unions are weak and exist as no more 
than an arm of the government (Haggard and Moon 1993: 56; Koo 
1987: 174). This led to markedly weak social pressure for state welfare 
In Japan, until recently trade unions affiliated either to the Sohyo or the Domei 
confederations. The Sohyo represented those members who affiliated to national wide 
trade unions, and it was strongly associated with the Japan Socialist Party. The Domei 
comprised members of enterprise trade unions, and it had strong links with the 
Democratic Socialist Party. These two have amalgamated in a single confederation, 
Rengo. 
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development. In Taiwan, trade unions were generally prohibited from 
pressing for large wage increases, and strikes and collective bargaining 
were prohibited under martial law. Existing unions were under strong 
Kuomintang supervision, including party controls over the selection 
of union leaders and all union activities (Johnson 1987: 150; Koo 1987: 
174; Lin 1990: 141-148). Like South Korea, however, a substantial 
portion of total government welfare expenditure has targeted 
government employees, a politically important group for the ruling 
party (Chang 1985; Deyo 1992a: 300; Fu 1990, 1993; Ku 1995a, 1995b). 
Similarly, South Korea's Economic Planning Board issued yearly 
wage recommendations that held wage gains to a fixed proportion of 
inflation and productivity gains2 . In Singapore, as in South Korea, 
wage constraint invoked direct wage controls and restrictive policies 
toward trade unions (Deyo 1992b: 294). In the 1960s extensive state 
controls over trade unions included detention of oppositional union 
leaders, deregistration of many unions, and in 1968, introduction of 
legislation which formed a ceiling on permissible benefits and mostly 
strengthened the employer's power in collective bargaining (Milne 
and Mauzy 1990). 
In 1972 the PAP government supported the establishment of a 
comprehensive, powerful, state-controlled national union federation, 
the National Wages Council (NWC). The idea behind the NWC was to 
prevent disruptive, rapid rises in wages. The NWC had 
representatives from government, labour, and business, and each year, 
until recently, depending on changes in the economy, recommended 
guidelines for wage increases (Milne and Mauzy 1990: 133). Yet union 
officials also occupied high level government positions, and came to 
play a dominant roles in campaigns to promote labour-management 
cooperation, increased productivity, and wage restraint (Deyo 1992a, 
1992b). 
The relatively low proportion of social welfare expenditures in 
Singapore partially reflects the fact that trade unions, which are closely 
affiliated with the People's Action Party, provide necessary welfare 
programs for their workers (Deyo 1992a: 58). A massive investment in 
2 One result of the democratic reforms of the late 1980s was a freeing-up of trade union 
activity, and this gave rise to many strikes in support of huge wage demands (McKay 
1993). 
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social infrastructure is necessary for economic development. The 
Singapore government provides the working class with appropriate 
education, health care and housing (Lim 1983, 1989; Castells et. al. 
1990). It not only incorporates the working class into the 
industrialising process, but also creates a disciplined, motivated and 
skilled workforce to attract much needed foreign investments (Siong 
1994: 52). 
Achieved vs. Granted Social Citizenship 
According to Marshall (1950), citizenship can be divided into three 
dimensions, each of which is a rights claim: the civil, political and 
social. Civil or legal rights developed in the seventeenth century, and 
political citizenship developed with the evolution of modern 
parliamentary democracy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
Social rights refer to those rights and duties of citizenship concerned 
with the welfare of people as citizens. They were further expanded in 
the twentieth century to include social entitlements, such as provision 
for education and health care, and unemployment benefit. These 
forms of social citizenship were institutionalised in the welfare state. 
Conceptions of citizenship have had a significant role in the 
historical development of modern (Western) societies and an ideal of 
citizenship was invoked in the founding of the British welfare state 
(Riley 1992: 180). After World War I, welfare services in Western 
Europe 'came to be perceived as a fundamental element of citizenship 
rights. National variations remained great, but in all countries the 
welfare expenditure ratio grew' (Alber 1988a: 454). 
In the mid-twentieth century in Western capitalist society 
notions of social citizenship tend to be intimately tied up with the 
development of, and lately the crisis of, the welfare state (Roche 1992). 
The development of a welfare state was an attempt to achieve the 
promise of citizenship entitlements granted by 'the technical political 
equality entailed in universal suffrage' (Riley 1992: 188). In the USA, 
the generally 'weak' level of national welfare rights represents the 
different political history of America as an assemblage of local states, 
while the British welfare state in the post-war era comprised a national 
arena for the better distribution of social rights and deliberately so 
(Riley 1992: 190). 
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It is argued that there are different citizenship formations in 
different societies. Turner (1990) rightly argues that a genuinely 
historical analysis of citizenship would be concerned with problematic 
comparisons between Western and non-Western traditions. In his 
words, 'a general theory of citizenship, as the crucial feature of modern 
political life, has to take a comparative and historical perspective on 
the question of citizenship rights, because the character of citizenship 
varies systematically between different societies' (Turner 1990: 195). 
Compared with their OECD counterparts, the achievement of 
social rights of citizenship in the East Asian NICs lags far behind. 
Taking pensions as an example, age pensions in Australia were 
legislated at the national level in 1908, albeit they had been in existence 
in some states from the turn of this century (Bryson 1992: 90). In the 
United Kingdom, the Pensions Act of 1908 provided the income 
security mechanisms of the modern British welfare state (Bryson 1992: 
81). In the USA, the Congress of Industrial Organizations in 1939 called 
for a national program that would pay $60 per month to everyone over 
the age of 60 and would be financed out of taxes on income and wealth 
(Myles 1989: 38). In Sweden, a universal pension for citizens at 67, with 
no eligibility requirements, was established in 1946 (Bryson 1992: 112). 
In Japan, the National Pensions Law were passed in 1959 (Gould 1993: 
36). During the formative years of pensions in these OECD countries, 
the guiding principle was that social provision should reflect the 
equality of citizenship in a democratic society (Myles 1989: 38; Culpitt 
1992; Roche 1992) . 
Unlike their OECD counterparts, the provision of pensions in the 
East Asian NICs appears only at the end of this century. The grant of 
social citizenship in the East Asian NICs is just beginning and limited, 
with widening democracy and emerging civil society in the 1980s. 
South Korea enforced the National Pension Scheme, Hong Kong 
introduced old age pension, and Taiwan adopted elderly farmer 
pensions in 1988, 1993 and 1995, respectively (Yoo 1993; Far Eastern 
Economic Review January 27th 1994: 24; The Economist April 30th 
1994: 28; The Economist August 12th 1995: 27). While Singapore has its 
Central Provident Funds (CPF), founded in 1955, to provide pensions, 
the contribution is provided by the employee and employer rather 
than the state (Asher 1993: 155-158; Lim 1989: 189; Tyabji and Ching 
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1989: 34-39; Milne and Mauzy 1990: 32-34; Ramesh 1992, 1993; 1995a; 
Murray and Perera 1995: 235-236). 
In essence, the CPF is the way by which the Singapore 
government makes sure that the working population pays for its own 
retirement, housing, health care, filial responsibilities for its parents, 
and possibly also unemployment income, via its own enforced savings 
and without cost to the government budget (Lim 1989: 189; Pugh 1984: 
72). To support economic development the state provides collective 
consumption goods as investments in the social infrastructure, but to 
limit welfare expenditures social welfare is seen as a form of transfers 
in cash and services to a strictly tested underclass (Ramesh 1992, 1993, 
1995a; Siong 1994). Apparently, the development of citizenship is 
closely involved in the process of nation-building and the state in 
Singapore rejects state welfarism (Hill and Lian 1995: 25-27). Such a 
welfare strategy 'thwarts expectations for state subsidies as a right of 
citizenship and enforces an ethic of self-reliance' (Siong 1994: 53). 
Even vs. Uneven Development Strategy 
The Western societies generally present an even development model 
in that the development of the economy is coupled with the shift of 
relationships and the differentiation of structures, and political 
modernisation (Parsons et al. 1951; Levy 1966; Etzioni-Halevy 1981). In 
this perspective, even development is defined as highly organised 
industrialisation with complex differentiation and systematic 
organisations. However, the development strategy in the East Asian 
NICs is characterised by their uneven character (Amsden 1985; Berger 
1987; Cotton 1994: 39; Koo 1993b: 231; Kim 1994). Each aspect—
economy, socio-culture, and polity— may, or may not occur at the 
same pace. For instance, whereas economic development is rapid and 
wide in scope, political democracy is slower to develop, and socio-
cultural change is even more limited. 
Such uneven development is an outcome of the specific 
historical context in East Asia. The biggest challenge that the East Asian 
NICs faced were political instability and economic chaos with the end 
of the Second World War (Weiss and Hobson 1995: 183-190). To 
develop their economy became an imperative for survival (CasteIls 
1992: 58). Public support for the state in the East Asian NICs seems 
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dependent in large measure on its economic performance (Lucas 1982: 
220; Castells 1992). 
Politicians and decision-makers have sought to promote 
economic development in the belief that it will advance the quality of 
life, and assure political legitimacy and social stability (Goldstein 1991; 
Castells 1992). The expectation is that the benefits of economic growth 
would 'trickle-down', would minimise inequalities in the distribution 
of income, and would soon eradicate poverty (Kim 1985: 1). They thus 
advised that social welfare programs may hamper economic growth 
and weaken international competitiveness (Lee 1993: 112-113). The 
development of social welfare is based on economic growth, and the 
overall introduction of social welfare should follow the steps of 
economic growth. 
From the outset, the priority of state development in the East 
Asian NICs is to accumulate wealth via economic growth, rather than 
to redistribute the wealth through state welfare provisions (Friedman 
and Hausman 1993: 143; Siong 1994: 52). Hum. an resource 
development in these four NICs is viewed as a prerequisite for 
economic growth (World Bank 1993: 192-203). The relatively minimal 
social expenditures in the East Asian NICs and their emphasis on 
human capital formation through education rather than on social 
security and welfare reflect a single-minded commitment to the 
pursuit of economic development regardless of social cost (Kim 1985; 
Castells 1992; Krause and Park 1993). To a large extent, the lack of 
infrastructure of social welfare and income-maintenance policies in 
the East Asian NICs is bound up with their economic development 
strategy (Kim 1985; Palley 1992). 
Nevertheless, economic success does not mean that there are no 
social welfare needs and social problems. Indeed social welfare needs 
and social problems may be hidden by economic progress and may 
even be exacerbated by it (Krause and Park 1993: 12). It is clear that with 
the development of civil society and the evolution toward more 
democracy in these NICs these problems are highlighted. The state in 
the East Asian NICs cannot but give greater attention to these 
problems (Goldstein 1991; Hsiao 1991, 1992; Lee 1993; Pepper 1995). In 
all likelihood, the state in the East Asian NICs will continue to play a 
major role in economic development, and it may be more active in 
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welfare in the foreseeable future (Chow 1993, 1995; Ku 1995a, 1995b). 
Yet the state must find new ways of intervention in economy, and 
adjust divisions of welfare between itself and various sectors of civil 
society due to the formation of new patterns of state-society relation 
(Hsiao 1991, 1992; Castells 1992: 62-66; Lee 1993; Hsiao and Koo 1995). 
Social Security vs. National Security 
The two world wars this century have played significant roles in 
creating the modern welfare state. Postwar prosperity and very low 
unemployment seemed to support the notion that general economic 
growth had 'trickled down' to those who rely on welfare benefits 
(Jones 1990: 47). While Western societies have suffered from tension 
in the welfare state since the mid-1970s (OECD 1981; Mishra 1984, 1990, 
1993; Offe 1984), they supported extensive welfare services when costs 
were low and general levels of income were increasing in the 
immediate post-war era. 
Rose (1986: 14) rightly argues that '[n]or is welfare the primary 
concern of the state. Historically, the first concern of the state has been 
the maintenance of public order and the defense of its territory against 
foreign attack.' The five OECD countries removed the immediate 
external military threat with the end of the Second World War. The 
historical evidence seems to affirm that 'the transformation from a 
warfare-dominated to a welfare-dominated state has been particularly 
marked across all advanced capitalist nations in the post-second-world-
war era' (McGrew 1992: 75). 
Unlike their OECD counterparts, the East Asian NICs, in 
particular South Korea and Taiwan, remain under the shadow of war 
in the post-war era (Castells 1992: 58-62; Cheng 1993: 238-239; Lee and 
Sohn 1995: 31-34; Weiss and Hobson 1995: 183-190). With the exception 
of Hong Kong, the heavy burden of national defence has limited their 
annual budget allocation to social expenditures (Chan 1988: 39; Deyo 
1992b: 292-293; Lee 1993: 112). The potential trade-offs are at least worth 
considering, even though it is difficult to assert that one type of outlay 
gives rise to another. Yet as far as defence and welfare are concerned, 
when revenues set some kind of upper limit for spending, outlays for 
social welfare must compete with defence expenditures for available 
funds (Pampel and Williamson 1989: 46). 
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When Singapore ceased to be part of Malaysia in 1965, the PAP 
government decided that it was necessary to build up its defence forces 
rather than depend upon others to protect the new state. Singapore's 
political elites believed that defence capabilities necessarily worked in 
tandem with political stability and economic prosperity (Milne and 
Mauzy 1990: 156). Given its small size and population, Singapore could 
not neglect the question of its national security as an aspect of its 
development process. Although paying attention to the concerns of 
economic development, and adopting effective strategies to achieve its 
various development goals, Singapore was also required to give 
attention to the issue of its geopolitical location (Somjee and Somjee 
1995: 31-32). Under this circumstance, 'Singapore's defense and foreign 
policies have been specially designed to maximize its chances of 
survival in the international jungle' (Milne and Mauzy 1990: 174). 
Likewise, for historical and strategic reasons, a higher proportion 
of annual budget was spent on defence in South Korea and Taiwan 
than in other countries and this may have led them to spending less 
on social welfare. In fact, both the KMT government in Taiwan since 
the 1949 civil war and South Korea since the 1953 Korean war, have 
'faced on-going security threats from their respective fraternal 
adversaries' (Cheng 1993: 238). They have thus focused on 'national 
security' rather than 'social security' because preparation for war 
remains a continuous activity (Castells 1992: 58-62; Lin 1990: 114-124; 
Weiss and Hobson 1995: 183-190). In Taiwan, for example, the 
government announces that: 
National security is of special importance to the Republic of 
China, since the communist mainland will not renounce the 
threat of using force to unite the ROC with the mainland. Until 
that assurance is received, the ROC is required to maintain a 
significant deterrent force. (ROC 1995: 157) 
Under the circumstances, the priority of government policy goes to 
military and welfare expenditure thus remains relatively low. It is 
surely, to some extent, this 'imperative for survival' which set the East 
Asian NICs apart from the Western OECD countries' welfare 
development (Castells 1992: 58-62; Deyo 1992b: 292-293; Lee 1993: 112; 




CHANGES AND CHALLENGES 
Different Welfare Development 
A comparison of the development of welfare, in the East Asian NICs 
with that in the Western OECD countries, indicates the different level 
of involvement of the state and various sectors of civil society in 
welfare provision. In broad brush terms the state was strong and civil 
society weak in the East Asian NICs. Welfare was a top-down state 
initiated provision and it was primarily initiated to aid in nation-
building, hence the emphasis on education in particular to provide 
human capital and ideologically correct citizenry. In the OECD 
countries welfare was a result of a push (pressure groups) in 'bottom 
up' civil society. 
Existing theories of welfare state development are socially 
specific. Although formulated by Western scholars, they cannot 
provide a complete explanation of the development of welfare in the 
Western OECD countries, let alone be used to understand the 
development of welfare in the East Asian NICs (Deyo 1992a, 1992b; 
Jones 1990, 1993; MacPherson 1992; Midgley 1986). As mentioned in 
Chapter One, there are two limitations of the models/typologies of 
welfare state regimes so far provided. First, they place primary 
emphasis on state welfare. Second, they are classified by empirical 
cross-national or comparative studies on advanced capitalist societies, 
in particular on OECD countries. 
Some recent comparative studies of 'the welfare state' have 
developed two new approaches, which can be seen as a response to 
these two limitations. First, 'conventional measures of welfare effort 
have been questioned by a number of writers as an acceptable means of 
comparing welfare states' (Mitchell 1991: 161). Studies no longer focus 
solely on the social expenditure of the state or 'welfare effort' (eg. 
Abrahamson 1991; Johnson 1987, 1990; Rose 1989; Shaver and 
Bradshaw 1995: 11). Instead, they also examine sources of welfare 
provision from various sectors of civil society, even though such 
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studies still use the term 'the welfare state'. Second, comparative 
studies of welfare development have extended beyond the OECD 
countries. For example, some scholars have begun examine welfare 
development in the East Asian NICs. However such studies have not 
compared welfare provision in these societies with OECD countries 
(eg. Deyo 1992a, 1992b; Jones 1990, 1993; MacPherson 1992; Midgley 
1986; Rose 1993). 
It is clear firstly that an examination of the development of 
welfare should look beyond state welfare and secondly such an 
examination should include developing countries, in particular the 
East Asian NICs. Most analytical approaches to the study of the 
development of 'the welfare state' do not capture the dynamics of the 
state-society relation because the concept of 'the welfare state' is used 
in a static way. The models provided in this thesis are dynamic and can 
be applied cross-nationally or comparatively. In this sense, the thesis 
provides a new concept: 'welfare configuration', a new perspective: the 
welfare state-society relation, and a new comparison: the East Asian 
NICs and OECD countries. 
New Concept 
'The welfare state' has been studied for a half century since the Second 
World War, but definitions of it are inconsistent. The different 
definitions of 'the welfare state', in large measure, rely on whether it is 
broadly or narrowly defined. By and large, 'the welfare state is a 
concept developed to describe the involvement of the state in 
advanced capitalist societies, after the Second World War, in providing 
welfare for its citizens. This involvement leads to some transfer of 
responsibility for ordinary people's welfare from the family and other 
supportive systems to the state. 
This results in a blurred distinction between the state and civil 
society in welfare provision. The growing public expenditure on, and 
control of, matters that used to be left to various sectors of civil society, 
in particular the family, is undoubtedly the main feature in the history 
of welfare development in most countries. Comparisons of welfare 
states that focus only on welfare provision by the state can easily 
underestimate the complex and uneven welfare development across 
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various sectors of civil society, thus leading to a distorted picture of 
'the welfare state'. 
Drawing on the concepts of Rose's 'welfare mix' and 
Abrahamson's 'welfare triangle', this thesis develops the concept of 
'welfare configuration': a description of the differing involvement of 
the state and various sectors of civil society in the provision of welfare. 
In other words, a welfare configuration is a result of the interplay 
between the state and civil society in welfare provision. Empirically a 
welfare configuration is determined to varying degrees by both the 
state and various sectors of civil society in different societies. Particular 
attention is paid to historical developments and changing social, 
economic and cultural forces enabling four models of welfare 
configuration to be devised taking into consideration: (a) type of 
welfare (education, child care etc.); (b) changes in welfare provision 
over time; and (c) government policy. 
New Perspective 
Analytically, both the state and civil society are separate, but 
empirically the relationship between them is dynamic and symbiotic. 
State intervention or government action embraces not only direct 
welfare provision, but also the regulation and subsidy of welfare 
provision in various sectors of civil society. The role of the state in the 
regulation, subsidy and provision of education and child care 
necessarily relies on the state's political, economic and social systems. 
Civil society, in turn, can affect the structure and process of state 
apparatus through its social and economic resources. 
I argue that in examining welfare provision, the relationship 
between the state and civil society is crucial to understanding the 
development of welfare in different countries. Welfare is like a 
mosaic, both in its sources and in the modes of its provision. State 
welfare is set alongside the various sectors of civil society welfare, as a 
source of different welfare provisions. Understanding the 
characteristics of welfare provision in various sectors of civil society at 
a given point in time presupposes a simultaneous understanding of 
the state. 
This more dynamic perspective suggests one cannot understand 
the characteristics of welfare provision expressed by the state without 
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simultaneously taking into account its relationship with various 
sectors of civil society. Welfare provision of both the state and civil 
society can be identified differently in different contexts, that is, in 
different countries or in the same country over time. 
New Comparison 
As mentioned above, most comparative studies of 'the welfare state' 
focus on the Western OECD countries. The development of welfare in 
non-Western societies, such as the East Asian NICs, is often neglected. 
The exclusion of the East Asian NICs 'might help to explain one 
limitation of recent comparative studies which have focused on 
European countries and the USA' (Gould 1993: 236). 
The nature of the welfare arrangements in the East Asian NICs is 
similar to those in non-Western countries, but quite different from 
those in the Western OECD countries. The family or kinship system 
plays an important role in welfare provision in East Asian societies. By 
contrast, compared with the Western OECD countries, the low 
involvement of the state in welfare in the East Asian NICs results 
from a weaker civil society and strong state power in those countries. 
By examining comparatively, patterns of division of welfare 
provisions in the East Asian NICs and the OECD countries, the thesis 
provides a new dimension of comparison. The different experiences of 
welfare development in the East Asian NICs challenge both current 
theories of welfare development and the models/typologies of 'the 
welfare state'. 
Changes and Challenges 
There are variabilities within both OECD countries and the East Asian 
NICs because of differential forces operating. Also there are changes 
taking place now in both categories. The idea of public responsibility 
for welfare gained strong and broad political support in most OECD 
countries after the Second World War. 'The welfare state in crisis' in 
those same OECD countries led to shrinking state intervention in the 
social welfare area in the 1970s and onwards. The general orientation 
of the development of welfare is clear. Reduction in state welfare have 
occurred since the mid-1970s. The OECD book on The Welfare State in 
Crisis (1981) documented the trend which 'has materialized in the 
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form of modernization programmes for the public sector throughout 
the OECD area' (Kuhnle and Selle 1992: 9). 
The OECD countries have faced a fiscal crisis and the state has to 
some extent withdrawn from welfare provision setting up markets 
and quasi markets to differing extents in different countries (Mishra 
1984; O'Connor 1973; Offe 1984). A new division of welfare 
responsibility between the state and various sectors of civil society is 
increasingly developing. It is likely that civil society will take more 
welfare responsibilities than before, and this will become common in 
the OECD countries in the future. Kuhnle and Selle (1992: 9-10) 
suggest: 
The general (ideological, if not always empirical) tendency to 
individualize, privatize, and decentralize welfare responsibilities 
seems to have been a conscious strategy to upgrade the 
importance of voluntary organizations and informal social 
networks and to reduce expectations as to what government can 
do. 
At the same time in the East Asian NICs a growing middle class is 
creating an active civil society that is demanding welfare provision 
from the state. This will produce convergences of welfare 
development in the East Asian NICs and the OECD countries. The 
limits to this 'convergence' are due to the centrality of national 
security in the East Asian NICs and the continuing strength of civil 
society in the OECD countries. 
However, the thesis does not suggest that a growing civil society 
will eventually lead to a 'welfare state' as understood in Western 
societies. Rather, it is argued that a growing civil society will create a 
demanding welfare provision pressure forcing the state to take more 
responsibilities than before or at least to rethink a new division of 
welfare responsibility between it and various sectors of civil society. 
This is particularly true for the development of welfare in the East 
Asian NICs. 
While the similarities in welfare development in the East Asian 
NICs outweigh the differences, one has to bear it in mind that within 
the East Asian NICs different welfare provisions already exist. For 
example, the social insurance scheme in Hong Kong has taken a 
residual model, while South Korea and Taiwan have taken a social 
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security state model with increasing state intervention. Singapore has 
rested the responsibility upon employers in the form of CPF. 
These differences are due to their different history, geopolitical 
situation and the relationship between the state and civil society. 
Further divergences will depend on the extent of development of civil 
society. It is likely that Taiwan will move towards a growing and 
demanding civil society. Singapore will move less so due to its 
resistance to Western democracy. Hong Kong will weaken its civil 
society after the territory reverts to Chinese rule in 1997. South Korea 
will produce a growing civil society in increasing tension with the 
state. 
The Hong Kong Government has been extending its role in 
welfare provisions and making relevant policies more responsive to 
the needs of its citizens since the 1980s. These reforms have mainly 
been implemented in accordance with the process of widening 
democracy. To what extent these changes in welfare provisions will 
last after 1997 relies on, in some degree, the development of civil 
society in Hong Kong in the future. 
Pepper (1996: 31) shows that 'all Chinese officials reiterated that 
the 1994-95 elections will not be recognised after June 30, 1997; ... and 
that the various levels of government must be reconstituted in 
accordance with the Basic Law. Moreover, China is apparently 
interested in adopting some features of Singapore's political and 
socioeconomic system, in particular in studying Singapore's social 
welfare system (Mauzy 1996: 122). In this way, Hong Kong's citizens are 
being led through a crash course in democratisation and Hong Kong's 
civil society will probably weaken after 1997 (Chow 1995: 182-188; 
Pepper 1996: 25-32). 
Unlike the other three East Asian NICs, the development of civil 
society in Singapore seems weaker than its counterparts due to its 
stronger state control. For example, when the Taiwanese and South 
Korean governments responded to the challenges from the Western 
democracies in the 1980s, the Singapore government attempted to 
persuade its citizens that Western-style democracy is inappropriate for 
developing countries. 
With its rapid economic development, Taiwan has created an 
active civil society and a rising middle class in pursuit of its well-being 
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via social movements since the 1980s. Political isolation compels the 
state in Taiwan to confirm its role in the international community 
through economic growth. Both changes in international political 
economy and the rise of a demanding civil society are playing a key 
part in shaping the future welfare development in Taiwan (Ku 1995b: 
362). 
1995 was a watershed year in South Korea's transition to 
democracy. Two former presidents were in prison, one indicted on 
bribery charges and the other on charges of rebellion. The 'local 
autonomy' elections on June 27 showed that South Korean citizens, 
for the first time in 34 years, were given an opportunity to choose the 
chief executives of local and provincial governments as well as 
members of their legislative assemblies. The stunning defeats of the 
ruling party in the elections indicated that Kim Young Sam's political 
party did not enjoy the kind of popular support that derives from civil 
society. These tremors of transition were reflected in the increasing 
tension between the state and civil society (Koh 1996: 53-60). 
Regardless of these variations among the East Asian NICs it is 
clear that the state remains paramount. It is able to mobilise the 
necessary social resources to realise its policies and achieve its goals. 
The precondition of this takes place in accordance with the 
developmental processes of the capitalist world system. The political 
legitimacy of the East Asian NICs is rooted in integrating their civil 
societies into the capitalist world system to support their economic 
development efforts. State welfare as a means of social control is more 
explicit in Singapore than in the other three NICs. However, in all 
cases economic growth in the East Asian NICs is viewed as the 
precondition for political legitimacy, and social welfare development 
becomes the outcome of this development strategy. 
Social policy in these four NICs plays a crucial role in 
contributing to the requirements of economic growth and provides a 
means of social control. In the process of economic development 
various sectors of civil society play a key part in welfare provision. The 
development of welfare in the East Asian NICs is characterised by a 
minimal state welfare provision with heavy reliance on civil society, 
in particular the family (MacPherson 1993: 51). Thus the welfare 
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configuration in the four NICs is different from the Western-style 
welfare configuration. 
The creation of the 'economic miracle' in the East Asian NICs can 
be seen as the outcome of the state successfully integrating civil society 
into economic development. The co-existence of an 'economic 
miracle' and an 'underdeveloped state welfare' in the East Asian NICs 
implies that the distinct family-oriented welfare provision is a 
successful but imperfect development paradigm. The development 
strategies of the state in pursuit of economic growth, to secure its 
political legitimacy, also lead to some social problems due to an 
uneven development strategy. 
During the past three decades, under the rule of a strong state in 
all of these NIC societies civil society was weak. Paradoxically, such a 
successful but imperfect development paradigm in turn eroded the 
political legitimacy of the state and encouraged the rise of a demanding 
civil society in the last decade. The trends of social development show 
that the 'old' state-society relation is being critically challenged by a 
more demanding civil society. 
The changing relationship between the state and civil society has 
accelerated the development of welfare in the East Asian NICs since 
the 1980s with the development of civil society and democratisation. 
To maintain its economic growth and political legitimacy the state 
cannot but take more welfare responsibilities for its citizens. As the 
extent and pace of social change continue to be prevalent and rapid, 
how to deal with the growing demands of different population groups 
becomes a crucial issue faced by the state in the East Asian NICs. This 
more or less reflects the fact that since the 1980s the state has borne 
more welfare responsibilities for some groups, such as the homeless, 
the disabled, the aged and children. 
More state welfare responsibilities than before seem to be the 
future trend in the four NICs. While the East Asian states are likely to 
have major long-term cost advantages over the West due to the 
stronger family systems in their societies, the functions and structure 
of the family begin to undergo significant transformation in the 
process of industrialisation, urbanisation and modernisation. Like the 
OECD countries, with economic success, the East Asian NICs 
encounter similar problems, such as the weakening of the family and 
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the loosening of some traditional values. This implies that the family 
in the East Asian NICs may no longer be capable of taking care of and 
providing welfare for its members as in the past, and there would be 
higher pressure on the state to provide the necessary care and support 
for its citizens. 
As the East Asian NICs become more closely integrated into the 
global market and depend more heavily on the capitalist world system, 
these challenges will increase. Although they get economic 
achievement in the capitalist world system, they cannot avoid the 
impact of Western democracy and welfare ideas on their societies. This 
external pressure will stimulate the rise of internal pressure coming 
from civil society, and these pressures interact with each other to force 
the state to change its relationship with civil society. 
For the East Asian NICs, a balance between economic growth and 
social development is necessary for their future. The development of 
social policy in the East Asian NICs is very important and it will be a 
key part of their efforts to cope with the potential challenge from rapid 
social change. Although some welfare measures were introduced by 
the state in the East Asian NICs in recent years, the question of how to 
provide a well-designed and effective welfare provision for its citizens 
has to take into account divisions of welfare between the state and 
various sectors of civil society. It is hoped that, in some small way, the 
arguments and data presented in this dissertation can help resolve this 
increasingly important question. 
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